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This thesis focuses on understanding broader or Knightian uncertainty and its relation with financial 
risk, given the overlaps existing between these two important concepts in the economics and finance 
literature. Each chapter tackles a different aspect of uncertainty, from a different angle and using a 
different methodology and data set. For this reason, the chapters are structured as standalone papers to 
assist readers and improve readability. 
The first chapter of the thesis is titled: “Uncertainty spill-overs: when policy and financial realms 
overlap”. It attempts to identify two different uncertainty shocks along with their policy effects and 
consequences, by modelling the complex intertwining between policy and financial realms that appears 
to be particularly relevant in the European context. The methodological differences in the construction 
and statistical properties of the two proxies, used for financial and policy uncertainty, facilitate the 
implementation of a recent structural identification approach based on magnitude restrictions. One of 
the main contributions of the chapter is to apply magnitude restrictions in a multi-country context with 
the aim of identifying two uncertainty shocks. This identification approach offers several advantages 
over other alternative structural identification methods, which the chapter discusses in details. After 
estimating the model, we recover the two structural uncertainty shocks, and find they match the dates 
and timing of some remarkable events that marked the recent history of the European project. Although 
there are significant cross-influences and overlaps between financial and policy uncertainty, the later 
reacts stronger to shocks in the former proxy; in other words, it is more likely that financial frictions 
and stress amplify uncertainty in the policy realm than vice-versa. The empirical results also point to 
ECB adopting a more pro-active stance towards policy uncertainty shocks in order to prevent further 
segmentation of the Euro Area financial market during periods of turmoil, but a more (passive or) 
accommodative stance towards financial uncertainty shocks.  
The second chapter discusses the trade-off between prediction accuracy and reaction speed that 
allows hedge funds, some of the most astute investors today, to better time the market and profit during 
turmoil periods. The chapter is titled: “Trading off accuracy for speed: Hedge Funds’ decision-making 
under uncertainty”, and is co-authored with prof. D. Philippas and prof. M. Tsionas. A mathematical 
formulation of the trade-off casts the decision-making process in a Bayesian framework, while the 
empirical analysis employs different data-filtering techniques to distinguish between different 
prediction accuracy levels. According to the main results, less accurate predictions can speed up hedge 
funds’ reactions to changes in the information set. For many hedge funds that claim to maintain a low 
beta and in the same time generate profits, market timing is essential, and therefore reaction speed 
becomes a means to achieve better timing. We justify our empirical findings in a simulation exercise, 
highlighting the importance of market timing abilities for active players like hedge funds. 
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The third chapter is titled: “On herding behaviour, ‘green’ energy and uncertainty” and is co-
authored with prof. D. Philippas and prof. E. Galariotis. The chapter discusses challenges arising from 
the ongoing transition to a low-carbon economy and the portfolio choices that investors are facing 
during this process. The ‘green’ sector today looks as an exciting opportunity for investors in the energy 
sector, but uncertainty prevails in relation to the long-term economic viability of new ‘green’ 
technologies. In addition, the ‘green’ sector faces constant regulatory and policy challenges. With 
multiple uncertainty sources, investors should worry about price distortions driven by their own 
behavioural biases, which arise particularly in markets characterised by uncertainty and information 
frictions. This chapter aims at contributing to the discussion related to herding behaviour, and therefore 
learning in financial markets. In a context where investors can opt between investing in an old 
technology, like oil, and a new, ‘greener’ technology, we find that herding responds to oil returns and 
‘green’ volatility shocks. Thus, investing into an old technology requires no more than information on 
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Chapter 1  
Uncertainty spill-overs: when policy and financial realms overlap♯ 
 
Abstract 
This chapter aims at contributing to a new and growing empirical literature strand on uncertainty-related 
topics. No matter its source, financial- or policy-related, uncertainty feeds continuously onto itself, 
contaminating the real sector, and leading to identification challenges in empirical applications. We 
propose a new application of a recent identification approach to reveal and separate two different 
uncertainty sources. We model the complex intertwining between policy and financial realms, whose 
interactions create amplification mechanisms for country-specific uncertainty shocks, framing our 
empirical analysis within a multi-country model set in the European context. Stark methodological 
differences between our financial and policy uncertainty proxies allow us to use the structural 
identification approach based on magnitude restrictions proposed in De Santis and Zimic (2018) that 
offers several advantages over other alternative identification methods. Using impulse responses 
derived from a global VAR specification, we find persistent effects for both uncertainty shocks, 
including significant cross-border spill-overs. We reveal significant cross-influences between the two 
uncertainty proxies, with policy uncertainty reacting stronger to financial uncertainty shocks than vice-
versa, in line with the existing evidence on the importance of financial frictions. Our identified structural 
shocks match the dates of some remarkable events that marked the recent history of the European 
project. With respect to ECB policy reactions, there are stronger but less persistent responses to financial 
uncertainty shocks compared to policy uncertainty shocks, pointing to ECB adopting a more pro-active 
stance towards the latter shocks, and a more (passive or) accommodative stance towards the former 
shocks. We suggest that a possible justification for such ECB actions might come from its attempt to 
tame policy uncertainty in order to prevent further segmentation of the Euro Area financial market.  
 
JEL codes: C3, E58, E60, F36, F40 
Keywords: policy uncertainty, financial integration, global VAR   
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For a few days every January in Davos, Switzerland, global financial elite mingles with political elite, 
central bankers and other policymakers. Most likely, policy and financial realms cannot be completely 
separated even if one dares considering centuries of history. From an analytical perspective, this leads 
to unexpected cross-influences that amplify each other, especially during uncertain times. Financial 
stress and market uncertainties can bring changes in policies or political contexts, as much as 
uncertainty stemming from policy changes creates anxieties for financial investors. No matter its source, 
financial or policy-related, uncertainty will feed onto itself, contaminating other areas and leading to 
identification challenges in empirical applications. Unfortunately, markets and investors are better 
equipped to evaluate and price risk rather than uncertainty, which is a broader concept encompassing 
risk and requiring proper analytical methods. We try to add to the existing stock of analytical methods 
able to disentangle among various sources of uncertainty in a multi-country context, where cross-border 
spill-overs and cross-influences are expected to pose additional identification challenges.  
From this perspective, the European Union (EU), and the Euro Area (EA) in particular – with its 
rather incomplete institutional architecture –, make for an interesting case due to its high potential for 
uncertainty spill-overs. On the one hand, domestic policy uncertainty can reverberate at the European 
and global levels with serious financial consequences measured in terms of bond yields, financial stock 
prices or currency moves. In June 2015 the Greek government called a referendum over its bailout 
terms, generating chaos in European policy circles, but also among financial investors who feared a 
Euro Area (EA) breakdown; as market sentiment turned sour, Greek sovereign bond spreads reached 
unprecedented levels and the country was effectively cut off global financial markets, while domestic 
banks suffered and were forced to impose strict capital controls. On the other hand, it is the banking 
sector turmoil that echoes in the policy domain, as risks are transferred from the private to the public 
sector due to bank-rescue packages that increase sovereign and contagion risks (see Acharya et al. 2014; 
Attinasi et al. 2010; Bicu and Candelon, 2013; Stângă, 2014). Ireland perfectly illustrates this latter 
case, when the government introduced guarantees to address the weakness of the domestic banking 
sector in September 2008, right after the Lehman shock; as a result, banks’ credit default swaps (CDS) 
came down but the Irish sovereign CDS spiked abruptly (Stângă, 2014; Leonello, 2018). 
The present paper aims at exploring this complex intertwining, which is particularly prevalent in 
Europe, between policy and financial realms, whose interactions might create amplification 
mechanisms for country-specific uncertainty shocks. Whether such mechanisms work to amplify 
financial uncertainty, policy uncertainty, none or both is the most important research question we 
address in this chapter. We seek therefore to contribute to a new and rapidly expanding literature strand 
that deals with various uncertainty measures, their sources, effects, and cross-border spill-overs (see 
among many others; Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca, 2013; Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and 
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Zakrajšek, 2016; Bacchiocchi, 2017; Shin and Zhong, 2018; Ludvigson, Ma and Ng, 2019; Angelini, 
Bacchiocchi, Caggiano, Fanelli, 2019).  
We also aim at understanding what specific role the European Central Bank (ECB) has played in 
counteracting various uncertainty sources and their spill-overs at the European level. Over the last 
decade, the ECB considerably expanded its policy toolkit, took greater supervisory and regulatory 
duties, and stepped in when there was no credible policy actor for global financial markets1, up to the 
point of being called ‘the only game in town’.2 On the back of a rather complicated EA governance 
structure, the ECB provided an effective backstop to area-wide financial stress, while treating country-
specific shocks with more flexibility. This is in spite of the fact that, in many instances, country-specific 
factors have penetrated the decision-making process in Brussels and Frankfurt.  
Complex identification challenges arise within a multi-country settings, such as the EA, due to its 
significant financial integration, but incomplete political integration, where information frictions are 
important (see Freixas and Holthausen, 2004). During the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic 
banks in some EA periphery were given incentives to draw more central bank liquidity, largely against 
domestic sovereign bonds. Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli (2014) and Acharya and Steffen (2015) 
provide empirical evidence on these mechanisms, where bailed-out periphery banks hold more 
periphery sovereign debt.3 Recently, the theoretical work of Farhi and Tirole (2017), Leonello (2018), 
and Cooper and Nikolov (2018) sheds light on the feedback-loops between sovereigns and banks, but 
strong feedback-loops can blur the thin separation line between financial and policy realms.  
Understanding the ECB role is an important topic because the EA suffers from a lack of institutional 
leadership to deal with several uncertainty sources. The existing literature on (monetary and fiscal) 
policy interactions within a common currency area does not provide us with sufficient clarifications in 
this regard (for a recent survey, see Foresti 2018). ECB faces numerous and delicate policy trade-offs 
in pursuing its price stability mandate, set according to the EU Treaties. A clearer distinction between 
policy and financial uncertainty shocks could improve ECB policy effectiveness, and even shield it 
from possible legal actions.4 There have been many controversies surrounding ECB monetary policy 
conduct, especially with respect to its unconventional measures, like the various asset purchasing 
                                                          
1 Mario Draghi’s speech on 26th July 2012 has been considered a cornerstone moment for the EA sovereign debt 
crisis. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
2 See Otmar Issing’s comment at: https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/economics/2473842/otmar-
issing-on-why-the-euro-house-of-cards-is-set-to-collapse.  
3 There are plenty of other empirically relevant studies on the moral hazard prevalent during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) show that CDS for sovereigns and banks commove 
over the European crisis period, but not much before the crisis. Koijen, Koulischer, Nguyen, and Yogo (2017) 
document the home bias existing in vulnerable countries during the implementation of the ECB asset purchasing 
programmes. 
4 See the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in favour of the ECB’s Public-Sector 




programs implemented over the last decade.5 In August 2011, for example, the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) made some sizeable bond purchases from the EA periphery, especially Italian and 
Spanish sovereigns, with some positive effects on spreads in unsettled market conditions. However, the 
program was soon suspended for Italian bonds as it became clear that the Berlusconi government was 
not delivering on its promised economic reforms; fast forward in November 2011, market confidence 
in the Italian government collapsed and a new prime-minister was appointed.  
Given the large consequences stemming from the interaction of financial and policy realms within 
the EA, as discussed above, it is important to evaluate whether there are sizable spill-overs of country-
specific uncertainty shocks, and whether ECB can play any specific role. Our main contribution is to 
approach these important research questions from an empirical perspective that is able to deal with the 
inherent identification challenges that arise in a multi-country setting. We use a global vector 
autoregressive (or GVAR) model specification (as in Dees et al., 2007; Georgiadis, 2015; Burriel and 
Galesi, 2018), and a new identification approach based on magnitude restrictions, recently proposed by 
De Santis and Zimic (2018). There are other few distinct but comparable approaches in a rapidly 
expanding empirical literature aiming at identifying (different types of) uncertainty shocks (e.g. 
Bacchiocchi, 2017; Shin and Zhong, 2018; Ludvigson, Ma and Ng, 2019; Angelini et al., 2019); as each 
methodological approach has its own merits, we regard them as largely complementary to ours. Inspired 
by event studies, the identification based on magnitude restrictions was proposed by De Santis and 
Zimic (2018) to expose spill-overs between U.S. and European sovereign bond yields. However, it is 
quite general and allows for the identification of shocks from within any strongly correlated variables, 
especially in cases of conceptual overlaps, like in the case of the two uncertainty proxies used in this 
study. An important aspect in our application is that the two proxies should focus on distinct data 
sources, and rely on different measurement approaches. 
To capture financial uncertainty, we use the Composite Indicator for Systemic Stress (CISS), a 
highly relevant policy indicator for ECB, which also makes this indicator available on a weekly 
frequency, and for most EU Member States (see Hollo et al., 2010). Compared to other financial 
uncertainty measures that are probably more readily available (e.g. CDS, volatility, cross-sectional 
variation), composite indicators summarize a higher dimensional space and are more efficient in 
reflecting financial stress across several market segments.6 Broader (or Knightian) uncertainty, instead, 
stemming from changes in the political landscape, rhetoric, opinions and policies is harder to measure 
(see Bekaert et al., 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng, 2015; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016; Ferrara et 
                                                          
5 In addition to PSPP, ECB conducted the Securities Markets Programme (SMP, May 2010-2012), and Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT, announced in September 2012) were targeted mostly at countries with severely 
impaired financial markets. 
6 Various studies, such as Fratzscher et al. (2016), Moder (2017), Burriel and Galesi (2018), Boeckx et al (2017) 
use the CISS index proposed in Hollo et al. (2010) to uncover transmission channels and consequences of financial 
stress across European markets. 
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al., 2018; Ludvigson et al., 2019). The recent literature is booming with different measures of this type 
of uncertainty, spanning different methodologies and data sources. However, some of the best known 
indicators rely heavily on media sources. In a highly influential paper, Baker et al. (2016) propose an 
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) measure based on the frequency of some relevant keywords in 
various newspapers (and other commonly available media sources); they further show their indicator is 
orthogonal to other common measures of risk and uncertainty, such as forecasts dispersion or financial 
volatility etc. We rely on EPU to measure policy uncertainty, mostly because of its wide availability for 
different EU and EA countries. Our selected CISS and EPU indexes, therefore, rely on different data 
sources and measurement methodologies. A closely related literature strand employs sovereign and 
banking risk measures derived from market instruments, like CDSs (see Bicu and Candelon, 2013; 
Stângă, 2014; Acharya, et al, 2014; Greenwood-Nimmo, Huang and Nguyen, 2019; Bettendorf, 2019). 
Our approach is broader, because in our case CISS reflects systemic rather than just bank-specific risks, 
while EPU reflects broader policy uncertainty rather than just sovereign risk.  
Given the growing interest in uncertainty-related topics, we hope to contribute to this literature by 
investigating the dynamics of uncertainty arising from the interaction of financial and policy realms, 
where EA stands, unfortunately, as a fertile ground for research. The remaining of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background relevant for our empirical analysis. 
Section 3 presents the data, along with its sources and limitations. Section 4 provides a detailed 
overview of the empirical approach, along with its main results and policy implications. Finally, section 
5 concludes.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section discusses the two main literature strands that directly relate to our empirical model. Firstly, 
we discuss the sovereign-bank nexus, and secondly, financial integration and the role of information 
frictions as uncertainty sources. The sovereign-bank nexus is important because it explains the 
interaction between financial and policy realms in a single-country setting. In multi-country settings, 
however, these theories cannot adequately explain the multiplicity of interactions that exist, for 
example, between, as well as among, EA sovereigns and EA banking sectors.  
 
2.1. Sovereign-bank nexus 
The sovereign-bank nexus, which is defined as the interaction between the financial and policy realms, 
is one of the main uncertainty sources in economics. What we are most interested in learning about is 
this very first stage of the uncertainty generating process, where policy and financial uncertainty usually 
combine and amplify each other, leading to identification challenges in empirical work. Then, once 
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uncertainty arises, it propagates rapidly and inflicts the real sector affecting investment dynamics, asset 
prices, firms’ balance sheets, credit spreads etc., amplified mainly by financial frictions (see among 
many others, Arellano, Bai, Kehoe, 2010; Christiano, Motto, Rostagno, 2014; Bloom, 2014; Gilchrist, 
Sim, Zakrajšek, 2014; Bloom et al., 2018).7  
The main theoretical mechanisms underpinning the feedback loops between banks and sovereigns 
are best described in Farhi and Tirole (2017), Faia (2017), Leonello (2018), Allen, Carletti, Goldstein 
and Leonello (2018), Cooper and Nikolov (2018). We briefly summarize the two key mechanisms 
featuring in these models. On the one hand, as banks hold sovereign bonds in their books for liquidity 
and regulatory reasons, sovereign distress can contaminate the banking sector. On the other hand, the 
(implicit or explicit) guarantees provided by the government allow banking sector distress to inflict the 
public sector. Empirical evidence on these theoretical transmission mechanisms is provided, among 
many others, in Bicu and Candelon (2013), Stângă, (2014), Bettendorf (2019). While the evidence is 
clear, in reality there are some nuances one needs to consider. Government commitment to bailing out 
the banking sector depends on its fiscal capacity and debt dynamics, which explains why EA periphery 
banks had higher levels of domestic sovereign bonds in their books (Acharya, et al 2014; Koijen et al., 
2017; Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2019). Besides the fiscal costs of a bailout, the central bank can be 
involved along with the government, in which case there will be inflation and devaluation costs (Farhi 
and Tirole, 2017). 
These theoretical models describing the sovereign-bank feedback-loops are all set within a single-
country framework, and therefore cannot be easily extended to a multi-country settings, which is the 
main focus in this chapter. Difficulties arise from the lack of full political integration across the EA, 
and in particular the lack of a fully-fledged Banking Union. Recent institutional reforms at the EU level 
are welcome, although a lack political consensus is hindering further progress in this direction.8  
 
2.2. Financial integration and the role of information frictions 
For a multi-country perspective, a slight change in focus is in order. Without a fully operational Banking 
Union or further political integration, the theoretical mechanisms underlying the sovereign-bank nexus 
do not directly apply at the EA level. Therefore, balance sheet linkages that run through bond holdings 
                                                          
7 Empirical evidence on these transmission mechanisms is provided in Stock and Watson (2012); Caldara et al., 
(2016), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019). Related to this literature strand, Shin (2012), Cerutti, Claessens and Rose 
(2017) highlight the role of European banks in the transmission of cross-border financial risk spill-overs.  
8 A Single Resolution Mechanism working in conjunction with a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) were 
recently established (second half of 2014), under the coordination of the ECB, together with competent 
supervisory authorities from EA Member States. These are two of the three pillars required for the Banking Union 
to function effectively. The third pillar, i.e. a common deposit guarantee across the entire EA, is still missing, 
despite ongoing technical discussions and negotiations. Therefore, there is no central authority at the EA level 




and government guarantees are no longer sufficient; instead, cross-border holdings that reflect capital 
flows across the EA, become part of the spill-overs transmission mechanism. Most importantly, 
uncertainty stemming from information frictions gathers a more prominent role than in a single-country 
setting.9  
European cross-border banking has dramatically increased financial integration as a direct result of 
the two banking directives adopted in 1977 and 1989 aiming at eliminating restrictions, harmonizing 
regulation, and achieving better coordination in prudential supervision. Besides the benefits measured 
in terms of reduced costs and access to financial services, it was hoped that integration would increase 
the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy and improve its transmission mechanisms.10 However, theory 
suggests that financial integration does not necessarily reduce information frictions and might even 
increase financial fragility.  
Freixas and Holthausen (2004) show that integration of the EA interbank market can magnify the 
asymmetry of information in cross-border banking, creating a contagion channel and financial fragility. 
Depending on the amount of information frictions, their model allows for multiple equilibria. In 
particular, the model differentiates between financial segmentation and integration, where the former 
relates to a case where all interbank transactions occur within the national borders, liquidity distribution 
is inefficient and interest rates are higher, while the latter refers to the opposite case. The main 
theoretical insights from Freixas and Holthausen (2004) are that a segmented market equilibrium is 
always possible, but an integrated market equilibrium is not necessarily feasible at all times; sometimes, 
they find that the integrated market equilibrium is not even welfare improving due to increased financial 
fragility. In fact, more recently, Passari and Rey (2015) conclude that large welfare gains from financial 
integration, in general, are rather hard to find (in contrast to Allen et al., 2011). According to Freixas 
and Holthausen (2004), asymmetries leading to market segmentation arise when information remains 
locally bounded, like in the case of substantial differences in cultures and accounting practices (e.g. 
policy decisions to restrict risk modelling options for banks), or in local policy preferences with respect 
to prudential supervision (e.g. commitment to bail out a bank in financial distress). These few examples 
point to uncertainty sources that originate mainly in the policy rather than the financial realm, although 
anxieties are likely to arise in both policy and financial circles.11 In a similar vein, more recently, 
                                                          
9 Drawing on empirical work, De Grauwe and Ji (2013) advocate for a more active ECB role in counteracting 
self-fulfilling crises driven by investors’ fears, not fundamentals, claiming that EA fragility stems from the lack 
of a “lender of last resort” for both banks and sovereigns. Their analysis underlines the importance of information 
frictions in a multi-country settings such as the EA, characterised by advanced financial and economic integration, 
but not enough political (including fiscal and other policies) integration. 
10 Legislative proposals to advance the integration of European capital markets, along with other segments of the 
financial market, are high on the policy agenda in Brussels and Frankfurt. Overall, financial integration had 
positive welfare effects over the first decade of the common currency, as summarized in Allen, Beck, Carletti, 
Lane, Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011). 
11 Obviously, differences in supervisory treatment should narrow under the newly established SSM framework, 
where the ECB is the direct supervisor for systemically important EA financial institutions. However, more recent 
data is needed to evaluate whether this is indeed the case. 
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Gârleanu, Panageas, and Yu (2015) present a theoretical model where access to financial markets is 
subject to information frictions, which lead to limited market integration in equilibrium. Moreover, 
because portfolio diversification (i.e. participation in distant markets) and leverage (i.e. taking more 
risks) are complements in their model, a symmetric equilibrium might fail to exist, just as in Freixas 
and Holthausen (2004).  
Information frictions, along with asset commonalities, play a key role in other models as well (e.g. 
Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Allen, Babus and Carletti, 2012). Allen, Babus and Carletti (2012) 
show that information contagion is more likely in clustered networks, where commonalities in banks’ 
asset portfolios (and structures) are higher.12 Information contagion refers to bad news about one bank 
that reveal (to depositors and investors) information about bad realisations of the common factor driving 
all banks’ loan portfolios (and therefore systemic risk). They also claim that banks are ‘informationally 
linked’ as long as they use short-term financing, which allows their investors (who cannot clearly 
dissociate between banks due to opaqueness) to more easily reject rolling over the debt in case of 
adverse information (i.e. long-term financing would cancel this transmission channel). In Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2008), banks undertake correlated investments in order to minimize the effect of 
information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. Deep financial and economic integration 
across the EA make more likely a situation in which banks’ loan portfolios share a common systematic 
factor that explains a higher share of the cross-sectional variation. For example, holding EA periphery 
versus EA core bonds brought substantial profits for European banks, an investment strategy that 
Acharya and Steffen (2015) have labelled as “the ‘greatest’ carry trade ever”. These situations point 
instead to financial information as a potential source of uncertainty, with information frictions playing 
an amplifying role in this case.  
In summary, while each of these theoretical mechanisms has its own merits, there is no clear 
consensus in the literature on the most relevant ones that can explain such complex, dynamic, double 
causality influences arising between financial and policy uncertainty within the EA. Starting from this 
reasoning, our empirical exercise can be seen as an attempt to shed light on these interactions that have 
important policy implications.      
 
3. DATA 
Our dataset focuses on the European region and consists of 24 individual countries and one aggregate, 
to which we add U.S., as summarised in Table 1 below. 
  
                                                          
12 Notice that their clustered versus unclustered network structures resembles the integrated versus segmented 
interbank markets from Freixas and Holthausen (2004). 
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United States, US 
 
Note: Due to data limitations for specific indicators, we aggregate Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into a single 
group, denoted as “Baltics”. All indicators pertaining to Baltics are simple averages of available indicators. 
 
The EA is represented here by 14 individual Member States and one aggregate, i.e. the Baltics. With 
respect to our country selection, some clarifications are in order at this point. Slovenia and Slovakia 
joined EA in 2007, and 2009 respectively, therefore, very early in the sample and before the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Although the Baltics joined the EA only recently (i.e. between 2011 and 2015), 
for the empirical analysis we consider them part of the EA given their small relative size, highly open 
economies, and the fact that all three have been in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) 
since mid-2000s – underlining the importance of ECB monetary policy for this aggregate. Regarding 
other EU member states that are not part of the EA, we include U.K., Denmark and Sweden, along with 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary as three of the most representative countries for Central and 
Eastern EU with the best data availability.13 We also include Russia, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland, 
which are important commercial partners for EU; in addition, each of these countries has some 
particularities that justifies their inclusion in the sample: Russia is a source of policy uncertainty for 
Europe, especially during the 2014 annexation of Crimea; Turkey is an important global player in the 
                                                          
13 Other EU members that are not part of the EA, e.g. Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, suffer from severe 
limitations on data availability (i.e. shorter sample availability) for the main model’s variables and, therefore, 
were not included in the analysis. Aggregating these countries is not a feasible option due to their larger 
heterogeneity than in the case of Baltics. 
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war against the terrorism that generated the massive immigration influx of 2015; Switzerland is an 
important financial hub; Norway is an important energy supplier for EU. Finally, we include U.S. as 
the main global financial centre, and an important source of policy and macroeconomic dynamics 
relevant for Europe and EA.   
Our dataset consists in monthly time-series running from January 2003 to June 2018 (all data 
description and definitions are provided in Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter). Although CISS is 
available with a weekly frequency from the ECB data warehouse, EPU are available only with a 
monthly frequency. We believe that such a frequency is sufficient to uncover the most relevant spill-
overs and cross-influences between the financial and policy uncertainty, due to the latter rather complex 
concept and measurement methodology. All country-specific EPU indexes have been calculated based 
on the same approach detailed in Baker et al. (2016), who propose searching the databases of major 
news publications in order to gauge the frequency of some relevant keywords pertaining to economic 
policy uncertainty domain. Obviously, speculations about un-announced policy changes, intentions or 
political declarations can be read almost daily in some economic and business publications, but time is 
of essence in order to observe sufficient political tension that eventually features prominently in the 
news (and gets captured in the EPU). Considering our country list, EPU time-series14 are available for 
the following 11 countries: FR, DE, NL, ES, IT, EL, IE, SE, UK, RU and US. Most importantly, EU 
countries such as EL, IT, ES, FR, IE and UK, which have been the source of many peculiar events over 
the last two decades,15 have both EPU and CISS available, allowing us to apply the identification from 
De Santis and Zimic (2018), which we discuss in the next section.  
Besides the uncertainty proxies EPU and CISS, we include for each country the spread in 10-year 
sovereign yields against Germany, which is the analytical benchmark for the EA.16 As a robustness 
check, we rebase all spreads against U.S., which represents instead the global benchmark. Including 
bond yields along with uncertainty proxies captures the inherent trade-off between risk and return.17 
Taking bond yield spreads against Germany should wipe out EA-aggregate uncertainty, which would 
be reflected in the dynamics of the German bond yields, ensuring therefore we indeed capture country-
specific dynamics. To further reduce the risk that our results are influenced by aggregate dynamics, the 
GVAR rich specification allows us to include different measures of area-wide uncertainty computed as 
weighted averages of EPU and CISS indexes (see the definition of foreign variables in the next section). 
Besides weighted averages of country-specific EPU and CISS indexes, we include the volatility index 
                                                          
14 We download all EPU data from www.policyuncertainty.com.     
15 Notice that only Portugal is missing from the list of so-called PIIGS countries. 
16 Data on 10-year sovereign spreads is available for all countries, except Turkey for which we use its 5-year 
sovereign yield.   
17 According to a recent Bloomberg article, financial investors still prefer high yields, despite high uncertainty 




VIX18 – which is a proxy for global risk appetite in the literature on global financial cycles (see Rey, 
2015; Bruno and Shin, 2014; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015) as well as in the literature on global 
financial spill-overs (Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011; Bettendorf, 2019).  
The original idea of the GVAR model specification is the complex re-weighting of country-specific 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models that reduces the parameters space and makes its estimation feasible 
(see Pesaran et al., 2004; Dees et al., 2007). To this end, we use a weighting scheme derived from data 
on bilateral portfolio exposures taken from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), 
which includes cross-border investments in bonds and equities.19 Weights based on portfolio flows, 
which are less volatile than other capital flows driven by changes in cross-border banking exposures, 
are more relevant for the model’s main transmission mechanisms that reflect risk-return trade-offs 
across limited integrated markets (see discussion in Gârleanu et al., 2015).20 Therefore, our specification 
only indirectly touches on the link between international capital flows and moves in sovereign spreads, 
i.e. the international portfolios rebalancing channel. According to this literature strand (see Rey, 2015; 
Bruno and Shin, 2014; Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski, 2017), global capital flows co-move with 
global risk factors and monetary policy changes in centre countries like U.S. and EA. In a similar vein, 
our empirical specification includes aggregate uncertainty and risk proxies (e.g. VIX, weighted 
averages of EPU and CISS), bond yield spreads against Germany (or US), and weights based on capital 
flows. In addition, by amplifying the effects of foreign shocks on the domestic economy, capital flows 
limit the policy options available to governments (Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas, 2015) and/or 
financial supervisory authorities (Allen et al., 2011), therefore further increasing policy uncertainty.  
Due to data limitations for some countries, we use a fixed rather than a time-varying weighting 
matrix,21 although the latter would probably only amplify the effects we uncover because of the time-
varying profile of contagion among (as well as originating from) vulnerable EA countries. Table 2 
below gives an overview on the stability of such portfolio exposures, displaying the average to standard 
deviation ratios computed over the 2001-2015 time period; lower values of the ratio correspond to more 
volatile flows, in general, while higher ratios stand for more stable flows. As expected, most EA 
countries (except EL, SK), together with UK and US have more stable (incoming and outgoing) 
portfolio flows compared to Eastern EU, Turkey and Russia.  
                                                          
18 VIX is the implied volatility of the S&P500 stock index option prices (the Chicago Board of Options Exchange 
Market Volatility Index). 
19 Data source is http://data.imf.org/cpis. We average annual data over the 2000-2015 period (subject to 
availability; some countries, e.g. Baltics, had shorter time-series). The matrix is illustrated in Appendix 2.  
20 A similar weighting scheme based on CPIS data is employed, for example, in Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) 
and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2019), although most GVAR papers use weighting schemes based on bilateral 
trade flows. Eickmeier and Ng (2015) investigate several weighting schemes (e.g. based on bilateral trade, 
portfolio investment, foreign direct investment, banking exposures) and find that a combination between trade 
and financial weights works best to expose credit supply shocks in a GVAR including real and financial variables. 
See also Feldkircher and Huber (2016) for an analysis of different weighting schemes in GVARs. 
21 Large part of the GVAR literature simply employs fixed rather than time-varying weighting matrixes because 




Table 2: Average-to-standard-deviation ratios for portfolio exposures over 2001-2015  












    EA countries     Other EU countries 
AT 2.4 2.4 PL 1.6 1.1 
BE 2.1 2.2 HU 1.7 1.1 
FI 2.4 2.1 CZ 1.5 1.6 
FR 2.5 2.1 SE 2.0 2.0 
DE 2.8 2.3 DK 1.7 2.0 
EL 1.0 1.2 UK 2.6 2.3 
IE 1.6 1.7     Other Europe 
IT 2.4 2.7 CH 2.2 2.3 
LU 1.8 2.3 TR 1.4 0.6 
NL 2.8 2.1 RU 1.6 0.7 
PT 1.8 1.8 NO 1.6 1.5 
SK 1.1 1.0     Others   
SI 1.0 3.7 US 2.5 1.9 
ES 1.8 1.9    
Note: The table displays the mean value of these (average-to-standard-deviation) ratios computed over all country-
pairs, where the indicated country is a destination or a source of portfolio flows (as mentioned on the first row), 
therefore, summarizing in a more efficient way a full matrix of statistics where each country pairs with all others. 
CPIS data is available for all countries from 2001 to 2015; exceptions are Lithuania (data available only for 2009-
2015), Latvia (2006-2015), and Slovenia (2009 – 2015).  
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
4.1. Preliminary data analysis 
As the conceptual overlaps between policy and financial uncertainty were discussed in the previous 
sections, here we provide arguments for their empirical overlaps. As a preliminary analysis, Table 3 
below displays the pair-wise correlations between country-specific EPU and CISS indexes, in logs, 
computed over the entire sample (for countries where EPU is available), at monthly frequencies.  
As Table 3 illustrates, with the noticeable exception of U.K., almost all correlations are positive and 
statistically significant. For France and Ireland, correlations are slightly weaker when CISS lags EPU. 
The magnitude of the correlations is higher when EPU lags CISS in case of France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain and Ireland, but lower in case of Italy and Greece. We caution the readers not to 
make any causality inference from these correlations, which lack sufficient robustness and sometimes 
change with the sample size and period. This lack of robustness, instead, should be interpreted as an 
illustration of the dynamic nature of the interactions between policy (EPU) and financial (CISS) 
uncertainty, which might amplify or cancel each other, depending on the period, or the nature of the 
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event that triggered the shock in a particular country. Once we identify the structural shocks from the 
reduced form residuals, we can investigate the overlapping of the structural shocks’ time-series with 
some well-known episodes that marked the recent history of countries under consideration.   
 
Table 3: Pair-wise correlations between country-specific EPU and CISS indexes  
Country EPU(t) x 
CISS(t-2) 
























































































Note: The effective sample is: 2003:M01 – 2018:M06. The first rows display the lag/lead structure of the two 
time-series for which we compute the correlations, with t-1, t-2 and t+1, t+2 denoting 1 and 2 period lags, and 
leads respectively. Both EPU and CISS time series are in log terms. The p-values are provided in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
4.2. The baseline GVAR specification with identification based on magnitude restrictions 
The global VAR, or GVAR, was designed to simultaneously model cross-sectional dependence and 
time-series behaviour in macroeconomic data. This very flexible empirical framework was originally 
proposed by Pesaran et al., (2004), and extended by Dees et al., (2007). In essence, the GVAR is a 
collection of country-specific VARs, conveniently linked via a weighting matrix that makes the 
estimation feasible by reducing the parameter space. As discussed in section 3, we use financial weights 
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derived based on IMF CPIS data, which reflect the importance of financial flows in explaining the 
dynamics of sovereign bond yield spreads, and the transmission of uncertainty spill-overs. 
In principle, the GVAR model embeds three channels of cross-country interactions through: (i) 
foreign-specific variables, (ii) common factors and (iii) contemporaneous dependence of shocks. In this 
section, we allow for foreign-specific (or so-called star, i.e. *) variables to interact with domestic ones 
via the first channel, while in the next section, we introduce the second channel that works through 
common variables (i.e. the ECB monetary policy proxies). The third channel is implicitly accounted for 
through the estimated variance-covariance matrix in both this section and the next one. As long as the 
pairwise cross-country correlations left in the model residuals are low, most GVARs in the literature 
capture the cross-country interactions only through the first two channels, restricting22 the variance-
covariance matrix to be block-diagonal (e.g. Cesa-Bianchi 2013; Eickmeier and Ng, 2015; Feldkircher 
and Huber, 2016). However, since our focus is specifically on uncertainty spill-overs, we would like to 
capture the second-order moments of the data as well, and therefore leave the variance-covariance 
matrix unrestricted in the following analysis.  
In the baseline specification, each country 𝑖 is represented by a country-specific VAR model denoted 
as VARX (𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖), with 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 lags and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 a vector of endogenous variables. Each country-specific 
model is specified as: 







                                           (1) 
where 𝑎𝑖 is a vector of intercepts; 𝐵𝑖,𝑗 and 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 are coefficient matrixes; and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of 
idiosyncratic shocks, serially uncorrelated and with full variance-covariance matrix. The vector of 
endogenous variables 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 includes domestic variables, while foreign variables are denoted by 𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖,ℎ𝑌ℎ,𝑡𝑖≠ℎ , which are specific to each country 𝑖 and are constructed as weighted averages of country-
specific endogenous variables using the CPIS weighting matrix, 𝑊, where for each 𝑖 we have  
∑ 𝑤𝑖,ℎ𝑖≠ℎ = 1.  
For all EU countries, the domestic 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 vector includes three variables: EPU, CISS, and 10-year 
sovereign yield spread against Germany, denoted as 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑. Obviously, three is the maximum size of 
the 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 vector for EU countries; this happens because for some countries there is no EPU available and, 
for Germany the sovereign spread is exactly zero, and so it is excluded as a variable. For non-EU 
countries, the vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 includes only EPU (for the sake of notation below, we assume there is an EPU 
available for all non-EU countries) and 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑, but no CISS because ECB does not compute a CISS 
                                                          
22 In technical terms, this assumption would amount to a lack of contemporaneous volatility spill-overs between 
the countries included in the sample, though it would still allow for indirect volatility spill-overs that work through 
the complex lag structure of the model. 
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index for these countries. For US, instead, we add VIX, which also serves as a global proxy for risk, in 
line with much of the existing literature on the determinants of sovereign spreads (see the discussion in 
section 3). The foreign country-specific vector 𝑌∗𝑖,𝑡 includes the foreign counterparts of domestic 
variables, so its size is set: to four for EU countries, to two for non-EU non-US countries, and to one 
for US. This symmetric (in terms of treating the two uncertainty proxies) but richer specification for 
EU countries captures the common European policy-making framework (i.e. through 𝐸𝑃𝑈∗), and the 
common financial regulatory framework (i.e. 𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑆∗). Except for US where it is endogenous23, VIX 
features in the 𝑌∗𝑖,𝑡 vector of all countries, along with the foreign sovereign spreads denoted by 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑∗.  In summary, each VARX is specified as: 









]               
Non-EU countries, except US: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = [
𝐸𝑃𝑈
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
]   and  𝑌∗𝑖,𝑡 = [
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑∗
𝑉𝐼𝑋
]             (2) 




]   and  𝑌∗𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
∗] 
Note that foreign variables are linear combinations of domestic ones, 𝑌∗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑌𝑡, with 𝑊𝑖 being 
country-specific link matrices based on CPIS portfolio weights. We can therefore rewrite (1) as:  
[𝐼, −𝐶𝑖,0]𝑊𝑖𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + ∑[𝐵𝑖,𝑗, 𝐶𝑖,𝑗]
𝑗=1
𝑊𝑖𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
for each country, 𝑖. By staking all countries together, we obtain: 
𝐺0𝑌𝑡 = 𝑔0 + ∑ 𝐺𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=1
+ 𝑣𝑡                                       (3)   
















). Provided that 𝐺0 
is invertible, we can write the GVAR in its reduced form as: 
𝑌𝑡 = ℎ0 + ∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=1
+ 𝑢𝑡                                          (4) 
                                                          
23 Notice that there is no 𝑉𝐼𝑋∗ because VIX is available only for US, and therefore the two would be identical. 
Moreover, the simplified specification of the foreign vector for US reflects is in line with much of the GVAR 
literature, reflecting the prominent (financial and economic) role of the US.  
 24 For Germany, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = [𝐸𝑃𝑈, 𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑆]′, but the 𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑡 is specified the same as for other EU countries. 
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where ℎ0 = 𝐺0
−1𝑔0, 𝐻𝑗 = 𝐺0
−1𝐺𝑗 are coefficients, and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐺0
−1𝑣𝑡 are reduced form residuals with 
variance-covariance matrix given by Ω𝑢. 
With all variables expressed in logs (except for spreads), we estimate the model directly in levels, 
allowing an easy interpretation of impulse responses, which provide us with the main insights. Sims, 
Stock and Watson (1990) recommend against differencing even in the presence of unit roots, arguing 
that the goal of the analysis should be to determine the interactions between variables. They show that 
the VAR specified in levels delivers consistent estimates, even in the presence of stochastic trends and 
cointegration. Elliot (1998) further shows theoretically that imposing cointegration for near unit root 
variables can lead to large distortions. We do not estimate cointegrating relations, nor include time 
trends and error correction terms, also because our short sample and small set of variables would 
preclude a robust identification of these long-term relationships.25   
Our sample includes more than 15 years of monthly observations. The main trade-off we are facing 
in the estimation is between model parsimony and its statistical properties (e.g. stability, residual tests). 
Kapetanios et al. (2007) notice that the quality of a VAR approximation to the true model depends on 
both the number of variables and the lag order; as the GVAR includes more variables than a normal 
VAR (i.e. both domestic and foreign variables in each country-specific model), small lag orders are 
regularly employed. We notice that setting a maximum lag length for domestic variables 𝑝𝑖 = 3 
eliminates most residual autocorrelation (or serial dependence) and preserves a parsimonious 
specification (i.e. setting a higher lag order would further reduce autocorrelation). As for the maximum 
lag employed for foreign variables, 𝑞𝑖, a smaller lag order is to be preferred because financial markets 
can react rapidly to foreign influences (e.g. media news, uncertainty boosts); in fact, accounting for the 
contemporaneous effects of foreign uncertainty proxies is key for estimating the cross-border spill-
overs. Setting the maximum lag length 𝑞𝑖 = 0 for all country-specific models as in Burriel and Galesi 
(2018) does not guarantee model stability (i.e. all eigenvalues below unity) in all different 
specifications; therefore, allowing for 𝑞𝑖 = 1 in few specific VARX models, particularly for small 
countries (that are more likely to receive heavier influences from abroad, like for example AT, BE, IE, 
DK), appears the easiest fix to this stability problem and, in addition, maintains model parsimony and 
lowers autocorrelation further. Figure 1 depicts the estimated residual autocorrelation and the 
eigenvalues of the GVAR in the baseline specification. The large majority of residual autocorrelations 
lie within or close to the confidence bands (±2 standard deviations), and all eigenvalues are less than 
one, despite some inherent persistency.  
 
                                                          
25 Both theory and empirical studies provide evidence that European sovereign spreads are cointegrated with 
fundamentals (e.g. fiscal proxies, economic and financial proxies), which are omitted from our estimated GVAR 
(see De Santis, 2019). 
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Figure 1: Specification checks for baseline GVAR  
Panel A: Residual autocorrelation 
 
Panel B: Eigenvalues of GVAR 
 
Note: Panel A plots the values of residual autocorrelation for all GVAR variables and all country-specific 
models, depending on the serial lag; the vast majority of them (96.5%) are lying within the indicated 
confidence bands (±2 standard deviations). Panel B plots the GVAR eigenvalues, all lying below unity. 
 
As noted in Dees et al (2014), and also Dungey and Osborn (2014), dealing with multi-country 
models in general requires a different framework for conceptualizing the nature of shocks that one 
wishes to identify, particularly because of the strong cross-sectional dimension implied in such models. 
This is one of the contributions we bring to the uncertainty-related empirical literature, which deals 
largely with shock identification in single country models (noteworthy exceptions are Bicu and 
Candelon, 2013; Stângă, 2014; Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014; Bacchiocchi, 2017; 
Greenwood-Nimmo, Huang and Nguyen, 2019; Bettendorf, 2019). A GVAR specification can elegantly 
solve such challenges through the inclusion of country-specific foreign variables (and common 
variables) that can effectively reduce, and even eliminate, cross-sectional correlations in residuals. In 
our baseline specification, the average cross-sectional correlation is below 0.04 in absolute terms for 
CISS and EPU, and below 0.05 in absolute terms for spreads, with a maximum of 0.13 for some 
countries (e.g. FI, PL, ES, CZ). To better illustrate this point, not including the country-specific foreign 
vector 𝑌∗𝑖,𝑡 would rise all these cross-sectional correlations to within the 0.2 – 0.4 range. 
In terms of identification, we follow De Santis and Zimic (2018) and implement structural 
identification through absolute magnitude restrictions. Any structural identification requires a mapping 
from reduced-form shocks, 𝑢, into structural ones, 𝜀, say in the form: 𝑢 = 𝑆𝜀, where 𝑆 is a matrix that 
is the focus of any identification strategy. In practice, we are only interested in the identification of the 
two uncertainty shocks associated with the two uncertainty proxies and therefore with a partition of 𝑆 
that we denote as 𝑆2x2. The GVAR estimated variance-covariance matrix associated with the first two 
equations in this case becomes Ω𝑢,2x2 = 𝑆2x2𝑆2x2′, since the structural shocks 𝜀 are normalised and 
assumed to have unit variance. The main identification challenge is the lack of uniqueness for the matrix 
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𝑆2x2. In particular, for any orthonormal matrix, 𝐾, satisfying 𝐾𝐾




′ = 𝑆2x2𝑆2x2′ meaning that 𝑆2x2 is not uniquely identified from the data 
without some additional assumptions. 
Magnitude restrictions work by conveniently restricting the space where the coefficients of the 𝑆2x2 
matrix are required to lie, based on the simple assumption that the relative size of the contemporaneous 
response of uncertainty variable 𝑖 to an uncertainty shock 𝑗, with 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, must be smaller (in absolute 
terms)26 than the contemporaneous response of uncertainty variable 𝑗 to the same uncertainty shock 𝑗. 
In other words, when both variables 𝑖, 𝑗 are scaled by their standard deviations, the indirect effect of a 
structural uncertainty shock 𝜀𝑗 on variable 𝑖, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, is lower than its direct effect on variable 𝑗. To some 
extent, these restrictions imply that any of our two uncertainty measures is better than the other one in 
capturing a structural shock that stems from its own domain – an implication that is not hard to accept 
given the obvious methodological differences between the two indicators. Indeed, despite the inherent 
statistical overlaps, CISS is a composite indicator designed and empirically tested (see Hollo et al., 
2012) to reflect stress in different financial market segments rather than Knightian uncertainty, while 
EPU is designed to capture policy uncertainty as reflected in the media and related to government’s 
initiatives, public proposals, or changes in rhetoric and opinions rather than financial stress.    
De Santis and Zimic (2018) show that these simple inequality restrictions allow the unique 
identification of structural shocks in sovereign yields within a simple VAR focusing on EA. We rely 
on their proposed algorithm for small systems (see the Appendix from De Santis and Zimic, 2018), as 
we only require the identification of two structural shocks where convergence problems are not an issue. 
There is no particular difference between the working of the algorithm in a VAR settings compared to 
a GVAR one, apart from its different Matlab implementation and additional coding required into the 
GVAR toolbox, which is made available in Burriel and Galesi (2018). Appendix 3 at the end of this 
chapter details the main steps of the algorithm as implemented in our GVAR specification. 
The advantages of using magnitude restrictions in our empirical setting are important to discuss in 
relation to other structural identification methods available in the VAR literature.27 Firstly, the 
identification through magnitude restrictions does not impose any time precedence on the two 
uncertainty variables, like would be the case when applying a standard Choleski identification (which 
is just a special case of the identification based on magnitude restrictions as it imposes a zero 
contemporaneous response of some variables to some shocks).28 In our case, imposing a time 
                                                          
26 This means that the two uncertainty variables are allowed to move contemporaneously in any direction in 
response to a structural shock, as along as the relative (measured in terms of standard deviations) impact fulfils 
the respective inequality. 
27 It is important to mention that most of the GVAR literature uses generalised IRFs (or GIRFs) due to 
identification challenges in multi-country settings, as discussed in Dees et al. (2014). The GIRFs, however, have 
the main disadvantage that shocks cannot be given a structural interpretation. 
28 Bekaert et al. (2013) estimate a VAR specified in business cycle, monetary policy, risk aversion and expected 
market volatility, using a Choleski decomposition (with variables ordered as listed), and a combination of 
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precedence between two uncertainty proxies would be too strong of an assumption, given the complex, 
dynamic, double causality influences between policy and financial uncertainty (e.g. in the cases of 
Greece and Ireland the precedence of the shocks is reversed; see Farhi and Tirole, 2017). Secondly, an 
alternative identification method such as one based on sign restrictions would require not only more 
complex transmission mechanisms than the one implied here, but also strong theoretical predictions 
about these mechanisms. As long as the literature on measuring uncertainty and estimating its effects is 
still in its infancy, a perfect matching between theoretical concepts and empirical counterparts is 
challenging (see discussion in Jurado et al., 2015). Moreover, as noted in Caldara et al., (2016), different 
uncertainty shocks, despite differences in measurement, can have similar effects on other 
macroeconomic variables, complicating identification.29 Thirdly, Bacchiocchi (2017) and Angelini et 
al., (2019) build on the original “identification through heteroskedasticity” idea proposed in Rigobon 
(2003) in order to identify uncertainty shocks in a VAR model. While their method is successful in 
dealing with endogeneity challenges that arise between uncertainty and real or financial variables, it 
requires that (at least some) structural parameters remain constant over time and across volatility 
regimes. Forth, Caldara et al., (2016) identify the effects of economic uncertainty and financial shocks 
by employing a penalty function approach, which shares some similarities with our identification 
approach. In their case, the structural shock should maximize the impulse response of its respective 
target variable over a pre-defined period. However, although they are able to identify the two structural 
shocks, they still use a sequential identification due to reverse causality fears.  
To derive our main insights, we rely on the models’ impulse response functions (IRFs), which are 
conveniently summarised in Table 4 below. To gauge statistical significance of the IRFs, we use 
bootstrapped 68% confidence intervals30 based on 200 replications, with (a maximum of) 200 draws of 
the orthonormal matrix for each replication. In Appendix 4, Figures 4.1 – 4.6, we display detailed IRFs 
for all country-specific variables to uncertainty shocks originating in Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
France and UK, for which we have data on both EPU and CISS uncertainty proxies. Due to the large 
number of countries, and to save space, we only display the most representative ones in Appendix 4. 
 
  
                                                          
contemporaneous with long-run restrictions. They find that risk aversion decreases more strongly than volatility 
to a lax monetary shock, with both expected volatility and risk aversion extracted from VIX. Others like Baker et 
al. (2016) and Jurado et al. (2015) also employ Choleski decompositions, but use a single uncertainty proxy not 
two different ones. 
29 As the required inequality restrictions must be fulfilled only in absolute terms in our case, EPU and CISS are 
free to either co-move or move in opposite directions, and they might have similar effects on bond spreads. 
30 Burriel and Galesi (2018) and Anaya, Hachula and Offermanns (2017) also use 68% confidence intervals in 
GVAR applications, which are known to suffer from wider confidence bands due to over-parameterization. 
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to CISS shock 
EPU responses to 
CISS shock 
CISS responses 
to EPU shock 
EPU responses to 
EPU shock 
Italy domestic Significant, up to 
9 months 
Significant and 
quick, up to 6 
months  
Insignificant Significant, up to 





Significant, up to 
9-18 months 
Significant and 
quick, up to 3-12 
months 
Insignificant Significant, up to 
9-12 months 
Spain domestic Significant, up to 
9 months 






Significant, up to 
9-24 months 
Weakly 




Significant, up to 
6-9 months 
Greece domestic Significant, up to 
12 months 






Significant, up to 
6-18 months 
Short-lived, 
significant up to 9 
months 
Significant, up to 
6-12 months 
Significant, up to 
6-12 months 




















France domestic Significant, up to 
9 months 






Significant, up to 
9-18 months 
Short-lived, 
significant up to 9 
months 
Insignificant Significant, up to 
9-12 months 
UK domestic Significant, up to 
9 months 
Short-lived, 
significant up to 6 
months  






Significant, up to 
9-24 months 
Short-lived, 
significant up to 
6-9 months for 
some countries 
Significant, up to 
3-9 months 
Significant, up to 
6-12 months 
Note: The table displays a summary of the IRFs results derived for structural uncertainty shocks in the baseline 
GVAR specification. Statistical significance is based on bootstrapped 68% confidence intervals based on 200 




Some main results from Table 4 stand out. Firstly, there are substantial and persistent cross-border 
spill-overs for both EPU and CISS shocks. Depending on the shock’s country of origin, CISS or EPU 
might display more or less persistency in responding to own shocks. These observations are in line with 
the prevalence of different shocks in different countries and the narrative evidence available. For 
example in Spain and Ireland, CISS displays more persistent responses to its own shocks (i.e. mostly 
financial crises), while in Italy it is the EPU that displays more persistency to its own shocks (i.e. mostly 
political crises).  
Secondly, there are substantial interactions (or cross-influences) between the two uncertainty 
proxies, revealing the important overlaps existing between policy and financial realms. In particular, 
most EPU responses to CISS shocks are significant and quick, lasting between impact and 12 months 
after the shock. On the contrary, CISS responses to EPU shocks, even when statistically significant, are 
only very weak and slow. In other words, policy uncertainty responds strongly and quickly to shocks in 
financial uncertainty, but financial uncertainty in general does not react to policy uncertainty shocks. 
This asymmetry is surprising given the perfectly symmetric treatment of the two uncertainty proxies in 
the specification of EU countries’ VARX models (see equations 2). This is an important result in line 
with the existing evidence of the importance of financial frictions for (macro)economic policy stability 
(Allen et al., 2011).  
Thirdly, there is more often the case that domestic interactions between EPU and CISS are 
insignificant, while their cross-border spill-overs are significant, like in the cases of Greece, France and 
Spain; this could mean that domestic events in these countries have been more relevant from a European 
rather than a domestic perspective.  
A fourth result, not summarised in Table 4 to save space but easily revealed when inspecting Figures 
4.1 – 4.6 panels C and F, in Appendix 4, refers to sovereign spreads’ reaction to uncertainty shocks; 
these reactions are consistent with international portfolios rebalancing away from (mainly) EU 
periphery (though France, Netherlands, Baltics, and Eastern Europe can be also included here) and into 
US and UK bonds (along with other safe assets like Luxemburg, Norway).31 Moreover, spreads’ 
reactions to CISS shocks point to overshooting followed by undershooting their initial level within a 
two-year period, while reactions to EPU shocks are mostly positive with a slow return to the initial level 
over the same period of time. In other words, higher financial (though not policy) uncertainty is more 
likely to be associated with higher volatility in sovereign yields.  
 
 
                                                          
31 Interestingly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, sovereign spreads of UK and Ireland decrease in reaction to 
domestic CISS shocks (and EPU shocks for UK), highlighting the European rather than local dimension of the 
stress events, and the two countries’ role as financial hubs for European markets. 
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4.3. Extended GVAR specification: including ECB monetary policy  
In this section we include ECB monetary policy, such that ECB can be interpreted as a synthetic country 
of the GVAR32, as in Georgiadis, (2015), Burriel and Galesi (2018). Accordingly, we re-specify the 
reduced-form GVAR given in (1) as:   
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝐵𝑖,𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑗𝑌
∗








                            (5) 
where 𝑋𝑡 includes the common variables that represent the ECB monetary policy, while 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 is the 
associated coefficient matrix. We follow Boeckx et al. (2017) and Burriel and Galesi (2018) and define 
𝑋𝑡 such as to capture the main aspects of ECB monetary policy: (i) conventional monetary policy (CMP) 
and (ii) unconventional (UMP) policy tools, as well as (iii) a liquidity proxy; see data description in 
Appendix 1. We proxy CMP using the Main Refinancing Operations interest rate, which is the ECB 
main policy rate. As a liquidity proxy we use the spread between EONIA (i.e. the Euro Overnight Index 
average) and the Main Refinancing Operations rate. As UMP proxy we use the (log of) ECB balance 
sheet, which is the standard indicator in the literature. These same three indicators define ECB monetary 
policy in Boeckx et al., (2017) and Burriel and Galesi (2018), though here our focus is on evaluating 
ECB responses to uncertainty shocks. Accordingly, the extended GVAR specifies 𝑋𝑡 as an 
autoregressive process with lag orders given by (𝑝𝑥, 𝑞𝑥) as: 






+ 𝑢𝑥,𝑡                                                       (6) 
where 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑀𝑗 are (matrix) coefficients, while ?̃?𝑡 is a vector of feedbacks from GVAR’s endogenous 
domestic variables – capturing the response of ECB monetary policy to developments in the EA region 
(see Table 1), similar to Georgiadis (2015), Burriel and Galesi, (2018). As lag orders, we chose a 
parsimonious model matching the baseline specification and set 𝑝𝑥 = 3 and 𝑞𝑥 = 1. 
Central banks’ balance sheets have recently attracted much research attention, with Gambacorta, 
Hofmann, and Peersman (2014) being the first to popularise the use of central bank balance sheet size 
as a proxy for unconventional monetary policy.33  Starting with Fratzscher et al. (2016), there is a 
growing list of studies focusing on ECB’s unconventional monetary policy effects and their cross-
country spill-overs; see among many others Moder (2017), Burriel and Galesi (2018), Boeckx, Dossche, 
and Peersman (2017), Kucharčuková et al. (2016), Koijen et al., (2018). Moreover, as noted in Boeckx, 
                                                          
32 In technical terms, equation (6) describes the dynamics of the dominant unit of the GVAR. 
33 ECB unconventional monetary policy tools include non-standard liquidity provision (LTROs) and several asset 
purchase programs. For example ECB conducted two Covered Bond Purchase Programs (CBPPs) between June 
2009 and October 2012; between 2010 and 2012, ECB bought government bonds on the secondary market through 
its Securities Markets Program (SMP). After November 2014, ECB conducted an asset-backed securities purchase 
program (ABSPP) and a third CBPP. 
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et al., (2017), identification of unconventional policy shocks can be challenging if it does not 
sufficiently distinguish between policy- and demand-driven shocks. Given the fixed-rate tender with 
full allotment strategy of the ECB,34 isolating the exogenous from the endogenous shifts in ECB’s 
balance sheet becomes key for proper identification (see also Burriel and Galesi, 2018). We do not 
attempt to identify conventional nor unconventional monetary policy shocks in our simple model, as 
long as some relevant transmission mechanisms and indicators (e.g. real business cycle indicators) are 
missing. Expanding the GVAR specification to include a more detailed set of indicators and 
transmission mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. 
The estimation of the extended GVAR proceeds as already described in the previous section. For 
consistency, we impose the same lag structure for the country-specific VARXs as in baseline, and 
observe this specification successfully passes stability and residual autocorrelations tests. In addition, 
Table 5 below presents, by country and equation, the F-statistics of the joint null that 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 = 0 in 
equation (5). Results are rather mixed, illustrating that ECB variables had jointly varying influences on 
each country; for Italy and Greece the impact of ECB proxies falls mostly on policy uncertainty, while 
for Portugal, Baltics and Central Europe it falls on financial uncertainty; sovereign spreads are instead 
affected by ECB in the cases of Greece, Spain, and some Central European countries. 
 
Table 5: F-tests of the joint null that ECB policies had no influence on a EA country/variable 
Country: Variable: Spread Variable: CISS Variable: EPU F crit. (5%) 
Austria 3.6786* 0.4309  2.1539 
Belgium 1.6759 1.1428  2.1539 
Finland 1.6692 0.9005  2.6571 
France 1.7233 1.2541 0.9965 2.1549 
Germany  1.7696 1.8607 2.6571 
Italy 1.0234 0.9305 4.3796* 2.1549 
Netherlands 2.0572 0.7916 2.2181 2.6581 
Spain 8.2791* 2.4232 0.7440 2.6581 
Greece 3.0175* 0.9094 3.9638* 2.6581 
Ireland 0.1110 0.9401 1.5052 2.1549 
Portugal 1.9515 3.4332*  2.1539 
Luxemburg 7.1009* 2.4442  2.6571 
Slovakia 3.8868* 5.2872*  2.6571 
Slovenia 8.8777* 3.8107*  2.6571 
Baltics 0.6399 3.0100*  2.6571 
Note: The F-statistics is computed, by country and by equation, restricting the coefficients of the three ECB proxy 
variables to be exactly zero. The degrees of freedom associated with the F-statistics vary, depending on the lag 
structure of the foreign variables in each country-specific VARX model. The * denotes cases where the F-statistics 
is higher than the critical value, and therefore the null can be rejected at a 5% significance level. 
 




Again, our main insights are derived based on the analysis of the IRFs to structural uncertainty 
shocks identified using magnitude restrictions. This time, however, the extended GVAR specification 
allows us to analyse more results with a richer dynamics, including the different ECB monetary policy 
responses to different uncertainty shocks. Detailed IFRs for some of the most representative countries 
can be found in Appendix 4, in Figures 4.1 – 4.6, and in Appendix 5 in Figure 5.1.  
The most striking difference between the baseline and the extended GVAR is the reduction in 
persistency, and in some cases statistical significance, for uncertainty responses to uncertainty shocks. 
Most EPU reactions to either CISS or EPU shocks become less statistically significant compared to the 
baseline, and this happens particularly in EA periphery; meanwhile, CISS reactions remain broadly 
unchanged. In other words, with the inclusion of ECB in the extended GVAR, EPU dynamics become 
more muted – an idea that matches the positive views held on ECB policies (particularly UMP) that 
dominate policy discussions in Italy for example, and corroborates with findings from Table 5 above. 
As more significant differences arise for EPU responses rather than for CISS responses, we can 
conjecture that ECB actions must have had a more important impact on policy uncertainty dynamics 
rather than financial uncertainty. 
The extended specification allow us to infer the responses of ECB monetary policy to structural 
uncertainty shocks as well, providing a complementary perspective to our results discussed above (see 
Appendix 5). Firstly, ECB assets temporarily increase (for about 6 months) in reaction to CISS shocks, 
while reactions to EPU shocks last longer and are not easily reversed. In other words, ECB might be 
just accommodating higher liquidity needs rather than adopting new (un)conventional policy measures 
in reaction to CISS shocks. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that increases in the spread between 
EONIA and the ECB main policy rate, which are indicative for liquidity shortages, are more intense in 
reaction to CISS shocks than to EPU shocks. Secondly, the response of ECB’s policy rate to CISS 
shocks is almost immediate, always negative and statistically significant for about 12-18 months. In 
contrast, responses to EPU shocks are more sluggish and weaker. Overall, these new insights only serve 
to strengthen our conjecture above: that ECB had adopted a more pro-active stance towards policy 
uncertainty shocks, and a more accommodative (i.e. passive) stance towards financial uncertainty 
shocks. In line with the theoretical literature mentioned in section 2.2 (e.g. Freixas and Holthausen, 
2004), we might posit that ECB has tried to reduce policy uncertainty in order to prevent a 
“segmentation equilibrium”, or at least ensure that an “integration equilibrium” remains feasible. 
Lastly, with respect to sovereign spreads’ reactions to structural uncertainty shocks, our results point 
to some similarities compared to the baseline. The IFRs in panels C and F from Figure 4.1 – 4.6 in 
Appendix 4 illustrate the same idea consistent with portfolio rebalancing away from EA periphery and 
mainly into US and UK, i.e. outside EA. However, this time around the IRFs in the extended GVAR 
specification show a larger undershooting occurring between 9-24 months in response to CISS shocks, 
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highlighting the positive role ECB must have played on EA sovereign yields, and therefore on CISS 
dynamics, over a medium-to-long term.  
 
4.4. Event study back-testing 
According to De Santis and Zimic (2018), their magnitude restrictions are inspired by event study 
techniques. This type of techniques require a good understanding of the historical patterns and causality 
chains that facilitate the identification of the consequences of some unique shocks. As already 
mentioned before, magnitude restrictions are just a mathematical formulation that conveniently 
associates a causality order among some highly correlated variables. This section provides evidence on 
the suitability of our identification approach by associating an event timeline with the time-series of the 
identified structural uncertainty shocks. We draw on various data sources to identify a set of unique 
country-specific events, many of whom have shaped the recent history of Europe. Figure 2 plots the 
identified structural CISS and EPU shocks for Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, France and UK, along with 
a timetable that provides details on the most likely event that can be associated with some outliers. 
 
Figure 2: Time-series of structural uncertainty shocks and timetable of major events and headlines 
 
Italy timeline: 
Mar. - Apr. 2005: ABN Amro bids for Antonveneta in a 
first cross-border acquisition of an Italian bank. BBVA bids 
for BNL, another Italian bank. Italian authorities oppose, but 
European Commission insists.  
Apr. 2006: Berlusconi squares off against Prodi in general 
elections. The Italian Supreme Court confirms Prodi's election 
win, but Berlusconi doesn't concede  
Jan. 2013: Monti’s gov’t resigns 
Apr-May 2015: EU Migration crisis begins with a tragedy in 
the Mediterranean, with Italy taking centre stage 
May 2018: Anti-system parties M5 and Lega Nord win 
general elections and will form the gov’t 
 
Spain timeline: 
May-Jun. 2006: Campaign and referendum on Catalonia 
autonomy.  
Apr. 2007: Spanish bank Santander bids with a consortium 
to acquire ABN Amro, in the world’s biggest bank takeover to 
date. Markets fear financial troubles due to oversized debt.  
May 2010: Bank of Spain seizes CajaSur, a savings bank run 
by the Roman Catholic Church, making investors worried about 
the ongoing restructuring of the Spanish banking sector 
Mar. 2012: Strikes against austerity and labour market reform 
spread throughout Spain.   
Oct 2017: Madrid imposes direct rule in Catalonia after voters 





Feb. 2005: EU finance ministers warned Greece to get its 
finances in order and bring its annual budget deficit in line with 
EU spending rules or face hefty fines 
 Jun. 2008. Greece ratifies the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 Oct. 2011: Eurozone leaders agree on an exceptional package 
of measures to address crisis, including a 50% debt write-off for 
Greece in return for further austerity measures.  
Oct. 2014:  concerns over Greek gov’t collapse triggers 
massive sell-off in the stock and bond markets; main stock 
index down 9.8 %. EBA stress test results published, showing 
3 Greek banks failed the test. 
Feb. 2018: gov’t eases capital controls from 2015. Greece 




 Feb. 2005: Northern Bank robbery investigation reveals 
money laundering and leads to political scandal; Gov’t accuses 
top members of Sinn Fein are part of IRA leadership; Bank of 
Scotland chairman, associate with prime-minister, steps down.   
 Dec. 2006: Irelands’ biggest political scandal related to 
former Prime-Minister Haughey 
Sep 2008: Gov’t to guarantee all deposits in Ireland 
 Nov 2010: European ministers agree a bailout for Ireland  
Dec 2010 – Jan 2011: Gov’t nationalizes Allied Irish Banks, 
the 4th bank taken over in the crisis.  
Jul 2011: Jul 21, EU leaders cut interest rates on Irish bailout 
Sep 2014: EU warns Ireland that the country had granted 
Apple tax advantages as illegal state aid. 
 
France timeline: 
Nov 2004: an armed conflict starts between France and Ivory 
Cost. Nearly 5000 foreign nationals evacuated. 
Jun 2010: Gov’t announces huger public spending cuts of 45 
bn. EUR to reduce public debt. 
Sep 2011: Moody's downgrades the two biggest French 
banks, Credit Agricole and Societe Generale, because of their 
exposure to Greek debt. 
Apr. 2017: First round presidential elections between E. 





Oct 2008: Gov’t increases to GBP 50,000 its guarantees of 
British bank deposits. British gov’t bails out several banks, 
including the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS. 
 Jul. 2016: dire policy implications emerge regarding the 
surprising results on the UK referendum for EU membership, 
held at the end of June. PM David Cameron resigns. 
Feb 2017: Parliament votes to invoke Article 50. Gov’t 
publishes its first blueprint on Brexit, removing some of the 
existing uncertainty.  
 
  
Note: News and headline sources include the following webpages: www.FT.com, www.bbc.com/news, 
www.cnn.com, www.wikipedia.org, www.imf.org, www.timelines.ws, https://ftalphaville.ft.com, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Current_events.     
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
Three different robustness checks are performed in order to verify the consistency of our main findings. 
We next provide the main technical details behind their implementation and discuss the main results in 
comparison with the results of the baseline and extended specifications.  
As a first robustness check, we add a measure of global liquidity risk, i.e. the TED spread, which is 
the spread between the 3-Month LIBOR based on US dollars and the 3-Month Treasury Bills (see 
Brunnermeier, 2009). Although our extended GVAR already includes a liquidity proxy relevant for EA 
markets (i.e. the spread between EONIA and the main ECB policy rate), the US dollar-denominated 
funding costs of European banks play a key role within the literature on global financial cycles35 (see 
Rey, 2015; Bruno and Shin, 2014). When uncertainty raises, banks charge themselves higher interest 
rates for uncollateralised loans (i.e. LIBOR rate is the reference rate for interbank lending) compared 
to the yield of risk-free US Treasuries, and therefore the TED spread is actually a global liquidity proxy. 
The cost of US dollar funding has been a central element of the policy reactions during the peaks of the 
financial crisis from 2007/2008. All major central banks, including ECB, set up direct currency swap 
lines with the US Federal Reserve System, precisely to alleviate pressures from the US dollar funding.36 
By adding the TED spread as an endogenous variable to the US model in our GVAR, we account for 
changes in global liquidity and US dollar funding, providing a consistency check to our main findings 
from the previous sections. We find that the main results from sections 4.2 and 4.3 remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
                                                          
35 This is because the US dollar is the world’s main reserve currency. Similar to the global financial cycle 
literature, the international bank lending channel, exposed in Schmidt, Caccavaio, Carpinelli and Marinelli (2018), 
highlights the importance of US dollar funding costs on lending in Europe, particularly in France and Italy. 
36 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm.  
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As a second robustness check, we compute the sovereign spreads against the 10 year U.S. sovereign 
yield, which is the global benchmark, rather than against Germany, which is the European benchmark. 
The only technical change required in the model specification given by equation (2) is that the German 
VARX now includes the sovereign spreads against US, while the US VARX includes only EPU and 
VIX as endogenous variables. Main findings are again qualitatively unchanged. 
In a third robustness check, we re-estimate the extended GVAR specification with a different 
weighting matrix based on BIS Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) data. Appendix 2 provides more 
details on the constructions of weights in this case. The GVAR estimated in Eickmeier and Ng (2015) 
fits the data better when using weights based on BIS LBS banking exposures for financial variables 
(along with trade weights for their model’s real variables). Such weights based on BIS LBS data are 
also employed in Bicu and Candelon, (2013), Feldkircher and Huber (2016) among others. Yet, capital 
flows driving bank cross-border exposures are generally more volatile than flows driving portfolio 
exposures according to balance of payments statistics, and our statistical evidence points to the same 
result. Despite some important differences in weighting between IMF CPIS data and BIS LBS data37, 
estimating the extended GVAR specification with weights based on the latter dataset delivers 
qualitatively similar results. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
From a theoretical perspective, the sovereign-bank nexus entails strong feedback loops between 
financial and policy realms within a single-country setting. Instead, in the case of Euro Area, with its 
rather incomplete institutional architecture, more complex interactions between the two realms can be 
expected. This is especially so during uncertain times, since EA lacks institutional leadership to deal 
with several uncertainty sources, either financial or policy-related. Moreover, as the European financial 
markets swing between integration and fragmentation with each passing crisis, it becomes highly 
relevant to investigate the sources of various information frictions, the spill-over potential of country-
specific uncertainty shocks, and the specific role that a key EA institution such as the ECB might play 
in mitigating the effects of such shocks. 
We approach these relevant questions from an empirical perspective, employing a GVAR 
specification that efficiently summarises the time-series dynamics of our multi-country dataset focused 
on the Euro Area. We use the CISS composite indicator, proposed by Hollo et al., (2012), as a proxy 
for financial uncertainty and the EPU index, proposed in Baker et al. (2016), as a proxy for economic 
policy uncertainty. Despite substantial correlations, the methodological and data set differences 
                                                          
37 For example, the IMF CPIS data show that most countries in our sample have out-weighted exposures towards 
US, UK and LU, in this order. Instead, according to BIS LBS data, most countries have out-weighted exposures 
towards UK and LU. 
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between our uncertainty proxies allow us to use a recently proposed structural identification approach 
based on magnitude restrictions as in De Santis and Zimic (2018). One of the main contributions we 
bring to the uncertainty-related literature is therefore to identify both financial uncertainty and policy 
uncertainty shocks in a multi-country setting, allowing for a variety of contemporaneous spill-overs. In 
a similar vein, Caldara et al. (2016) employ a penalty function approach, but are not able to deal with 
reverse causality issues between the two uncertainty shocks they uncover – a weakness that we avoid 
with our approach. We further discuss the main advantages of our identification over other methods 
available in the relevant literature. In a convincing proof, our identified structural shocks match the 
dates of some remarkable events that marked the recent history of some European Union countries. 
The empirical findings confirm there are statistically significant and persistent effects for both 
financial- and policy-driven uncertainty shocks. Besides domestic effects and cross-influences shaped 
according to the prevalence of uncertainty shocks in each country, cross-border uncertainty spill-overs 
are also statistically significant. In terms of cross-influences between the two uncertainty proxies, we 
find that policy uncertainty reacts stronger to financial uncertainty shocks than vice-versa. When we 
include proxies for ECB monetary policy into the model, we find that these reactions persist although 
they are reduced to some extent, thus reinforcing the previous finding that causality influences are 
running stronger in one direction, rather than in both directions. In other words, it is more likely that 
financial frictions and stress amplify policy uncertainty than vice-versa – a result that is in line with 
much of the existing empirical (e.g. Stock and Watson 2012; Caldara et al., 2016; Alessandri and 
Mumtaz 2019) and theoretical literature (e.g. Arellano, et al. 2010; Christiano, et al., 2014; Bloom, 
2014). In addition, ECB policy reactions to uncertainty are stronger, but less persistent, for CISS shocks 
than for EPU shocks. Our findings further suggest that ECB adopted a more pro-active stance towards 
policy uncertainty shocks (and the variety and range of ECB unconventional policy measures stands as 
an additional proof), but a more passive or accommodative stance towards financial uncertainty shocks. 
All these empirical findings withstand multiple robustness checks. 
Our analysis has policy implications as well. The insights we derive on ECB policy preferences are 
only indirect, but robust and revealing. Firstly, we find that in reaction to financial uncertainty shocks 
ECB prefers to accommodate the higher liquidity demand of banks by deploying its conventional 
monetary policy tools (i.e. short term interest rates) with direct effects on yield curve and sovereign 
spreads. Although this type of reaction might appear limited in an environment where the zero lower 
bound is binding, empirical evidence suggests that ECB has in fact been quite effective in lowering the 
short end of the EA yield curve further into negative territory (see Wu and Xia, 2017). Secondly, we 
find that ECB prefers to deploy its unconventional toolkit and, in the same time, be less likely to reverse 
course, when reacting to policy uncertainty shocks, whose prevalence has increased in some EA 
countries (e.g. France and Italy, and mostly due to political turmoil). Yet, prevalence and political 
turmoil cannot be used as a justification, so arguments must be looked for elsewhere. Policy uncertainty 
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shocks also seem not to pose too great of a challenge to area-wide financial stability, which does in fact 
represent one of the ECB core policy objectives. According to our discussion in section 2, policy 
uncertainty shocks are more likely to lead to a ‘segmented equilibrium’ within the EA financial system, 
therefore justifying ECB actions. Given the current incomplete institutional architecture of the Euro 
Area, we can expect ECB to remain the ‘only game in town’ and therefore assume leadership in reacting 
to both policy and financial uncertainty shocks. 
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Appendix 1: Data description, sources and definitions 
CISS – Composite Indicator for Systemic Risk. Frequency: monthly averages. Transformation: natural 
logarithm. Adjustment: seasonally adjusted using X-12 procedure. Source: ECB warehouse 
(https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9689686). See also Hollo et al. (2012) for the 
methodology. For Baltics, we compute the average of CISS indexes for all three countries. 
EPU – economic policy uncertainty index, computed based on Baker et al. (2016). Transformation: 
natural logarithm. Adjustment: seasonally adjusted using X-12 procedure. Source: data and 
methodology available from www.policyuncertainty.com.  
VIX – the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index. Frequency: monthly averages.  
Transformation: natural logarithm. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database. 
Spread – the difference between 10-year sovereign bond yields for each country and Germany (or US). 




∗ ln (1 +
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
100
)  to smooth spikes in the time-series. Source: Eurostat.  
Main Refinancing Operations rate – is the short term interest rate at which ECB provides the bulk of 
liquidity to the banking system of the Euro Area.38 Source: ECB warehouse.   
EONIA – is the Euro Overnight Index average or the Euro Interbank Offered Rate defined as the 
weighted rate for the overnight maturity, calculated by collecting data on unsecured overnight lending 




∗ ln (1 +
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
100
). The liquidity proxy used in the extended GVAR 
is the spread (difference) between EONIA and the Main Refinancing Operations rate. 
ECB assets – defined as central bank assets for Euro Area (11-19 Countries). Frequency: monthly, end 
of month. Transformation: natural logarithm. Adjustment: seasonally adjusted using X-12 procedure. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database.  
TED spreads – defined as the spread between the 3-Month LIBOR based on US dollars and the 3-
Month US Treasury Bills. Frequency: monthly averages. Transformation: none. Source: Federal 




                                                          
38 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html  




Appendix 2: GVAR weighting matrixes  
Panel A below displays the weighting matrix, 𝑊, based on IMF CPIS data that is used in the baseline 
and extended GVAR specifications. Weights reflect portfolio allocations from countries mentioned on 
rows towards countries on mentioned on columns (country labels are according to Table 1). The colour 
of each cell indicates the share of country’s portfolio allocation towards other countries, based on the 
scale displayed on the right of the figure. Each row sums to 1, as countries on the column represent the 
entire investable universe for the country specified at the start of each row.   
Panel A: 
IMF CPIS weights 
 
Panel B displays the weighting matrix used as robustness check in section 4.5, based on data from BIS 
Locational Banking Statistics, tables A6.2.40 These tables contain data on cross-border positions in mil. 
USD, by counterparty’s country of residency, and by location of the reporting bank. Since not all 28 
countries (i.e. 25 individual countries and the 3 Baltics) are reporting to BIS, cross-border positions for 
banks located in other countries are only indirectly available as the reverse balance sheet positions of 
banks located in BIS reporting countries; for example, outward claims of banks located in Poland can 
be inferred as inward liabilities of banks located in BIS reporting countries with Polish resident banks 
as their counterparties. Moreover, for banks located in BIS reporting countries, there might be some 
differences between what banks from country X reports as outward claims in country Y, and what banks 
from country Y reports as inward liabilities from country X. To mitigate the impact of such 
inconsistencies, we average between (outward) claims and (inward) liabilities for all country pairs, and 
use bank-to-all sectors rather than just bank-to-bank positions. Further to reduce the impact of time-
variation, we average the end of year (4th quarter) exposures over a 7-year period from 2010 to 2016. 
The colour of each cell indicates the share of country’s outward exposures (i.e. claims) towards other 
                                                          
40 See https://stats.bis.org/statx/toc/LBS.html. 
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countries, based on the scale displayed on the right of the figure. Each row sums to 1, as countries on 
the column represent the entire investable universe for the country specified at the start of each row.   
Panel B: 
BIS LBS weights 
 
 
Appendix 3: The algorithm used for structural identification 
The estimation algorithm consists in the following steps: 
1. Bootstrap the reduced-form GVAR model given in equation (4) to obtain the variance-covariance 
matrix of reduced-form errors, Ω𝑢
(𝑏). An initial estimate of 𝑆2x2
(𝑏) is obtained as a Choleski 
decomposition of the upper block of  Ω𝑢
(𝑏), meaning 𝑆2x2
(𝑏) = 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙( Ω𝑢,2𝑥2
(𝑏)). 
2. Obtain a candidate matrix 𝑈(𝑖) that satisfies 𝑈(𝑖)𝑈(𝑖)′ = Ω𝑢,2𝑥2
(𝑏) and the identifying restrictions. 
(2a) We draw a 2x2 matrix 𝑇 from a standard normal distribution and obtain its QR 
decomposition, such that 𝑇 = QR, where Q is orthonormal, i.e. QQ′ = I.  
(2b) We check whether the matrix 𝑈(𝑖) = 𝑆2x2
(𝑏)
Q  satisfies the magnitude restrictions. If it 
does, we keep this draw (𝑖). If not, we go back to step (2a). We repeat this process for a 
maximum of 200 times, such that we obtain a sufficient number of successful draws. 
4. Repeat step 1 and 2 for 200 (bootstraps) times; compute the 68% confidence bands for IFRs 
considering all successful candidate matrices 𝑈 = 𝑆2x2
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Note: The legend displays the corresponding uncertainty shock that is being simulated. The title of each plot 
displays the origin country of the shock. The 68% confidence bands are constructed from 200 bootstrapped 








Chapter 2  




Hedge funds that operate quick portfolio adjustments, backed only by some rough estimates and loose 
predictions, can improve their market timing performances and benefit in turbulent markets, but 
oversimplification can lead to an inability to profit from opportunities in calm markets. The paper 
presents this trade-off between prediction accuracy and reaction speed, capturing some key aspects of 
decision-making under uncertainty. We select the accuracy levels upfront, through different data-
filtering techniques, and investigate their empirical consequences on decision-making. Across different 
hedge funds’ investment styles, our analysis shows that less accurate predictions can speed up reactions 
to unexpected changes in a large set of uncertainty and risk measures. We justify these empirical 
findings in a simulation exercise, highlighting the importance of market timing abilities for active 
players like hedge funds.   
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Hedge funds (HFs) can exploit market opportunities that are not available to other market participants, 
being able to adjust their leverage, portfolio exposure and trading strategy, sometimes on a moment’s 
whim. HFs implement their dynamic exposures to various pricing factors following a decision-making 
process based on a series of estimates and predictions that are continuously updated with new 
information. Obviously, in a market environment dominated by multiple sources of risk and uncertainty, 
such predictions cannot avoid rough approximations and simplifications of the available information 
set. Quick portfolio adjustments, backed only by some rough estimates and loose predictions, could 
increase HFs’ reaction speed, which is key for their market timing performances (Cao et al., 2013; Bali 
et al., 2014). However, information losses due to oversimplification can lead to an inability to uncover 
and profit from opportunities, especially in calm markets. We hope to shed light on these key aspects 
of the HFs’ decision-making process by drawing on some recent theoretical work where information 
acquisition behaviour determines both investors’ attention and risky investment choices (see Huang and 
Liu, 2007; Andrei and Hasler, 2015, 2019; Kacperczyk et al., 2016). This growing literature strand on 
rational inattention builds on mostly psychological and experimental work, but also empirical evidence, 
on which we aim to contribute with new insights.  
A representative HF is normally required to provide an investment alternative that offers 
diversification benefits to its clients. In fact, most HFs claim to generate excess returns that are 
uncorrelated, that is, have a low or even zero beta with some widely used benchmarks (Blocher and 
Molyboga, 2017; Agarwal et al., 2018). There is a large body of research examining HFs’ exposure to 
various pricing factors, which essentially act as proxies for different (primitive) investment strategies. 
These studies employ various methods, ranging from the most straightforward (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 
1997; Agarwal and Naik, 2004) to complex techniques that are able to precisely infer the dynamics of 
the factor loadings or, in other words, the time-varying correlations between the HF portfolio returns 
and the pricing factors (see, among others, Aragon, 2007; Kessler and Scherer, 2011; Billio et al., 2012; 
Patton and Ramadorai, 2013; Savona, 2014a and 2014b; Racicot and Theoret, 2016). Moreover, there 
is a long and growing list of pricing factors (i.e. Fama and French, 1993, 2015; Carhart et al., 2014) 
able to give a better fit of realised returns, many of them specifically addressing the non-normal 
distribution of HF returns (Agarwal and Naik, 2004; Goyenko et al., 2009).  
Such increase in the number and variety of pricing factors, and therefore of potential investment 
strategies, further complicates the decision-making process. In fluid markets, active investors such as 
HFs might decide about a change in strategy based on heuristics or intuition rather than on the basis of 
some accurate, real-time estimates of the portfolio impact of sudden market moves. For many HFs that 
claim to maintain a low beta, and in the same time generate profits, market timing is essential, and 
therefore reaction speed can be an advantage. In this context, it seems reasonable to assume that they 
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might prefer a faster, but less accurate approach to adjusting their desired portfolio exposures to the 
targeted pricing factors, thus trading off accuracy for speed in this process. We address this trade-off 
upfront by employing data-filtering techniques that proxy for different accuracy levels and allow us to 
gain insights into the HFs’ decision-making process under uncertainty. 
With the advent of algorithmic trading, about two decades ago, transaction speed has collapsed to 
within milliseconds. However, what we are more interested in here is not the time required for trade 
execution, which is the final step in the portfolio adjustment process, but the speed through which 
changes in tactical allocations occur. On the one hand, the decision process leading to such changes is 
time consuming, even in today’s HF industry, as it involves selecting among alternative strategies, 
evaluating and back-testing, and finally implementing the trade(s).41 On the other hand, many HFs hold 
illiquid exposures that take time to reverse (Getmansky et al., 2004); for example, Aragon et al., (2013) 
find that HFs seek confidential treatment (and delay disclosure) for their illiquid positions to avoid 
front-running by other investors, implying that such positions are very important for HFs. 
Consider the market factor as the most relevant pricing factor for a HF manager and think about her 
having to choose between a “moving-with-the-market” and a “moving-against-the-market” strategy, or 
else between a “high-beta” and a “low-beta” strategy in reaction to a sudden change in her information 
set. Beta is key for hedging effectiveness in portfolio management, and therefore changes in beta can 
be a good proxy for changes in strategy. A binary decision, formulated as a discrete prediction of beta, 
would require focusing her attention on a smaller subset of data or indicators, and therefore be much 
easier to take in an uncertain market environment (section 2 provides a detailed description of our 
conceptual framework). This simplification, however, is likely to be inefficient in normal times, when 
higher accuracy and attention levels are required to uncover smaller profit opportunities.  
Allowing for time-varying levels of accuracy in HFs’ predictions with respect to their portfolio 
exposures (i.e. betas) should be key for understanding HFs risky choices and behaviours under 
uncertainty. Whether this assumption is acceptable or not is the main question we address in the 
following sections. A battery of empirical models shows that strategies based on less accurate 
predictions can speed up HFs’ reactions to relevant shocks in their information set, exposing a trade-
off between accuracy and speed during market high-stress periods. To justify HFs’ swift adjustments, 
we run a simulation exercise where we show that a portfolio switching from high to low-level accuracy 
betas during uncertain or risky periods is likely to outperform other strategies. Market timing requires 
higher reaction speed for HFs and, according to our empirical analysis and simulation exercise, this 
implies accepting lower accuracy levels in setting their portfolio exposures (betas). 
                                                          
41 With algorithmic trading, execution can indeed take milliseconds, but it might take days as well, depending on whether the 
order is split in smaller sizes and allocated over time and across different market venues.  
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Although we consider a representative HF set-up when introducing and formulating the accuracy–
speed trade-off, in our empirical application we differentiate HFs by investment style to capture the 
idea that HFs specialise in analysing and profiting from different information flows (e.g. equity hedge, 
macro, and relative arbitrage). While this specialization remains true in general, it cannot explain the 
prominent role that HFs have come to play in the cross-sectional transmission of systemic stress (Fung 
and Hsieh, 2006). In Cipriani and Guarino (2008), information spill-overs can lead to contagion when 
trading activity is correlated across markets, although fundamentals are not necessarily related. In the 
early model of King and Wadhwani (1990), contagion occurs when investors, despite investing in 
different markets, mistakenly interpret an idiosyncratic signal as carrying common, i.e. systemic, 
information. We follow this theoretical strand to explain some of our results from the empirical section, 
in which we find that various HF styles might respond simultaneously to unexpected shocks in some 
market-wide risk and uncertainty measures.42 
We make two important contributions in this chapter. Firstly, we formulate and empirically examine 
the accuracy–speed trade-off, which characterises HFs investment strategies best during market stress 
episodes. We select the precision or accuracy of our beta estimates upfront, and then identify speed 
gains from within our empirical analyses. As discussed above, we let HFs formulate both accurate and 
less accurate predictions (i.e. estimates) about their portfolio betas, which are relabelled hereafter for 
convenience as realised beta, and expected beta respectively.43 Intuitively, accuracy here refers to the 
full range of possible values taken by the prediction errors for the two betas, i.e. either a continuous 
interval or some range of discrete values. Technically, the derivation of the realised beta is based on a 
time-varying coefficients (TVC) Kalman filter, which is more precise in estimating beta, but less 
flexible, particularly in case of sudden changes in the data. By contrast, the expected beta is derived 
from a Markov Switching (MS) model, which can be considered a discrete version of the Kalman filter. 
Note that the recursive nature of the two filters represents an essential ingredient in an empirical analysis 
of decision-making. The main difference though between the two filters is that the unobservable nature 
of the hidden Markov Chain process behind the MS model requires approximations obtained by 
collapsing some of the terms (therefore, implying information losses) in the derivation of its likelihood 
function (see Kim, 1994). From an empirical perspective, this rather technical particularity of the MS 
filter should reflect the lower-level accuracy associated with filtering out expected betas from the data.   
Secondly, we find that the less accurate predictions, measured by expected betas, could lead to 
simultaneous portfolio adjustments across different HF styles in reaction to large shocks that also have 
                                                          
42 The difference between uncertainty and risk, though important, is less relevant to our discussion here. However, in section 
3, we provide a full description and discuss in detail the list of risk and uncertainty measures employed in the present analysis.  
43 We label the more accurate prediction of beta as realised beta to deliberately suggest its higher informational content, and 
the less accurate prediction as expected beta to suggest a lower informational content. To some extent, the two betas might be 
also seen as the ex-post and ex-ante predictions derived from information processing.  
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high propensity to capture systemic stress and contagion risk. Our findings thus are in line with the 
theoretical models developed in King and Wadhwani (1990), and Cipriani and Guarino (2008), 
predicting that information spill-overs across various market segments can lead to contagion (see also 
Hasler and Ornthanalai, 2018). Two early warning indicators that might signal rapid shifts in HFs’ risk 
appetite are identified from our analysis: the CBOE Volatility index (VIX) and the Composite Indicator 
of Systemic Stress (CISS) – a highly relevant policy indicator for the European financial sector. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, and 
provides the conceptual and mathematical formulation of the accuracy–speed trade-off. Section 3 
presents a detailed description of the data. Section 4 lays out the empirical approach and discusses its 
main findings. Section 5 presents a simulation exercise that compares two hypothetical portfolios built 
on two strategies with different accuracy levels and market timing. Finally, section 6 concludes. More 
detailed results of our analyses are provided in three Appendixes at the end of the chapter.  
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Skilled, active investors like HFs can reallocate their attention44 over time in order to extract the most 
relevant information from many diverse and noisy sources, including market moves, asset prices, news 
and rumours etc. In the general equilibrium model of Kacperczyk et al., (2016), attention allocation is 
optimally determined along with asset prices and portfolio allocations; skilled investors prefer to learn 
more about idiosyncratic risks in expansions, and more about aggregate risks during recessions, because 
such risks affect a higher share of their portfolios during market turmoil (given the increase in 
correlations across different asset classes). Similar theoretical mechanisms can be found in the recent 
literature45 investigating the relationship between uncertainty and market volatility on the one side, and 
investors’ (in)attention and information acquisition behaviour on the other side (see, Huang and Liu, 
2007; Andrei and Hasler, 2015, 2019). In line with these theoretical predictions, we want to understand 
whether allowing for time-varying levels of accuracy in HFs’ predictions can explain HFs’ shifts in 
portfolio exposures. Assuming prediction accuracy is an increasing function of attention, we can 
suppose that a HF manager focuses only on aggregate risks during market turmoil and prefers to 
formulate her decision in terms of a simple binary choice, for example in terms of choosing between a 
“high-beta” versus a “low-beta” strategy.46 Intuitively, during volatile periods her prediction accuracy 
                                                          
44 Time-varying attention features in the studies of Da et al., (2014), Yuan (2015), Lu et al., (2016) among many others. 
45 There is a larger and growing literature strand on rational inattention in general, encompassing both psychology and 
economics fields, as recently summarised in Gabaix (2017), and Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, (2018). Woodford (2014), and 
Steiner et al., (2017) present significant theoretical contributions in this area.  
46 We focus on beta, which is the coefficient of the market factor, because of its prime role in portfolio management. Moreover, 
Blocher and Molyboga (2017) and Agarwal et al., (2018) find recent evidence that HF clients use an overall market index as 
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will be low; to simplify, it can be restricted to some discrete values to which her portfolio exposures 
will be set accordingly. In less volatile periods, her accuracy instead might increase in order to exploit 
a wider range of market opportunities.  
Similar ideas can be found in the “category-learning behaviour” described by Peng and Xiong 
(2006), or in the “simple forecasts and paradigm shifts” described by Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007). Peng 
and Xiong (2006) rely on psychological evidence that attention is a scarce cognitive resource to 
motivate learning in their asset-pricing model. They find that investors tend to focus more on market-
level rather than firm-specific information when the information-processing efficiency is low (e.g. in 
turbulent times). Hong et al. (2007) also use arguments rooted in psychology that provide evidence on 
how people tend to simplify complex problems due to limited attention and the cognitive costs 
associated with information processing.  
From an empirical perspective, we use two recursive filters to reflect two different levels of 
prediction accuracy with respect to HFs portfolios’ beta, and then investigate the consequences of time-
varying accuracy on decision-making. Bollen and Whaley (2009) also compare the performances of 
two estimated betas, one discrete and one time-continuous version, concluding that the discrete beta 
(i.e. a changepoint regression in their case) has superior statistical power in revealing HFs’ time-varying 
exposures. Unsurprisingly, the use of Kalman filters has been common in the recent empirical literature 
investigating HFs’ dynamic exposures to pricing factors (e.g. Billio et al., 2012; Racicot and Theoret, 
2016). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt that relies on (both discrete and continuous) 
Kalman filters to expose the accuracy-speed trade-off, which is novel in the empirical finance literature, 
though there is plenty of experimental evidence in both psychology and economics (some recent 
reviews are Gabaix, 2017; Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018). 
A handful of empirical approaches bear some similarities to our paper. Brogaard and Detzel (2015) 
study the asset-pricing implications of uncertainty (i.e. economic policy uncertainty, which is a type of 
uncertainty based on news and keywords, as proposed by Baker et al., (2016), which is also covered 
here) in a static CAPM framework. The studies of Ferson and Schadt (1996), Patton and Ramadorai 
(2013), Bali et al., (2014), Savona (2014a and 2014b), and Amisano and Savona (2017) model dynamic 
portfolio exposures using macroeconomic predictors. In particular, Patton and Ramadorai (2013) 
investigate how implied volatility influences the dynamics of HF exposures and find that HFs reduce 
their market exposure only during highly volatile periods. Billio et al., (2012) also study the time-
varying non-linear HF exposure to pricing factors during different market volatility regimes and 
propose a measure of contagion based on the joint probability that all HFs are in the high-volatility 
regime; other papers dealing with contagion across HFs are those by Boyson et al., (2010) and Dudley 
                                                          
a performance evaluation benchmark; therefore, we can presume that HF managers also attend most closely to market risk to 
attract clients and justify their high management fees. 
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and Nimalendran (2011). Compared with these papers, our approach investigates in greater depth how 
the decision process is affected when we allow for different accuracy levels in the real-time estimation 
of portfolio exposures.  
Another related strand in the empirical literature focuses on forecast combinations as a means of 
improving forecasting accuracy in the presence of structural changes, implying a well-known trade-off 
between bias and variance (Pesaran and Timmermann, 2007; Clark and McCracken, 2009). Our 
emphasis instead is not on improving HFs’ (possible) forecasting models, but on evaluating the 
consequences of varying prediction accuracy levels on decisions.  
Our work relates to the experimental literature as well, as recently summarised in Spiliopoulos and 
Ortmann (2018). A closely related strand is the literature dealing with “learning-to-forecast” 
experiments, as described by Hommes et al. (2005) and Heemeijer et al. (2009). Pastor and Stambaugh’s 
(2009) show how a Bayesian investor can exploit model design and misspecification to improve 
prediction accuracy, even when “imperfect predictors” are available. In contrast to these papers, the ex-
post forecasting ability of HFs is not the main focus of our analysis. 
Finally, we touch on the literature strand concerned with contagion and information spill-overs. King 
and Wadhawani’s (1990) model provides a theoretical channel through which a signal extraction 
“mistake” in one market can be transmitted to all other markets (i.e. separated by the non-overlapping 
trading hours in the original model) because agents cannot clearly differentiate between systemic and 
idiosyncratic information signals, or shocks (see also Cipriani and Guarino, 2008). In a similar vein, 
Hasler and Ornthanalai (2018) highlight the role of information spill-overs in amplifying contagion 
because increased investors’ attention can lead to correlated trades executed across separate markets. 
 
2.1 Mathematical formulation 
Modelling the reactions of every HF in a precise way is, naturally, an impossible task. Consider the 
problem of a representative HF manager updating her prior belief distribution to a posterior, when the 
parameters of interest are given via a loss function, say 𝐿(𝑅, 𝑉; 𝜃), where 𝑅 is a vector of the 
characteristics related to returns, 𝑉 is a vector of the characteristics related to volatility and 𝜃 is a 
parameter vector unknown to the HF. Bissiri et al. (2016) show that rational agents can update 𝜃 under 
such circumstances without full information on the data-generating process. Following Bissiri et al. 
(2016), we assume that 𝑝(𝜃) represents prior beliefs about the parameters 𝜃 and, hence, a Bayesian 
posterior/update of the beliefs about the parameters can be made using: 
𝑝(𝜃|𝑅, 𝑉) ∝ 𝑝(𝜃)  exp(−𝐿(𝑅, 𝑉; 𝜃)) (1) 
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In other words, we have a well-defined parameter of interest 𝜃 and an initial belief distribution about 
the location of the parameter 𝑝(𝜃); in this case the loss function defines a likelihood on which the HF 
manager can rely to update information. Clearly, this provides a basis for Bayesian learning by using 
belief probability distributions based on a solid foundation (loss) for which managers, generally, have 
a clear notion. Bayesian learning features in the theoretical models of Andrei and Hasler (2015) and 
Kacperczyk et al., (2016) as well. Thus, we can say that for some function 𝜓, we must have:  
𝑝(𝜃|𝑅, 𝑉) = 𝜓 [𝐿(𝑅, 𝑉; 𝜃), 𝑝(𝜃)] (2) 
Consider now the updating of manager’s subjective beliefs, 𝑝(𝜃|𝑅, 𝑉), as an action made under 
uncertainty using decision theory to guide the optimal action. To assess her ability to outperform the 
market, assume the HF manager focuses on just two parameters, say 𝜁 and 𝜉, that proxy for her 
selectivity and market timing abilities (Ferson and Schadt, 1996). Consequently, there is a subjective 
loss function 𝐿(𝜁𝑡, 𝜉𝑡; 𝜃) with selectivity (𝜁𝑡) and market timing (𝜉𝑡) both specified as time-varying. 
Given a prior 𝑝(𝜃), an optimal posterior distribution, say 𝑣∗(𝜃), is obtained by minimizing expected 
loss, in which case we have a general form: 𝑣∗(𝜃)= 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣[𝐿(𝜁𝑡 , 𝜉𝑡; 𝜃)].  
Based on the same information set and by imposing the same basic model structure, let us consider 
now the loss function 𝐿𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑓, 𝑝}, as follows: (i) 𝐿𝑓 is an approximation of the manager’s loss 
function under full information, and can be taken to be the current-period expectation of an inter-
temporal loss function; and (ii) 𝐿𝑝 is the approximation of the manager’s loss function under partial 
(incomplete) information. Denote as 𝐼𝑡−1 the information set up to period 𝑡 − 1; therefore, updated 
beliefs are given as:  
𝑝(𝜁𝑡 , 𝜉𝑡 , 𝜃|𝐼
𝑡−1) ∝ 𝑝(𝜁𝑡−1, 𝜉𝑡−1, 𝜃)  exp(−𝐿𝑖(𝜁𝑡, 𝜉𝑡; 𝜃)) (3) 
Here, we update information on selectivity, market timing and any structural parameters, 𝜃, based 
on a prior 𝑝(𝜃) and a subjective loss function, 𝐿𝑖(𝜁𝑡 , 𝜉𝑡; 𝜃)) under a Bayesian process. Although 
𝑝(𝜁𝑡−1, 𝜉𝑡−1, 𝜃) can be any prior, it can be defined more reasonably as the posterior from the previous 
period. This specification implies that we can formulate a suitable model on selectivity and market 
timing and proceed with the usual methods of Bayesian inference. If prior 𝑝(𝜃) is diffused or “loose” 
(relative to the likelihood), standard frequent methods can be used to estimate 𝜃 as well as 𝜁𝑡 , 𝜉𝑡 , for 
example through the use of a Kalman filter. Depending on the prior specification, we make a distinction 
between the realised and expected betas, such that market timing will be dealt with separately in the 
estimation. With respect to selectivity, our formulation implies that HF managers draw on the market 




Our data set comes from different sources and includes weekly observations for a period spanning from 
the beginning of July 2004 until the end of May 2017. The timespan is rich enough to include many of 
the most significant economic and financial stress events that have affected the global financial industry 
and reverberated across the investable universe of a representative HF, including events originating in 
the US, Europe, and elsewhere.47 Moreover, besides financial triggers, the sample includes recent social 
and political events that were relevant to the HF industry and have generated significant market 
reactions, such as the Brexit referendum (June 2016), the latest US presidential election (November 
2016), terrorist attacks (e.g. in Paris, London, etc.), and so on.  
To compute HFs’ weekly average returns, we use data provided by Hedge Fund Research 
(henceforth HFR), which has constructed a robust classification system that includes a strategy, sub-
strategy, and regional investment focus. Billio et al. (2009) provide a full description of the various 
statistical aspects of the data provided by different HF data sets, including HFR; when analysing 
differences in the distributional properties of HF returns at both daily and monthly frequencies, they 
find larger deviations from normality for monthly rather than daily returns. Patton and Ramadorai 
(2013) analyse similar issues and find that the intra-month variation in HFs’ portfolio exposures is 
significant, because, as long as HFs report on a voluntary basis (normally at the end of the month), they 
have a strong incentive to engage in window dressing. Based on the above, and the fact that some of 
the most important indicators on which we condition the decision-making process in our empirical 
analysis are available only on a weekly basis, we choose to use weekly observations in the empirical 
analysis. 
Self-selection, backfilling, and survivorship biases are quite common in the HF industry, but some 
of them, especially the last two, could be mitigated by using investable (rather than non-investable) 
benchmarks. Our empirical analysis focuses mainly on four investable HF main styles, which are 
captured by the following indexes: (i) the HFRX Event Driven Index, denoted by ED; (ii) the HFRX 
Equity Hedge Index, denoted by EH; (iii) the HFRX Macro/CTA Index, denoted by M; and (iv) the 
HFRX Relative Value Arbitrage Index, denoted by RVA. Since we are using aggregated (index) data, 
the returns can be considered the returns of a representative HF that follows a given investment style, 
                                                          
47  Among the most important economic stress events covered in our data set, we can recount here the US subprime mortgage 
crisis that erupted in August 2007, the Lehman Brothers’ moment of September 2008, the start of the European sovereign debt 
crisis in May 2010, the three quantitative easing (QE) programmes implemented by the FED (e.g. 2008, 2009, and 2012), the 
liquidity support programmes of the ECB, and so on.  
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for example ED, EH, M, or RVA. In a robustness check, we employ nine HF sub-styles (of the four main 
styles mentioned above), for which weekly data are available from the same data source.48  
We compute the excess HF weekly returns using a risk-free rate proxy. To better reflect the HFs’ 
investable universe and have a basis for comparison among them, we estimate specifications with global 
(and not just US-based) risk-free rates and global pricing factors, which we download from Kenneth R. 
French’s website.49 For simplicity, we use the CAPM model as a workhorse specification throughout 
the paper, but our approach is robust and can accommodate other factors as well.50 
There is a continuous and growing interest in the literature in how to measure risk and uncertainty. 
We take no stand on which measure is best and use a range of indicators that are already available in 
the literature. We split the various available risk and uncertainty measures into three broad groups. A 
majority of these measures refer to the US market, as it is the most liquid and sophisticated financial 
market worldwide. Nevertheless, we include risk and uncertainty measures that have global or European 
coverage, the latter being particularly useful in exposing some important stress events originating in 
Europe during our sample period.  
Group A: Uncertainty measures based on media sources  
There has been a significant increase in the number of available indicators measuring uncertainty 
based on (text) information accessible via the Internet from various newspapers and other media 
sources. The success of these indicators seems to come from their ability to reflect, with high 
frequencies, agents’ behaviour in relation to news, events, and other media-related factors (see, among 
others, Pastor and Veronesi, 2012; Da et al., 2014; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015; Baker et al., 2016). For 
our empirical analysis, we focus on three measures, which come from Baker et al. (2016) and are based 
on the frequency of some relevant keywords appearing in newspapers and major media sources in the 
US and across the globe. The first two measures refer to the US and the third is a global one; the three 
                                                          
48 HFR utilises a methodology based on certain well-defined, predetermined rules and objective criteria to select and rebalance 
index components and maximise the representation of the HF investable universe. The construction of each index employs 
state-of-the-art quantitative techniques and qualitative analysis (i.e. multi-level screening, cluster analysis, Monte Carlo 
simulations, optimisation techniques, etc.), which ensure that each index is a pure representation of its corresponding HF 
investment style. A detailed description of HFR styles and sub-styles can be found in Table B1, in Appendix B. More details 
of the description of the HFR investment styles can be found at: https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/hfrx-index-
characteristics.  
49 Using US-based pricing factors does not significantly alter the results or the conclusions of our analysis.  
Source : http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
50 As an alternative specification, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) produces very similar results (which we 
do not present here to save space), because betas are not significantly altered by the inclusion of additional (pricing) factors.  
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indicators are: economic policy uncertainty, denoted by EPU; US equity market uncertainty, denoted 
by EQU; and global political risk, denoted by GPR.51  
Group B: Market-based risk measures 
This second group refers to market-based indicators of risk, which are commonly used in many 
empirical exercises. We firstly use the VIX (i.e. Volatility Index) and TYVIX (i.e. Treasury Yields 
Volatility Index), which are provided by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and are 
available from the Bloomberg database. Even though the VIX is the most followed measure of implied 
volatility, commonly referred to as “the fear index”, the TYVIX is equally important for active players 
like HFs, because it covers the most liquid segment of the financial market, that is, the fixed-income 
market. While equity volatility (VIX) can be specified exogenously, government bond volatility needs 
to fulfil “no-arbitrage” restrictions and to be consistent with the dynamics of the whole yield curve.  
We also include in this group the volatility risk premium (or variance premium) denoted 𝑉𝑃, which 
is defined as the difference between the ex-ante risk-neutral expectation of the future return variation 
and the ex-post realised return variation over a specific period (we chose 𝑛𝑚 = 10 days), in line with 
Bollerslev et al. (2009). The variance premium is given by 𝑉𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡. The first term (𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡) is 
proxied by the square of the respective model-free implied volatility index, in our case the VIX, while 
the second term is proxied by the ex-post realised return variation of the underlying index, in our case 
the S&P 500 Index.52 The term 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 denotes the recorded closing value of the implied volatility index 
squared for the last trading day of period 𝑡, which also represents the market participants’ expectation 
of the future realised variance of the underlying benchmark index in time period 𝑡. The term 𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡 





𝑡=1 , where 𝑟 is the daily return of 
the underlying S&P 500 Equity Index and 𝑛𝑚 = 10 is the number of trading days in a year (i.e. we use 
the 252-day counting convention). Higher levels of implied volatility refer to upcoming volatile periods. 
However, historical observations show that implied volatility tends to overestimate future realised 
volatility, as most portfolio managers generally dislike variance; the volatility risk premium is shown 
to be a good proxy for market sentiment (Bollerslev et al., 2009).  
Group C: Constructed measures of (systemic) risk 
For the US market, a commonly used measure to track systemic stress is the Financial Stress Index 
(FSI), constructed by the St. Louis Fed and available on a weekly basis. It is an equal-variance weighted 
                                                          
51 All the data and methodology notes are available at www.policyuncertainty.com. Only EQU is available on a daily basis; 
therefore, we interpolate the other two, that is, EPU and GPR, using the Denton method from a monthly into a weekly 
frequency, relying on the EPU intra-month variation.  
52 We compute the VP in relation only to the VIX and not to the TYVIX, as the market for derivatives based on the TYVIX is 
less liquid than the market for derivatives based on the VIX.  
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average of eighteen explanatory variables, capturing various aspects of risk and uncertainty in different 
segments of the market.53 The FSI is constructed using principal component analysis, in which it is 
assumed that financial stress is the primary factor influencing the co-movement of all these variables. 
A similar financial stress indicator (with weekly availability) is the Composite Indicator of Systemic 
Stress (CISS), which captures instability in the financial system of the euro area (Hollo et al., 2012). 
The aggregation method takes into account the time-varying cross-correlations between the sub-indices. 
Therefore, the CISS puts relatively more weight on situations in which stress prevails in several market 
segments simultaneously.54  
Finally, Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2014) propose a set of financial stress measures that, within the 
relevant literature, are normally referred to with the label connectedness. Grounded in modern network 
theories but drawing on variance decomposition methods, these measures quantify the spillovers arising 
between financial intermediaries, and between financial markets for various instruments. The three 
measures of connectedness that we retain for our analysis55 are computed for: (i) global equity markets 
(denoted ConnEQ); (ii) global foreign exchange markets (denoted ConnFX); and (iii) global sovereign 
bond markets (denoted ConnSB). 
 
The list of uncertainty and risk measures described above is inherently limited. However, the 
relevance of our empirical approach is not restricted by the list of selected indicators, which can 
obviously be expanded with new additions. Nevertheless, the selected measures cover a broad range of 
indicators from different sources and based on different methodologies. Moreover, all these risk and 
uncertainty measures have high (absolute) values for skewness and kurtosis, confirming their high 
sensitivity to stress events.56 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Using the theory-based CAPM, one can specify the excess (over the risk-free rate) HF returns as: 
[𝑅𝐻𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑡 (4) 
                                                          
53 Three main categories of indicators are included: (a) interest rates (e.g. federal funds rates, short- and long-term Treasury 
rates, corporate bond yields, etc.); (b) yield spreads; and (c) other indicators (e.g. market volatility indices). Source: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI.  
54 The CISS includes fifteen market-based financial stress measures for the financial intermediary sector, money markets, 
equity markets, bond markets, and foreign exchange markets. 
55 Daily data are available since 2004 and are downloaded from http://financialconnectedness.org/data.html.  
56 A detailed description of the summary statistics can be found in Table B2 from Appendix B. 
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where 𝑅𝐻𝐹 is the weekly return on a HF-style index portfolio, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate return, 𝑀𝑘𝑡 is the 
return on the market portfolio, 𝑡 is the time index and 𝜖𝑡 is the error term. The factor loading, denoted 
by 𝛽, would capture the portfolio’s exposure to the market portfolio, while 𝛼 is a measure of the 
portfolio’s abnormal returns.  
Coefficient 𝛽 is a well-known measure used in portfolio management. Blocher and Molyboga (2017) 
and Agarwal et al. (2018) argue that HF clients prefer to use simple models to evaluate HFs performance 
rather than models with many (and more complex) pricing factors. Intuitively, it can be inferred simply 
by comparing the observed returns of a specific investment strategy with the returns of a broad market 
index. There is a wide consensus that most actively managed investment funds, particularly HFs, face 
very few investment constraints, and hence their exposures to pricing factors are essentially dynamic; 
that is, the factor loadings are not constant over time (see Billio et al., 2012; Savona, 2014a and 2014b; 
Racicot and Theoret, 2016; Amisano and Savona, 2017). In this context, our empirical framework can 
be split into two steps. In the first step, we apply data filters to extract the time-varying counterparts of 
𝛽′s from equation (4), the so-called betas, from the observed (excess) HF returns. In the second step, 
we employ a series of multivariate models that allows us to analyse the complex interactions between 
betas and changes in the information set, which we proxy using various risk and uncertainty measures. 
Appendix A relaxes the assumptions required for inference in a CAPM structure by considering a non-
parametric filter for beta; according to our findings, in the case of HF returns any estimate of beta is 
likely to have nonlinear interactions with some of the risk/uncertainty measures described in section 3.   
 
 
4.1 Discrete and time-continuous filters of betas  
In this section we rely on the mathematical formulation of our conceptual idea (as detailed in section 2) 
casting the representative HF decision-making problem in a Bayesian framework. The implementation 
is a juxtaposition of: (i) a discrete filter, implemented as a Markov Switching model, used to proxy for 
the less accurate beta predictions; and (ii) a continuous-time filter, implemented as a Kalman filter on 
a time-varying coefficients version of CAPM, used to proxy for more accurate predictions. The 
recursive nature of the two filters is an essential property that allows us to use them in HF decision-
making analysis.  
As a first filter, we adopt a MS specification of the CAPM that allows the estimation of the hidden 
Markov chain process driving the parameters of the model between some discrete, unobserved states or 
regimes. We then use the regime-dependant filtered probabilities and estimated coefficients to compute 
a time-varying beta as a proxy for the expected beta. For the second filter, we use a TVC Kalman filter 
on the same data set and model structure to derive a time-varying beta that will reflect the realised beta, 
or the high-level accuracy prediction of beta. The observation equation of the filter specifies the excess 
HF returns as a function of market excess returns, while the state equations define the time-varying 
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coefficients specified as pure unit root processes. We intentionally keep the state equations as simple 
as possible to avoid making any additional assumptions at this point about HF managers’ ability to time 
their strategies to market conditions (e.g. as in Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Racicot and Theoret, 2016).  
The first step of our empirical approach, therefore, consists in applying two data filters on the time-
varying version of equation (4): 
Filter 1: Expected beta to be inferred from a Markov Switching (MS) specification  
[𝑅𝐻𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
= (𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑠(𝑡) + (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑠(𝑡) ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑠(𝑡) (5) 
where 𝑠𝑡 is a first-order unobserved Markov chain with two regimes and a transition matrix 𝑃 (with 
elements on each row summing to 1) such that 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑠𝑡−1, which also acts as a (discrete) state 
equation in the case that the model is considered in its state–space form. The 𝜀𝑠(𝑡) are error terms with 
𝜀𝑠(𝑡)=1~𝑁(0, 𝝈𝒔=𝟏
2) and 𝜀𝑠(𝑡)=2~𝑁(0, 𝝈𝒔=𝟐
2). Due to its discrete nature and the approximations 
inherent in its maximum likelihood derivation (see Kim, 1994), the MS implies information losses in 
the data inference process and should be a poorer fit to the observed HF returns, indirectly providing us 
with a measure HFs’ less accurate predictions.  
Filter 2: TVC Kalman filter for the realised beta 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞: [𝑅𝐻𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
= (𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑡 + (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑡 ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 (6) 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑞: (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑡 = (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑏,𝑡,  (7) 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑞: (𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑡 = (𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑎,𝑡 (8) 
where 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝝈
2). We use the filtered state (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑡 from equation (7) as a measure of the realised 





Table 1. CAPM model specification estimated on excess HF weekly returns 






















Panel A: Markov Switching model estimates used to derive expected betas 
LogL -470.06  -610.65  -689.53  -301.95  
AIC 3.69  3.17  2.93  4.58  
Regime 1: (more persistent and lower risk regime) 
(𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑠=1 0.146
***  0.103***  0.053*  0.052***  
(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑠=1 0.103
***  0.220***  -0.013  0.039***  
𝜎𝑠=1 0.363
***  0.384***  0.560***  0.244***  
p11 0.966***  0.929***  0.970***  0.981***  
Regime 2 (alternative regime) 
(𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑠=2 -0.422
***  -0.326***  -0.481*  -0.221**  
(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑠=2 0.154
***  0.194***  0.281*  0.146***  
𝜎𝑠=2 0.895
*  0.964  1.642***  1.147**  
p22 0.883***  0.871***  0.729*  0.934***  
         
Panel B: Kalman filter, used to derive realised betas 
LogL  -591.7  -721.9  -800.5  -512.5 
AIC  -6.77  -7.16  -7.37  -6.48 
𝜎  0.269***  0.436***  0.550***  0.152*** 
Note: Estimation results from equation (5) are displayed in panel A, while estimation results for the system of equations (6)-
(8) are displayed in panel B. Both panels include the log-likelihood value at the optimum (LogL) and the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). The 𝜎𝑠=1 and 𝜎𝑠=2 in panel A are regime-specific standard deviations of the model estimated in equation (5), 
while p11 and p22 denote the diagonal elements of transition matrix P. Panel B displays only the standard deviation of the 
observation equation, 𝜎, which is comparable to the standard deviation of the model in panel A; the other coefficients are not 
displayed to save space. The four HF investment styles are specified in the first row of the table: Event Driven, denoted by 
ED; Equity Hedge, denoted by EH; Macro/CTA, denoted by M; and Relative Value Arbitrage, denoted by RVA. The 
estimation sample runs from the first week of July 2004 to the last week of May 2017. The (*), (**), and (***) denote coefficients’ 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
It is worth noting that the MS specification allows both the coefficients and the equation’s variance 
to vary over time across the two regimes, meaning that we are explicitly aiming at getting a good fit for 
the HF returns; the TVC Kalman filter instead allows only the coefficients (not the variance) to vary 
over time. For the MS estimates, with only one exception (style M, regime 1), the coefficient of the 
market factor is always statistically significant in both regimes. The constant term is always statistically 
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significant, positive in regime 1 but negative in regime 2; the persistence of regime 1 is always greater 
that the persistence of regime 2, according to the estimated probabilities, 𝑝11 and 𝑝22, respectively 
(which are the diagonal elements of the matrix 𝑃). Note that, based on the AIC criterion, the MS model 
always provides a worse fit than the TVC Kalman filter, a finding in line with the idea that MS provides 
a smoother (i.e. less accurate) perspective on the data. Figure 1 plots the realised and expected betas 
for each HF style, highlighting the partial overlap between the two measures. Moreover, there is 
interesting overlapping in terms of timing, with periods from 2007 to 2008 being identified as belonging 
to the high-volatility regime by all HF styles. 
 
Figure 1. Expected and realised betas, by HF investment style 
  
  
Note: The figure displays the expected and realised betas filtered using (i) a CAPM specification with coefficients switching 
between two unobserved regimes that follow a Markov Chain and (ii) a CAPM specification with time-varying coefficients 
set in a state-space and filtered using a standard Kalman filter, respectively. The four HF investment styles are specified in the 
in the titles: Event Driven, denoted by ED; Equity Hedge, denoted by EH; Macro/CTA, denoted by M; and Relative Value 
Arbitrage, denoted by RVA. We discard the first three months of data as a burn-in period, given the well-known erratic 
dynamics of the filtered states in a Kalman filter during the initial periods. Accordingly, the effective estimation sample that 
will be used in the empirical section starts with the first week of October 2004 and ends with the last week of May 2017, just 





4.2 Multivariate analysis: Causal influences 
The relationships between betas and various risk and uncertainty measures are neither simple, nor 
unidirectional, as highlighted by the application of the non-parametric filter ANOVA presented in 
Appendix A. Market moves give rise to risk-taking, hedging, and safe-haven motivations that can differ 
from one investor to another. Moreover, HFs can amplify uncertainty and increase the market risk levels 
through their trading strategies, leveraged bets and portfolio exposures vis-à-vis other investors (Fung 
and Hsieh, 2006). In addition, using various data filters to measure the betas (which is a standard 
procedure in the literature) does not necessarily help in disentangling the actual causality influences, 
due to the possible impact of unobserved factors on realised portfolio returns. 
To mitigate these concerns in an analysis of causal inferences, we employ the partial Granger 
causality (GC) approach set in the time domain, pioneered by Guo et al. (2008), and applied for example 
in Philippas and Dragomirescu-Gaina (2016). This approach, which is more robust to model 
misspecification and the omission of other relevant factors, allows us to isolate all traces of common 
exogenous (measured) factors and latent (unmeasured) factors, assuming that they all have 
simultaneous effects on all the observed components of the system. Hence, we account for any 
exogenous and latent (endogenous) factors that can produce misleading results or inaccurate causal 
inferences in a multivariate setting.  
We briefly present the partial GC general framework. Without loss of generality, consider a 
multivariate process 𝑾𝒕 with the following autoregressive formulation: 
𝑩(𝐿)𝑾𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 (9) 
where 𝐿 is the lag operator, and 𝑩 is a polynomial matrix of 𝐿; in particular 𝑩(0) = 𝑰, the identity 
matrix; 𝐸(𝑢𝑡) = 𝟎 and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡) = 𝜮. The process 𝑾𝑡  is an aggregation of three components (measured 
variables or groups of variables), denoted by 𝒙𝑡, 𝒚𝑡, and 𝒛𝑡. Accordingly, 𝑾𝑡 = [𝒙𝑡 𝒚𝑡 𝒛𝑡]′ can be 
used to model the causality influences arising between the first two components, for example from 𝒚𝑡  to 
𝒙𝑡, conditional on the third one, for example 𝒛𝑡.  
The error term 𝑢𝑡 can also be decomposed into a noise term, 𝑒𝑡, together with an exogenous term, 
denoted as 𝐸𝑡, and a latent variable term, Λ𝑡, which depends on the process 𝑾𝒕. Thus, the unrestricted 
multivariate VAR model of the process 𝑾𝑡  involving the factors 𝒙𝑡, 𝒚𝑡, and 𝒛𝑡 can be written (in matrix 
form) as: 
𝑩(𝐿)𝑾𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 + 𝑩
∗(𝐿)Λ𝑡 (10) 
where 𝑩∗ = [𝐵𝑥
∗ 𝐵𝑦
∗ 𝐵𝑧
∗]′ is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator 𝐿, 𝑒𝑡 = [𝑒𝑥,𝑡 𝑒𝑦,𝑡 𝑒𝑧,𝑡]′ is 




the latent variables that cannot be measured in the system, but which are normally distributed random 
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vectors, with the vectors 𝐸𝑡 and Λ𝑡 independent of 𝑒𝑡, and the variance–covariance matrix of the vector 
autoregressive unrestricted model denoted by 𝚺(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧),𝑡. Using the Wold representation, the latent 
variables can be represented as the summation of normally distributed random inputs; therefore, using 
an 𝑅 superscript to denote the restricted VAR model for 𝑾𝑡






where the noise variance–covariance matrix of the restricted model is 𝑺(𝑥,𝑧),𝑡.   
In the time domain setting, the partial GC shows the causal influence of one component, 𝑥, on 
another, 𝑦, conditioned on the other component 𝑧, using a partial correlation specification that 
eliminates the influence of the common exogenous inputs and any latent variables. Thus, the test statistic 
takes the following expression:  






where 𝑺𝑥𝑥, 𝑺𝑥𝑧, 𝑺𝑧𝑧, and 𝑺𝑧𝑥 are corresponding elements (or partitions in the multivariate case) of the 
𝑺(𝑥,𝑧) matrix, while 𝚺𝑥𝑥, 𝚺𝑥𝑧, 𝚺𝑧𝑧 and 𝚺𝑧𝑥 are elements (or partitions) of the 𝚺(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧) matrix. 
Table 2 presents the results derived from applying the partial Granger causality approach to a 
multivariate specification that includes all four (expected or realised) betas and one uncertainty/risk 
measure, which is displayed in the first column under the general label factor. Including all four betas 
should accommodate all the interactions that might arise from the fact that different HFs might 
simultaneously implement changes to their investment strategies in response to unexpected market 
moves and shocks. Similar results are obtained even if we consider a bivariate setting that pairs each 







































Style ED EH M RVA ED EH M RVA 
EQU  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
EPU   Yes   Yes    
GPR  Yes     Yes  
VIX   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TYVIX    Yes  Yes  Yes 
VP Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
CISS  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  
FSI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
ConnEQ  Yes Yes Yes   Yes  
ConnFX  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 



































Style ED EH M RVA ED EH M RVA 
EQU   Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
EPU   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
GPR Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
VIX   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TYVIX   Yes       
VP         
CISS  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes   Yes 
FSI   Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
ConnEQ     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ConnFX  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ConnSB  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Cells display the label “Yes” when we cannot reject the existence of partial Granger causality using 5% as the confidence 
level; a grey cell is displayed otherwise. The arrow in the first row indicates the direction of causality influences. The four HF 
investment styles are specified in the second row of the table: Event Driven, denoted by ED; Equity Hedge, denoted by EH; 
Macro/CTA, denoted by M; and Relative Value Arbitrage, denoted by RVA. 
 
The results show interesting patterns of influence that differ, sometimes significantly, between 
expected and realised betas. We cannot infer a unique causal ordering that holds for all possible beta–
uncertainty/risk pairs, but some qualitative results stand out. Firstly, only VIX affects all expected and 
realised betas, providing us with evidence in favour of its prominent role (see also the results obtained 
in Appendix A). Secondly, starting with the left half of the table, we see many more significant outgoing 
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causality influences from expected betas toward uncertainty/risk factors, rather than outgoing causality 
influences from realised betas toward uncertainty/risk factors, except those from group A (based on 
media sources). This finding gives us a first hint that less accurate predictions can lead to (actions with) 
negative feedbacks on (market-based and systemic) risk/uncertainty measures. Thirdly, as we move on 
to the right half of the table, we find many more significant incoming causality influences toward 
realised betas, rather than toward expected betas, stemming from uncertainty/risk factors, especially 
those from groups A and C. This reveals the higher information content of realised betas, pointing to 
their ex-post, rather than ex-ante, nature. These last two findings are reassuring, because the data too 
seems to reflect the particular differences in the construction of the two filters. Note that none of the 
uncertainty/risk factors was included in the dataset used to filter the betas (i.e. a standard CAPM-based 
specification for excess HFs returns).  
Using the same approach, we bundle together all of our risk and uncertainty measures into a model 
specification that can help us to understand better the existing patterns of causality influences among 
them. Table 3 below summarises the results of this exercise. Some of our indicators are very sensitive 
to incoming causality influences, but at the same time indifferent to influences from most others; for 
example, the FSI is influenced by almost every factor, except ConnEQ and ConnFX, but influences 
none. On the contrary, indicators like TYVIX, VIX, CISS, and ConnSB seem to influence many other 
indicators but are influenced by only a few others, thus being some of the most “exogenous” indicators 
































EQU→ -       Yes Yes Yes  
EPU→ Yes -      Yes    
GPR→ Yes  -     Yes    
VIX→ Yes   -  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
TYVIX→ Yes Yes Yes  - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VP→      - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CISS→  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes - Yes Yes Yes  
FSI→        -    
ConnEQ→         - Yes Yes 
ConnFX→         Yes - Yes 
ConnSB→ Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes - 
Note: The first column displays the “senders”, which represent the origin of the estimated causality influence, while the first 
row displays the “receivers”. Cells display the label “Yes” when we cannot reject the existence of partial Granger causality 
using 5% as a confidence level; a grey cell is displayed otherwise. The four HF investment styles are specified in the second 
row of the table: Event Driven, denoted by ED; Equity Hedge, denoted by EH; Macro/CTA, denoted by M; and Relative Value 
Arbitrage, denoted by RVA. 
  
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis: Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models 
We claim that the decision-making process of a representative HF can be framed as a trade-off between 
prediction accuracy and reaction speed, a trade-off that becomes binding particularly during turbulent 
market periods. We apply this idea to data by specifying a vector autoregressive model with three 
variables: the expected beta denoted as (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑠(𝑡), the realised beta or (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑡, and one 
risk/uncertainty measure or 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡. Our intention is to reveal the main differences in the adjustment 
speed of the two betas to sudden changes in the information set, which we proxy using unexpected 
shocks in the 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡. The model includes both betas to reflect the fact that both strategies are 
(hypothetically) available to any HF at any given moment; therefore, the endogenous vector 𝑦𝑡 is 
specified as: 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑡 (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎)𝑠(𝑡)]′.  
We estimate several VAR specifications and derive our findings based on the analysis of generalised 
impulse response functions (GIRFs) to unexpected shocks in each uncertainty/risk measure (Koop et 
al., 1996; Pesaran and Shin, 1998). Order-invariant GIRFs are better suited to tracking the dynamics of 
shocks through a system of simultaneous equations, especially when there is no prior understanding of 
the exogeneity rankings between the endogenous variables of the model. If we were to accept that 
estimating the empirical counterpart of an unobserved mental process implies that changes in the 
81 
 
information set are exogenous57, i.e. factor ordered first, then there would still be no difference between 
Choleski-based impulse responses and GIRFs to a shock in the first equation, which is our main focus.  
Lag lengths correspond to approximately one month and were chosen based on standard selection 
criteria (e.g. Akaike Information Criterion); if necessary, the number of lags was increased to insure 
lack of serial correlation in residuals. The effective estimation sample runs from the first week of 
October 2004 to the last week of May 2017. All estimated models are stable, with roots inside the unit 
circle. It should be noted that since our multivariate models include generated regressors (i.e. the two 
betas), the confidence intervals might be inaccurate. To obtain robust confidence intervals we bootstrap 
the estimated VARs for 5000 times following the approach proposed in Kilian (1998); in addition, we 
use a rather conservative confidence level of 95% (or +/- 2 standard deviations) for GIRFs to gauge the 
statistical significance of the results.  
Table 4 displays the sign and the horizon intervals for which the GIRFs are statistically significant. 
These estimates can help us gauge the timing and direction of changes in expected and realised betas 
in reaction to uncertainty/risk shocks. 
 
  
                                                          
57 Most readers would disagree though, and rightly so, given the extensive evidence showing that HFs play an essential role in 
the transmission of systemic shocks (Fung and Hsieh, 2006; Racicot and Theoret, 2016). In addition, our evidence in section 
4.2 does not support a unique causal ordering that can be applied to all beta-to-uncertainty/risk pairs. 
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Group A: Uncertainty measures  
EPU 1-2 (+) 5-50 (-) 1-8 (-) 4-50 (-) n.s. 2-50 (-) n.s. n.s. 
EQU 1-11 (+) 12-50 (-) 1-15 (-) 4-50 (-) n.s. 6-50 (-) n.s. n.s. 
GPR n.s. 6-50 (+) n.s. 6-50 (+) n.s. n.s. n.s. 8-9 (+) 
Group B: Market-based risk indicators  
VIX 2-21 (+) 12-50 (-) 3-35 (-) 8-50 (-) 2-8 (+) 12-50 (-) 2-50 (+) n.s. 
TYVIX 1-14 (+) 13-50 (-) 1-45 (-) 12-50 (-) 2-3 (+) 11-50 (-) 1-50 (+) 3-4 (+) 
VP 1-5 (+) n.s. 1-2 (-) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk  
ConnEQ 1-11 (+) n.s. 2-13 (-) n.s. 2-4 (+) 20-50 (-) 2-5 (+) 4-5 (+) 
ConnFX 2-7 (+) 7-47 (-) 2-7 (-) 8-50 (-) 11-48 (-) 10-50 (-) 2-4 (+) n.s. 
ConnSB n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 9-50 (+) n.s. 1-3 (+) n.s. 
FSI 1-13 (+) 35-50 (-) 1-8 (-) 6-37 (-) n.s. n.s. 1-50 (+) 2-4 (+) 
CISS 1-13(+) 19-50 (-) 1-28 (-) 17-50 (-) 1-3 (+) 8-50 (-) 1-50 (+) 3-4 (+) 
Note: The numbers displayed in the table denote the horizon intervals for which the GIRFs are statistically significant, with 
bootstrapped confidence bands set at +/- 2 standard deviations; 5000 bootstrap replications of the estimated model are used 
for the confidence interval, following Kilian (1998) approach. The (-) or (+) denotes the sign or direction of the GIRFs in the 
specified interval. The n.s. label in the table means that, given the confidence bands, the GIRFs are not significant for (at least) 
two consecutive observations. The maximum horizon is truncated at 50 weeks (approximately 1 year). The four HF investment 
styles are specified in the first row of the table: Event Driven, denoted by ED; Equity Hedge, denoted by EH; Macro/CTA, 
denoted by M; and Relative Value Arbitrage, denoted by RVA. The corresponding GIRF figures are reported in Figure B2, 
Appendix B. 
 
The results summarised in Table 4 show, with very few exceptions, a stronger and faster reaction 
for the expected betas, but a weaker, slower (or delayed) reaction for the realised betas. Therefore, 
relying on less accurate predictions implies faster portfolio adjustments in reaction to sudden changes 
in the information set. This is our first important result that survives across different estimation and 
robustness checks. In fact speed is key for market timing, and the HFs literature provides rich empirical 
evidence that (at least) some HFs have such abilities that allow them to earn extra profits, i.e. positive 
alpha (see Cao et al., 2013; Bali et al., 2014). With the remarkable exception of the EH style, the 
generally positive responses seen for expected betas suggest that most HFs tend to increase portfolio 
exposures in volatile markets; this finding in line with Billio et al., (2012), but in contrast to Patton and 
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Ramadorai (2013), suggesting that differences in HF investment styles are important to consider when 
analysing the direction of HFs exposure changes during turmoil. In the case of those HFs pursuing 
Equity Hedge (EH) strategies, for example, expected betas show reactions that are generally negative, 
most likely due to an over-reliance on hedge positions that explore idiosyncratic rather than general 
market trends. Notwithstanding differences in the direction of their bets, our results show that all HFs 
would be able to gain speed and thus improve their market timing abilities by adopting strategies with 
lower levels of accuracy, or to put it differently, by allowing their exposures to change more swiftly 
during turmoil (e.g. due to shifts in leverage, or exposures to option-like payoffs).  
Looking at Table 4 we see further that all HFs styles react to innovations in some particular indicators 
like VIX, TYVIX, ConnEQ, and CISS; more specifically, we find that all expected betas react to these 
same shocks, though we cannot find a similar result in the case of realised betas. Although HFs’ market 
exposures can increase or decrease, depending on the adopted investment style, having a common 
sensitivity to any single specific factor might lead to simultaneous reactions in case of large shocks. 
This is a good enough reason for including these risk indicators on supervisors’ watch lists. In fact, VIX 
and CISS were also two of the most ‘exogenous’ indicators already identified in section 4.2 and 
Appendix A, supporting the idea that they contain valuable information to signal early shifts in HFs’ 
risk appetite and market timing efforts. This potential simultaneity in case of large shocks is our second 
important result from the empirical analysis, with implications for contagion and market stress. King 
and Wadhwani (1990), and more recently Cipriani and Guarino (2008) advocate the importance of 
information spill-overs that can lead to contagion when trading activity is correlated across markets, 
although fundamentals are not necessarily related. Our empirical results are in line with this idea: due 
to their possible simultaneous actions and reliance on the same signal indicators for market timing, HFs 
can play a key role in the cross-sectional transmission of market stress and, therefore, contagion. 
 
4.4 Extensions of the model to HF investment sub-styles 
To better reflect the heterogeneity of HF investment styles, we replicate the analysis using HFRX 
indexes at different levels of aggregation, both below and above the one used so far. More precisely, 
besides the four main HF investment styles (i.e. ED, EH, M, and RVA), we use nine HF sub-styles and 
one global index.58 Our previous first main result is re-confirmed: expected betas react more quickly 
and/or strongly while realised betas are slower and weaker in response to an uncertainty/risk shock.  
                                                          
58 The correspondence between the nine sub-styles and the four main styles can be found in Appendix B, Table B1. Figure B1, 
in the same Appendix B, plots the realised and expected betas for each HF sub-style and for the Global style. A summary of 
the empirical results pertaining to this section are available in Appendix B, Table B4. 
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With respect to the second main result, we showed above that all HF investment styles can react 
simultaneously to certain shocks, despite important differences in terms of their particular investment 
strategy, geographical focus, financial markets, assets, and instruments employed. However, when 
differentiating HFs further into sub-styles, this result becomes less clear, though by a very small margin: 
there is only one exception out of nine sub-styles, for both VIX and CISS, while the other early-warning 
indicators drop out of our narrow list. Suppose all HF styles process information flows from non-
overlapping sources; however, in periods with high volatility, signal extraction “mistakes” can be 
transmitted to all other markets, generating contagion (see King and Wadhwani, 1990; Cipriani and 
Guarino, 2008; Hasler and Ornthanalai, 2018). Therefore, while having only four main HF styles could 
guarantee that the non-overlapping assumption holds exactly, a more granular approach could pose 
methodological challenges, but not as strong as to weaken the main implication about increasing 
contagion risks. 
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
To overcome some concerns regarding the specification used to explain HF excess returns and infer the 
betas, we employ a series of robustness checks. Much of the HF literature explains HF excess returns 
based on various pricing factors (e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2004; Carhart et al., 2014). We replicate the 
empirical analysis above by using a model specification with the three Fama-French factors (the only 
readily available at a weekly frequency), and even by adding a forth pricing factor, which we proxy by 
one of the uncertainty/risk measures in our list. Conclusions are similar. In fact, the more pricing factors 
we include, the better the explanatory power of the model, a dimension on which the TVP Kalman 
already proved superior compared to MS. Therefore, the success of expected betas over realised betas 
in terms of reaction speed does not lie in the explanatory power of the specification used to model HF 
returns. Instead, it seems to be dependent on the inability of the TVP Kalman filter to reflect the time-
varying nature of volatility, which the MS filter deals with directly during its estimation.  
To add more information into the filtered betas, Savona (2014a and 2014b) proposes a system 
estimation where time-varying betas are a function of some primitive risk signals (i.e. in essence, 
volatility proxies). We take a more direct approach here by changing the signal-to-noise ratio at the 
TVP Kalman filter stage. Note that we have specifically adopted a random walk (rather than AR(1) or 
mean reverting as in Savona, 2014a and 2014b) specification for the state equations to allow for a higher 
contemporaneous pass-through of volatility signals into the filtered beta state (i.e. equation 7). As a 
robustness check, we allow the signal-to-noise ratio in the TVP filter go to infinity (i.e. recent 
observations receive more weight during signal extraction), but we end up with noisier betas that do 
not react faster than expected betas. These findings highlight the advantages of a discrete filter (see also 
the results in Bollen and Whaley, 2009) in striking the right balance between inferring a time-varying 
85 
 
beta (needed to control portfolio exposures) and picking up relevant volatility jumps, which provide the 
best signals that can help managers in timing the market (Bali et al., 2014; Kacperczyk et al., 2016).   
 
5. SIMULATION EXERCISE 
This section presents a simulation exercise where we compare the performances of two hypothetical 
portfolios, both built based on two benchmark strategies that correspond to extreme accuracy levels. 
More technical details are relegated to Appendix C. Here we just provide the main intuition behind the 
construction of these portfolios and strategies, and describe the main results.  
The first benchmark strategy, denoted as S1, covers the “perfect accuracy” case and consists in a 
portfolio constructed such as its (excess) returns track the (excess) market returns at all times, assuming 
a small but positive and constant beta of 0.1 at all times.59 The second benchmark strategy, S2, 
corresponds to the “no accuracy” case where we assume managers just place random bets on the market 
based on a simulated Markov Chain (MC) variable that governs the direction of their bets (‘on’ or 
‘against’ the market), therefore, allowing for some degree of persistency in the strategy being followed; 
the value of beta for strategy S2 is necessarily time-varying, switching between two discrete values, but 
its average equals the same value of 0.1 just as for strategy S1.60 With some inherent simplifications, 
these two benchmark strategies S1 and S2 are consistent with the two investment strategies discussed 
so far; to see this, note that the prediction errors for the two betas are either zero (for realised beta) or 
a discrete range of values (for expected beta), in line with the intuition provided in the introduction. 
Next, we construct two hypothetical portfolios that alternate their investing strategy between the two 
benchmark strategies above, S1 and S2, depending on some information signal that reflects market 
timing. The empirical results we obtained in the previous section have identified the accuracy–speed 
trade-off during extreme market stress periods, which were proxied by the uncertainty/risk shocks in 
the multivariate (VAR) models. To keep things simple in this simulation exercise, we assume that the 
signal can be extracted from our uncertainty/risk measures, such that one strategy is replaced by the 
other one whenever the (standardised) value of some uncertainty/risk indicator crosses a certain level 
(determined according to its distributional properties). We assume that portfolio PA adopts strategy S1 
for most of the time, except for when signals identify volatile periods, prompting a switch to strategy 
S2; similarly, portfolio PB adopts strategy S2 most of the time, except for volatile periods when it 
                                                          
59 A small beta value of 0.1 has been selected to approximate the sample average of estimated realised betas of the four HFs 
styles. In the same time, such a low beta reflects the idea that HFs aim at having a low correlation with the market in order to 
attract client flows and present themselves as effective diversification instruments. 
60 We set the upper and lower bounds of beta as (0.05, 0.15) to approximate the estimated variation interval between the two 
states in Table 1, panel A. The transition matrix for the MC is calibrated with an equal persistence of 0.95 for both regimes. 
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switches to strategy S1. Although these two mixed-strategy portfolios are complementary with each 
other by construction, their simulated performances are completely different (see Appendix C for more 
technical details).  
There is strong empirical evidence that some HFs are able to time market liquidity (Cao et al., 2013) 
and uncertainty or, more generally, volatility spikes in financial and macroeconomic variables (Bali et 
al., 2014; Kacperczyk et al., 2016). Depending on the uncertainty/risk factor we select as a signal source, 
the timing of switching between the two benchmark strategies will change, as well as their 
performances. Using the real (excess) market returns over the October 2004 – May 2017 period and a 
random normally distributed noise added to each period returns, we repeatedly simulate the two 
portfolios PA and PB over a sample that matches the estimation sample length (i.e. 661 weeks/periods). 
Simulation results based on 5000 replications are displayed in Table 5 below. We report the median 
value (computed across all simulations) for the various summary statistics instead of the mean value, 
because the former suffers less impact from any possible outlier (i.e. simulated portfolio with extreme 
outcomes). We also report the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (henceforth KS) test statistics to facilitate the 
comparison of any two simulated distributions. 
 
Table 5. Simulation results 





































Group A: Uncertainty measures 








































GPR PA: 9.4783 
(KSA=S1: 0.0074) 


















Group B: Market-based indicators 






















TYVIX PA: 9.5547 







































Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk  




































































































Note: Table presents simulation results based on 5000 replications of the two hypothetical portfolios PA and PB; the two 
benchmark strategies S1 and S2 are displayed on the second row for comparability. The first column indicates the 
uncertainty/risk indicator used to determine the level that triggers the switch (i.e. market timing) between the two benchmark 
strategies. We report the median values, computed across all simulations, for the distribution of the following summary 
statistics: end of period portfolio value (i.e. cumulated returns), returns’ standard deviation, returns’ skewness, returns’ kurtosis 
and Sharpe ratio. In parentheses, we report the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics, denoted KSX=Y, on the equality of two 
simulated distributions X and Y; the * denotes rejection of the null that the two distributions are equal at the 5% statistical 
significance level. More technical details can be found in Appendix C.  
 
Firstly, notice that compared to strategy S1, S2 is more likely to display characteristics associated 
with HF returns (see Appendix B, Table B1), meaning higher risk (or standard deviation), lower skew 
and higher kurtosis; these differences are statistically significant according to the KS tests. Higher 
kurtosis and more negative skew arise from a higher probability of extreme returns, and particularly 
positive returns, something HFs are aiming to achieve; Dijk et al., (2014) explain how competition for 
social status can explain a preference for negative skew assets by over-performers, who want to preserve 
their status. Therefore, it is interesting to see how a simple strategy that randomly bets on the market 
direction can deliver a distribution of payoffs with higher kurtosis and more negative skew, reflecting 
therefore some important characteristics of the actual HF returns’ distribution.  
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Secondly, HFs (along with other active players in general) face strong incentives deriving from the 
possibly large, but asymmetric payoffs they can obtain in times of market stress. Since the previous 
section revealed speed gains from switching to lower accuracy during market stress, we concentrate on 
making a comparison (in probability terms) between PA on the one side, and PB (as well as S1) on the 
other side; this is to say that we are only interested in comparing strategies that differ during turmoil 
periods, while ignoring strategy differences, if any, during calm periods. In all 11 cases, portfolio PA 
displays lower risk than PB (as well as S1), a difference that is statistically significant according to KS 
tests. More importantly, PA displays statistically significant higher kurtosis and more negative skewness 
in 7 cases if we compare it to PB (and in 8 cases if we compare it to S1). As a confirmation of our 
previous findings, both VIX and CISS lie among the indicators delivering the best outcomes and market 
timing; the connectedness indicators instead do not seem to provide the best timing, given their much 
higher persistency and measurement focus. Clearly, HFs would prefer strategies with a lower risk, 
higher kurtosis and more negative skew, since the probability of high positive returns is much larger 
(see Dijk et al., 2014). In a majority of cases, therefore, our simulation demonstrates the stochastic 
dominance of PA over PB (as well as over S1) in terms of lower standard deviation and skew, and higher 
kurtosis; this finding is in line with the trade-off uncovered in the previous section, in which we find 
that periods of extreme uncertainty/risk are likely to be associated with low accuracy strategies where 
beta dynamics is discrete as in the case of PA. Overall, the simulation exercise shows that switching 
exposures from a high to a low accuracy beta only during volatile times could deliver payoffs with 
distributions that are preferable by most HF managers, i.e. negative skew and excess kurtosis. 
The simulation results are robust to a series of sensitivity checks we report in Appendix C at the end 
of this chapter. Obviously, our simulation exercise is an inherent simplification of reality, ignoring 
many important aspects for HF profitability such as liquidity and trading costs, margin requirements, 
clients’ outflows (redemptions) or inflows etc. In addition, it includes a very simple signal extraction 
mechanism for market timing, randomly selected direction of the bets (i.e. changes in beta), symmetric 
transitions between regimes, etc. However, it helps in revealing some very clear incentives that HFs 
have to switch to a low accuracy strategy by timing the market and profiting from its extreme moves; 
with PA being a dominating mixed-strategy portfolio (in probability terms), HFs will tend to implement 
it as fast as possible in order to profit from initial market moves, which are usually the biggest. The fear 
of missing an opportunity is probably stronger than the fear of losing a bet, also because HFs portray 
themselves as ‘low beta’ investment vehicles that might face scarce opportunities in trending markets; 
on the contrary, the increase in correlation across different asset classes could prevent more refined and 
carefully designed strategies from being implemented in extreme market conditions, leaving therefore 





6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We provide new insights into the investment decision-making process of hedge funds, some of the most 
active and astute investors. Drawing on the HFR database, we differentiate HFs according to several 
investment styles, and sub-styles, which define particularities with respect to investment horizon and 
strategy, preferred asset classes and market segments, etc. Despite large differences in style, their 
decision-making process boils down to a series of estimates and predictions that are continuously 
updated with new information. We assume this process can be framed as a trade-off between prediction 
accuracy and reaction speed, a trade-off that is best revealed during turbulent markets. We cast this 
process in a Bayesian framework and present a series of empirical analyses and a simulation exercise 
that concur in providing evidence in favour of this trade-off. 
Most HFs claim to generate excess returns that have a low, or even zero beta with a broad market 
index. Moreover, hedging effectiveness in portfolio management relies heavily on the same beta, and 
therefore changes in beta can be a good proxy for changes in investment strategy. Using the same data 
set and a common CAPM model structure, we apply one discrete filter and one time-continuous filter 
to extract two separate measures of beta that entail different levels of prediction accuracy. More 
specifically, a low-level accuracy prediction we label expected beta is filtered from a two-state Markov 
switching specification, which is more flexible, but provides a worse fit to HF returns than a time-
varying coefficient Kalman filter used to infer realised beta – the high-level accuracy prediction.  
The empirical analysis presented in section 4 shows that less accurate portfolio strategies 
(implemented as expected betas) would adjust more quickly to a series of uncertainty/risk shocks, which 
we use as proxies for changes in the relevant information set. Meantime, more accurate portfolio 
strategies (implemented as realised betas) would be slow in adjusting to similar shocks. Therefore, we 
highlight the accuracy–speed trade-off with respect to extreme market conditions, when unknown 
shocks are most likely to disturb the information set on which investors rely for valuation purposes. In 
section 5 we justify this result by emphasizing the dominance of a portfolio that switches its beta from 
a high-level to a low-level accuracy in times of extreme market moves, which we identify based on our 
uncertainty/risk factors. Our simulation exercise proves that return distributions with lower risk, more 
negative skew and higher kurtosis are associated with a mixed strategy that switches to a low accuracy 
beta during extreme market moves. It is easy to see how these alternating patterns in market exposure 
(i.e. beta) can also deliver the option-like payoff structure outlined in the HFs literature (e.g. in Agarwal 
and Naik, 2004; Billio et al., 2012). Therefore, market timing remains an essential ingredient for success 
in the HF industry. Moreover, since opportunities are scarce and might disappear quickly, HFs have 
strong incentives to precipitate implementation and gain more speed, which implies lower accuracy 
according to our results. These findings align with theoretical predictions from Kacperczyk et al., (2016) 
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where skilled managers allocate their (time-varying) attention to analysing aggregate risks during 
turmoil, and idiosyncratic risk during calm periods.  
Our empirical results also show that changes in some specific risk measures, mainly VIX and CISS, 
contain relevant information that helps HFs to better time the market. Although, in reality, the diversity 
of methods used by HFs to improve their market timing abilities might be hard to quantify, the two 
indicators we identify can summarize relevant information to provide regulators with early warnings 
regarding the upcoming (and possibly simultaneous) shifts in risk-appetite across a heterogeneous HF 
sector. Better counter measures that rely on the same indicators and thresholds could then be designed 
by market operators and regulators. Our analysis underlines the importance of proper regulations and 
market designs to prevent the negative consequences stemming from sudden shifts in risk-appetite. 
Many HFs (and active players as well) face strong incentives deriving from the possibly large, but 
asymmetric payoffs they can obtain in times of market stress. Market regulators and supervisory 
authorities have long considered ways to restrict this type of behaviour, and the literature on this topic 
is extremely rich. More effective early warning indicators and market circuit breakers, counter-cyclical 
margins and collateral requirements that restrict HFs’ ability to place highly leveraged bets during 
market stress are just some possible examples of intervention tools. Some negative consequences 
stemming from the cross-sectional transmission of market stress can be reduced as long as such risky 
strategies are discouraged or simply delayed by means of intervention tools that rely on the same 
indicators used by active players. In this context, proper identification of such indicators remains key 
for determining intervention effectiveness. 
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A Non-parametric filter: A smoothing spline ANOVA  
A parametric model imposes a formal structure on the underlying data-generating process, which can 
be described fully by a finite number of parameters, allowing easy computation of summary statistics. 
However, given the well-known non-standard characteristics of the distribution of HF returns, some of 
the hypotheses required for standard statistical inference (e.g. linear dependence, normality, etc.) would 
be hard to satisfy, but can be relaxed using non-parametric techniques, also called smoothing methods 
(e.g. Billio et al. (2009) use kernel smoothing methods for HFs). In this appendix, we use the non-
parametric filter introduced by Ratto et al. (2007) and Ratto and Pagano (2010), which combines the 
Kalman filter with fixed interval smoothing. The main advantages of using this non-parametric filter 
come from the easiness of interpreting its results, improvements in the fitness, and flexibility of the 
estimation approach. We only provide an intuitive description below and refer the interested reader to 
the studies referenced above.61  
Any model output, 𝑦, can be seen as a mapping on a set of inputs, 𝑋 = [𝑥1, 𝑥2, … ]. Allowing for 
both first-order and second-order interactions between these inputs, and ignoring the possible time 
subscripts, the output can be specified as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(x1, x2, … ) = g0 + g1(x1) + g2(x2) + g3(x1 ∗ x2) + ⋯ (A*) 
where gi are functions that need to be identified.  
Here we consider the one-factor model of Ferson and Schadt (1996) for excess HF returns, where a 
time-varying beta is allowed to depend on some lagged predetermined variables denoted by 𝑍, 
according to: 
[𝑅𝐻𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
= 𝑎 + 𝛽(𝑍𝑡−1) ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑡 
𝛽(𝑍𝑡−1) = 𝑏 + 𝐵 ∗ (𝑍𝑡−1) 
with 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝐵 coefficients, 𝐸(𝑒𝑡│𝑍𝑡−1) = 0 and 𝐸(𝑒𝑡 ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
│𝑍𝑡−1) = 0.  
In compact form, we have:  
[𝑅𝐻𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
= 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝐵 ∗ (𝑍𝑡−1) ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑡 (A**) 
where (𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓)𝑡
 is the market factor, and 𝑒𝑡 is an error term.  
                                                          
61 The codes for running the filter are part of the global sensitivity analysis (GSA interface) toolbox, which is integrated into 
the Dynare platform, developed by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (see http://www.dynare.org).  
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We apply the non-parametric filter to our case assuming that HF excess returns can be explained by 
a set of inputs summarized by a vector 𝑋𝑡 = [[𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡 ,  𝑍𝑡−1]. The filter can show the potential 
explanatory power of our inputs, allowing us to gauge the ones that make the biggest contribution to 
mapping the realised excess returns, [𝑅𝐻𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓], for each HF style. The main (or first-order) effects 
are computed as the percentage of variance explained by the first-order terms, while the second-order 
effects reflect the percentage of variance explained by the second-order (i.e. interactions) terms. The 
total effects include both the first- and the second-order interaction effects (the latter being double 
counted by construction).  
Table A1 displays the results obtained from filtering the excess HF weekly returns using the 
smoothing spline ANOVA model. Three main findings emerge from the table. The first is that the 
market factor, [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓], has always an important first-order effect, although most of the time it is 
dominated by other factors’ contributions, especially by the VIX (the EH style could be seen as an 
exception, though marginally).62 The second finding is that some of our measures, especially those from 
groups B and C (e.g. VIX, CISS) are very important in explaining HF excess returns. The third finding 
refers to the important increase in contributions once we account for second-order terms (or 
interactions), illustrating the non-linearities that one needs to account for. Particularly, the second order 
effects related to the market factor hint at some direct influences stemming from various 
uncertainty/risk factors, even when using lags, onto any beta one might wish to estimate in a CAPM 
settings when using HFs returns.63  
 
  
                                                          
62 Bali et al., (2014) find that variation in uncertainty betas can explain a significant share of the cross-sectional variation in 
HF returns; although their results are not directly comparable with ours in terms of empirical design, we make a similar 
argument here. 
63 Second order effects related to the market factor are much higher if we use contemporaneous uncertainty/risk factors. Since 
the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model specification includes the lagged  𝑍𝑡−1 term, we maintain consistency with this paper in 
order to show that, even in this case, any estimate of beta would be non-linearly depending on some uncertainty/risk factors. 
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Table A1. A smoothing spline ANOVA model for excess HF returns 
ANOVA 
decomposition  

















𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 0.227 0.236 0.319 0.319 0.026 0.079 0.049 0.057 
Group A 
EPU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EQU 0.005 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GPR 0.000 0.007 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Group B 
VIX 0.496 0.525 0.304 0.315 0.147 0.242 0.122 0.122 
TYVIX 0.016 0.016 0 0 0.031 0.047 0 0.109 
VP 0.005 0.021 0 0.012 0 0 0 0.082 
Group C 
ConnEQ 0.015 0.015 0 0 0 0 0 0.081 
ConnFX 0 0.031 0.019 0.029 0.057 0.189 0 0.028 
ConnSB 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 
FSI 0 0.033 0 0.012 0 0.007 0 0.074 
CISS 0.072 0.089 0.122 0.122 0 0 0.123 0.123 
Total 0.836 0.979 0.765 0.810 0.261 0.571 0.294 0.677 
Note: The four HF investment styles are specified in the first row of the table: Event Driven, denoted by ED; Equity Hedge, 
denoted by EH; Macro/CTA, denoted by M; and Relative Value Arbitrage, denoted by RVA. The main (or the first-order) 
effects are calculated as the percentage of variance explained by the first-order terms in equation (A*); second-order effects 
follow the same logic for the second-order terms in equation (A*). The total effects include both first- and second-order effects, 
the latter being double counted by the construction of the interaction terms; the first-order effects can lie between 0 and 1, but 








Table B1. HFRX Hedge Fund style and sub-style classifications. Summary Statistics. 
HF Investment Style Ticker Freq. 
Availabili
ty 
Mean St. dev. Skew Kurt 
Event Driven (ED) HFRXED D Apr. 2003 0.0509 0.6849 -1.9174 11.79 
Activist - M      
Credit Arbitrage - M      
Distressed/Restructuring HFRXDS D Apr. 2003 -0.0128 0.6115 -1.3669 8.26 
Merger Arbitrage HFRXMA D Apr. 2003 0.0871 0.4729 -1.4751 34.27 
Special Situations HFRXSS D Jan. 2009 0.0889 0.6648 -1.0777 6.47 
Multi-Strategy - M      
Equity Hedge (EH) HFRXEH D Apr. 2003 0.0090 0.8619 -1.3714 7.54 
Equity Market Neutral HFRXEMN D Apr. 2003 0.0040 0.4718 -1.5632 14.48 
Fundamental Growth HFRXEHG D Jan. 2009 0.0357 1.0575 -0.5972 5.16 
Fundamental Value HFRXEHV D Jan. 2009 0.0372 0.8111 -1.1604 7.42 
Quantitative Directional - M      
Sector: Energy/Basic Materials - M      
Sector: Healthcare - M      
Sector: Technology - M      
Short Bias - M      
Multi-Strategy - M      
Macro (M) HFRXM D Apr. 2003 0.0111 0.7980 -1.3533 10.08 
Active Trading - M      
Commodity: Agriculture - M      
Commodity: Energy - M      
Commodity: Metals - M      
Commodity: Multi - M      
Currency: Discretionary - M      
Currency: Systematic - M      
Discretionary Thematic - M      
Systematic Diversified HFRXSDV D Jan. 2009 -0.0329 0.8792 -0.3246 3.90 
Multi-Strategy - M      
Relative Value (RVA) HFRXRVA D Apr. 2003 0.0129 0.6688 -4.6999 52.12 
Fixed Income-Asset Backed - M      
Fixed Income-Convertible Arbitrage HFRXCA D Apr. 2003 -0.0432 1.1503 -7.066 69.93 
Fixed Income-Corporate - M      
Fixed Income-Sovereign - M      
Volatility - M      
Yield Alternatives: Energy 
Infrastructure 
- M      
Yield Alternatives: Real Estate - M      
Multi-Strategy HFRXRVMS D Jan. 2009 0.1044 0.4659 0.4156 6.42 
Note: Time series frequency is reported as M for monthly and D for daily. Availability refers to the month and 
year of the first observation in the HFR database. The mean, standard deviation (st. dev.), skewness (skew) and 
kurtosis (kurt) are computed with respect to average weekly returns and over the sample used in the multivariate 
analysis, i.e. first week of October 2004 to last week of May 2017; where sample availability is shorter, statistics 





Table B2. Summary statistics of risk and uncertainty measures 
Descriptive statistics 







Mean 4.476 3.511 4.310 2.856 1.801 -0.038 -1.836 -0.432 63.86 61.35 60.41 
St.dev. 0.527 0.749 0.456 0.384 0.273 0.050 0.847 1.106 9.11 5.58 8.45 
Skew 0.058 0.467 0.387 1.098 0.846 2.551 0.108 2.287 -0.171 -0.317 -0.651 
Kurt 2.78 3.16 3.18 4.12 3.24 18.9 1.92 9.17 2.24 2.81 3.02 
N 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 
 
Contemporaneous correlations       







EPU 1           
EQU 0.58 1          
GPR -0.05 -0.11 1         
VIX 0.53 0.50 -0.28 1        
TYVIX 0.48 0.40 -0.27 0.78 1       
VP 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.14 0.10 1      
CISS 0.55 0.42 -0.32 0.78 0.70 0.05 1     
FSI 0.30 0.42 -0.27 0.74 0.76 0.23 0.63 1    
ConnEQ 0.44 0.35 -0.10 0.63 0.52 0.01 0.68 0.46 1   
ConnFX 0.44 0.20 0.02 0.35 0.31 -0.05 0.38 0.04 0.63 1  
ConnSB -0.27 0.06 -0.01 0.16 0.27 0.14 0.03 0.52 0.10 -0.30 1 
Note: The table presents the mean, standard deviation (st.dev.), skewness (skew), excess kurtosis (kurt), number 
of weekly observations (N) and correlation coefficients for all the uncertainty/risk measures included in our 
sample, which runs from the first week of October 2004 until last week of May 2017. All variables are in log 





















































CA DS EHG EHV EMN MA RVMS SDV SS 
EQU Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EPU Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPR Yes   Yes    Yes  
VIX Yes  Yes Yes      
TYVIX Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
VP Yes   Yes Yes   Yes  
CISS  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
FSI Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ConnEQ Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
ConnFX Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 










































CA DS EHG EHV EMN MA RVMS SDV SS 
EQU Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EPU Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
GPR Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VIX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TYVIX Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VP    Yes      
CISS  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FSI Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ConnEQ Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
ConnFX Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes   
ConnSB Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Cells display the label “Yes” when we cannot reject the existence of partial Granger causality using 5% as 
a confidence level; a grey cell is displayed otherwise. The arrow in the first row indicates the direction of 









Main Style ED 













Group A: Uncertainty measures 
EPU 1-8 (-) n.s. 2-7 (+) 5-6 (-) n.s. n.s. 
EQU 2-8 (-) 7-40 (-) 1-10 (+) n.s. 2-6 (+) n.s. 
GPR n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 7-50 (+) 
Group B: Market-based risk indicators 
VIX 3-50 (-) n.s. 2-13 (+) n.s. 2-13 (+) n.s. 
TYVIX 1-50 (-) n.s. 1-11 (+) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
VP 1-4 (-) n.s. 2-9 (+) n.s. 1-4 (+) n.s. 
Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk 
ConnEQ 2-6 (-) n.s. 1-7 (+) 10-11(+) 2-7 (+) 2-18 (-) 
ConnFX 3-10 (-) n.s. n.s. 11-45 (-) n.s. 1-19 (-) 
ConnSB n.s. n.s. n.s. 15-30 (+) n.s. n.s. 
FSI 1-11 (-) 1-5 (+) 2-18 (+) 1-4 (+) 1-16 (+) n.s. 





Main Style EH 













Group A: Uncertainty measures 
EPU 5-13 (-) n.s. n.s. n.s. 1-5 (+) n.s. 
EQU 2-21 (-) n.s. n.s. n.s. 1-6 (+) n.s. 
GPR n.s. n.s. 3-12 (-) n.s. n.s. 5-50 (+) 
Group B: Market-based risk indicators 
VIX 2-31 (-) 5-50 (-) 2-21 (+) n.s. 3-11 (+) n.s. 
TYVIX 2-33 (-) n.s. 1-16 (+) n.s. 1-5 (+) n.s. 
VP 6-19 (-) 8-34 (-) n.s. 1-2 (-) 1-4 (+) n.s. 
Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk 
ConnEQ 2-50 (-) n.s. 1-6 (+) 7-33 (-) 2-8 (+) 3-4 (-) 
ConnFX n.s. 13-50(-) n.s. 4-22 (-) 7-30 (-) 3-11 (-) 
ConnSB 23-46 (-) n.s. n.s. 2-4 (-) n.s. n.s. 
FSI 8-23 (-) 9-50 (-) 1-10 (+) 1-9 (-) 1-11 (+) n.s. 







Main Style M Main Style RVA  

















Group A: Uncertainty measures   
EPU n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 3-22 (-) 1-2 (+) 6-48 (-) 
EQU n.s. 6-15 (-) n.s. n.s. n.s. 1-8 (-) 1-8 (+) 5-37 (-) 
GPR n.s. 2-7 (+) n.s. n.s. n.s. 5-48 (+) n.s. 5-28 (+) 
Group B: Market-based risk indicators    
VIX 5-33 (-) 6-23 (-) 3-50(+) n.s. 3-27 (+) 2-11 (-) 2-20 (+) 8-50 (-) 
TYVIX 4-22 (-) n.s. 1-50 (+) n.s. 2-8 (+) n.s. 1-20 (+) 8-50 (-) 
VP n.s. 3-22 (-) 1-30 (+) 7-13 (-) n.s. n.s. 1-4 (+) n.s. 
Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk   
ConnEQ 5-35 (-) n.s. n.s. 3-4 (+) 2-7 (+) n.s. 2-11 (+) 20-45 (-) 
ConnFX n.s. 1-4 (+) n.s. n.s. n.s. 1-7 (-) 2-5(+) 4-50 (-) 
ConnSB 7-22 (-) n.s. n.s. n.s. 1-3 (+) n.s. 17-26 (+) n.s. 
FSI 10-37 (-) n.s. 2-50 (+) 9-50 (-) 1-44 (+) n.s. 1-14 (+) 
1-4 (+); 
20-50 (-) 
CISS 4-45 (-) n.s. 1-30 (+) n.s. 2-8 (+) 2-7 (-) 1-6 (+) 12-50 (-) 
Note: Numbers displayed in the table denote the horizon intervals for which the bootstrapped GIRFs are 
statistically significant at +/- 2 standard deviations. The (-) or (+) denotes the sign or direction of the GIRFs in the 
specified interval. The label n.s. in the table means that, given the bootstrapped confidence bands, GIRFs are not 
significant for (at least) two consecutive observations. The maximum horizon is truncated at 50 weeks 













Note: We discard the first three months of data as a burn-in period, given the well-known erratic dynamics of the 
filtered states in a Kalman filter during the initial period. Accordingly, the effective estimation sample for the 
VARs starts with the first week of October 2004, and ends with last week of May 2017; for EHG, EHV, SDV, 
RVMS, and SS the effective estimation sample starts from the first week of April 2009 and ends with the last 





Figure B2. Bootstrapped GIRFs to an unexpected positive uncertainty/risk shock 
Note: The figure presents the bootstrapped GIRFs to a one standard deviation positive shock in different 
uncertainty/risk measures, for each of the four main HF styles, in panels 1 to 4. The central line 
represents the median estimate of the bootstrapped impulses, while the dotted lines around the median 
denote the confidence bands (set at +/- 2 standard deviations); 5000 bootstrapped replications of the 
estimated VAR are used. The maximum horizon is truncated at 50 weeks (approximately one year). 
 
Panel 1: HF style ED 
Group A: Uncertainty measures  
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in EPU 1 std. shock in EPU 
 
1 std. shock in EQU 1 std. shock in EQU 
 
1 std. shock in GPR 1 std. shock in GPR 
 
 
Group B: Market-based risk indicators 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 




1 std. shock in TYVIX 1 std. shock in TYVIX 
 
1 std. shock in VP 1 std. shock in VP 
 
 
Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in ConnEQ 1 std. shock in ConnEQ 
 
1 std. shock in ConnFX 1 std. shock in ConnFX 
 




1 std. shock in FSI 1 std. shock in FSI 
 
1 std. shock in CISS 1 std. shock in CISS 
 
 
Panel 2: HF style EH 
Group A: Uncertainty measures 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in EPU 1 std. shock in EPU 
 
1 std. shock in EQU 1 std. shock in EQU 
 





Group B: Market-based risk indicators 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in VIX 1 std. shock in VIX 
 
1 std. shock in TYVIX 1 std. shock in TYVIX 
 




Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 










1 std. shock in ConnFX 1 std. shock in ConnFX 
 
1 std. shock in ConnSB 1 std. shock in ConnSB 
 
1 std. shock in FSI 1 std. shock in FSI 
 
1 std. shock in CISS 1 std. shock in CISS 
 
 
Panel 3: HF style M 
Group A: Uncertainty measures 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 




1 std. shock in EQU 1 std. shock in EQU 
 
 
1 std. shock in GPR 
 
1 std. shock in GPR 
 
 
Group B: Market-based risk indicators 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in VIX 1 std. shock in VIX 
 
1 std. shock in TYVIX 1 std. shock in TYVIX 
 





Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in ConnEQ 1 std. shock in ConnEQ 
 
1 std. shock in ConnFX 1 std. shock in ConnFX 
 
1 std. shock in ConnSB 1 std. shock in ConnSB 
 
1 std. shock in FSI 1 std. shock in FSI 
 






Panel 4: HF style RVA 
Group A: Uncertainty measures 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in EPU 1 std. shock in EPU 
 
1 std. shock in EQU 1 std. shock in EQU 
 




Group B: Market-based risk indicators 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 










1 std. shock in TYVIX 1 std. shock in TYVIX 
 
1 std. shock in VP 1 std. shock in VP 
 
 
Group C: Computed measures of (systemic) risk 
Expected beta response to: Realised beta response to: 
1 std. shock in ConnEQ 1 std. shock in ConnEQ 
 
1 std. shock in ConnFX 1 std. shock in ConnFX 
 




1 std. shock in FSI 1 std. shock in FSI 
 














This Appendix provides more technical details about the simulation exercise performed in section 5. 
We first present the construction of two benchmark strategies: S1 – the “perfect accuracy” strategy, and 
S2 – the “no accuracy” strategy. Accuracy here refers to the range of possible values for the prediction 
error associated with a one-step-ahead forecast of beta. 
Strategy S1 is constructed by cumulating all profits and losses according to the following equation: 
𝑆1𝑡 = 𝑆1𝑡−1 + 𝛽 ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑡,    with 𝑡 = 1,2, … 661 and 𝑆10 = 0 
We calibrate 𝛽 = 0.1 and 𝜖𝑡~𝑁(0, 0.5) to match the average estimates presented in Table 1 in the 
text. Since 𝛽 is constant, prediction errors are zero, meaning that the manager has perfect accuracy 
regarding her portfolio strategy in any market context. Note that all simulated returns are implicitly 
excess returns. Using the same value of 𝜖𝑡 we also construct strategy S2 by cumulating all profits and 
losses according to the following equation: 
𝑆2𝑡 = 𝑆2𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑠(𝑡) ∗ [𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓]𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑡,   with 𝑡 = 1,2, … 661 and 𝑆20 = 0 
This time, coefficient 𝛽𝑠(𝑡) is not constant but switches randomly between two extreme values, set 
at 0.05 and 0.15, following to a Markov Chain process:  𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝑃, with symmetric transition 
matrix given by 𝑃 = (
0.95 0.05
0.05 0.95
), which matches the average of the estimates provided in Table 1. 
Given a signal extracted from a variable 𝑋𝑡, the two mixed-strategy portfolios 𝑃
𝐴 and 𝑃𝐵 are 
generated according to the following rules: 
𝑃𝐴𝑡 = {
𝑆1𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑡 < 𝑥 
𝑆2𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑡 ≥ 𝑥 
       and       𝑃𝐵𝑡 = {
𝑆2𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑡 < 𝑥 
𝑆1𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑡 ≥ 𝑥 
 
where 𝑋𝑡 is the standardised value of some risk/uncertainty factor, and 𝑥 = 1.65 such that we separate 
between calm (90%) and volatile periods (10%) according to the distribution properties of 𝑋𝑡.  
We generate 5000 simulations of 661-long time series for both the noise term 𝜖𝑡 and the Markov 
Chain 𝑠(𝑡) processes. No exit is assumed even for negative portfolio values (since the initial value can 
be set arbitrarily high); there are no client inflows or outflows (redemptions). We report the median 
value of the following summary statistics: end of period portfolio value or cumulated (excess) returns, 
returns’ standard deviation, returns’ skewness, returns’ kurtosis and Sharpe ratios. To facilitate 
comparison across simulated statistics, we report the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for the 
equality of two distributions in Table 5 (see the text). 
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Our calibration of the simulation inputs generally follows the estimates reported in Table 1 (see the 
text). To check the robustness of the simulation results, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect 
to the main inputs. Our main findings, i.e. the stochastic dominance of 𝑃𝐴 over 𝑃𝐵 (as well as S1) in 
terms of lower risk, higher kurtosis and more negative skew, remain qualitatively similar (and 
statistically significant according to KS tests) in the following cases. Firstly, we vary the standard 
deviation of the random noise process 𝜖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
𝜖) from 𝜎𝜖 = 0.4 to 𝜎𝜖 = 0.7 Secondly, we calibrate 
the persistence of the MC process both lower to 𝑃 = (
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9




we keep the mean at 0.1 but change the range of values allowed for 𝛽𝑠(𝑡) by narrowing the interval to 
[0.07; 0.13] or widening it to [0.025; 0.175]; wider intervals can lead to bimodal distributions for skew 
and/or kurtosis (driven by the MC process) making it hard to interpret and qualify the simulation results.  
Our simulation faces several constraints that refer to the inherent simplifications we impose, such as 
a symmetric transition matrix and symmetric variation interval for 𝛽𝑠(𝑡), equal variance across the MC 
generated regimes, etc. Obviously, some of these constraints can be relaxed in other simulations, but 








On herding behaviour, ‘green’ energy and uncertainty‡ 
 
Abstract 
The transition to a low-carbon economy poses significant challenges, entailing higher uncertainty, not 
just higher risks, for investors in energy markets. Given the current hype around ‘green’ investing, and 
climate change in general, investors should worry for price distortions driven by behavioural biases, 
which arise particularly in markets characterised by uncertainty and information frictions. We provide 
evidence on herding behaviour, and therefore social learning, in a context where investors can opt 
between investing in an old technology (i.e. oil) and a new (i.e. ‘green’) one. Based on herding dynamics 
and its responses to various shocks, our findings suggest that: (i) investment strategies into newer 
opportunities require a better information set than into older, more established ones; and (ii) policy 
uncertainty is a better indicator than financial risk proxies, like VIX, in reflecting the multidimensional 
nature of risks associated with ‘green’ investing today. 
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An increasing number of institutional investors are divesting64 from fossil fuel stocks and shifting 
billions of dollars into alternative assets belonging to a new sector, which claims promoting a ‘green’ 
or environmental-friendly and socially responsible investment agenda (Kaminker and Steward, 2012). 
Allured by wide media coverage, retail investors are jumping onto this bandwagon as well, for fear of 
missing out on an investment opportunity that seems to align better with the ongoing shifts in societal 
preferences. According to Morningstar, net inflows into the ‘sustainable’ sector during 2019 stand at 
USD 20.6 bn., nearly four times the USD 5.5 bn. record registered for the previous year.65  
When prices do not efficiently aggregate information, a trending market can enable investors to gain 
more from trading rather than from acting on their private information signals, raising the probability 
of information cascades and, thus, herding behaviour (Cipriani and Guarino, 2008). Since herding is 
usually associated with information frictions and volatility spikes, its impact on financial markets and 
prices can be substantial and persistent (Park and Sabourian, 2011; Schmitt and Westerhoff, 2017). We 
aim at addressing this problem upfront in this chapter, by analysing social learning and investors’ group 
behaviour with respect to the ongoing ‘greening’ in investment preferences.  
Given the current hype growing around ‘green’ investing, and climate change topics in general, 
financial investors should fear for price distortions which arise particularly in markets characterised by 
information frictions. In the case of ‘green’ investing, information is often costly or limited as reflected 
in the high uncertainty surrounding the long-term economic viability prospects of many ‘green’ 
technologies (Kaminker and Steward, 2012; Andersson et al., 2016). As long as this uncertainty 
prevails, it might be that investing in an old technology (i.e. oil or fossil fuels) is less risky66 than 
investing a new (i.e. ‘green’) technology (see Hall and Khan, 2003). High uncertainty delays the 
necessary learning process of identifying the most profitable market opportunities evaluated in risk-
adjusted terms, but it might also incentivise (particularly skilled) investors to pay more attention and 
learn more about the newer opportunities (Kacperczyk et al., 2016).  
It is also the case that the economic success of new technologies depends on regulations and 
government policies that greatly impact on the innovation process itself (Wustenhagen and Menichetti, 
                                                          
64 As of December 2019, various institutions ranging from NGOs, Philanthropic Foundations and Educational Institutions to 
Corporations have publicly announced and committed to divest from at least one type of fossil fuel almost $11.94 trillion. 
Source: http://gofossilfree.org/commitments, accessed on February 20, 2020. 
65 Source: “Sustainable Fund Flows in 2019 Smash Previous Records“, Morningstar, January 10, 2020, see 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/961765/sustainable-fund-flows-in-2019-smash-previous-records. 
66 During the transition to a low-carbon economy, ‘green’ investing entails dealing with higher uncertainty, not just higher 
risks. See the discussion in Thoma and Chenet (2017) on the distinction between uncertainty and risk in relation to the financial 
implications of climate change. 
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2012; Andersson et al., 2016; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018). Mazzucato and Semieniuk (2018) find 
that public financial institutions (e.g. state banks) invest in higher risk technologies, and therefore can 
create a direction for change; in fact, Mazzucato and Semieniuk (2017) show that successful past 
policies in the innovation sector have been more about incentivising and shaping new markets, rather 
than addressing market failures.  
With no certainty regarding long-term prospects and without a coherent global policy response (to 
which the recent U.S. withdrawal from the Paris climate accord is the latest proof), financial markets 
remain key to financing our society’s responses to climate-related challenges67 (Kaminker and Steward, 
2012; Andersson et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2019). As multidimensional uncertainty interacts with 
investors’ own behavioural biases, the social learning process becomes more complicated, possibly 
driving prices away from their fundamental values and increasing volatility (Avery and Zemsky, 1998). 
Within this market environment characterized by costly or limited information and constant 
regulatory challenges, the paper aims at understanding how financial investors deal with the inherent 
uncertainty that surrounds their current portfolio allocations in energy assets. We focus on U.S. energy 
stocks, which are the most likely to be affected by climate-related challenges. We are most interested 
though in investors’ collective or group dynamics, which is likely to display herding and other similar 
behavioural biases usually associated with information frictions and volatility spikes in financial 
markets. A 2015 survey conducted by the CFA Institute amongst professional portfolio managers places 
herding on top of a list including several behavioural biases.68 Herding arises when investors choose to 
suppress their own private information and instead mimic the actions of others, leading to information 
cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992). Many theories predict that herding leads to higher 
volatility and deviations from stocks’ fundamental values, i.e. asset booms and busts (Froot et al., 1992; 
Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Avramov et al., 2006; Park and Sabourian, 2011; Schmitt and Westerhoff, 
2017). The main questions we address in this context are: What drives herding behaviour in U.S. energy 
sector and how does social learning occur? What should investors learn before abandoning an 
established investment strategy, to chase for newer (i.e. ‘greener’) investment opportunities?  
To address these questions, we look for the main determinants of herding, considering uncertainty 
and the risk-return trade-offs relevant for investors in energy assets. Our main contribution is to provide 
                                                          
67 It is encouraging to see banks increasingly becoming aware of their contribution to fighting climate risks, particularly 
through their financing decisions. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is reported to consider changing its mandate and 
adapting its lending policies in order to fight climate change (Source: “EIB begins metamorphosis into climate bank”, Euractiv, 
September 9, 2019). The Dutch financial group ING Groep NV says it is allocating resources to estimate its overall carbon 
footprint, based on asset types and lending transactions (source: “Banks Are Finally Starting to Account for Climate Change 
Risk”, Bloomberg Businessweek, September 12, 2019).  




evidence on herding behaviour, and therefore social learning, in a market context where investors can 
opt between investing in an old technology (i.e. oil) versus a new (i.e. ‘green’) one. We find that 
investors in U.S. energy stocks herd more in response to shocks in oil returns, but not to shocks in oil 
volatility; investing in an old technology thus requires little besides information on returns. In contrast, 
the same investors herd less in response to ‘green’ volatility shocks, but seem immune to shocks in 
‘green’ returns; opting for a newer investment opportunity, therefore, requires a better information set. 
Another contribution of our analysis regards portfolio allocations in the current market context. 
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria are gaining in popularity among investors and 
companies alike, but despite this euphoria, 8 of the 10 biggest ESG funds in U.S. own substantial equity 
shares in big oil companies (e.g. ExxonMobil).69 Our findings help explain this allocation strategy as 
well, by providing empirical evidence on the lack of sensitivity for crude oil to policy uncertainty that 
highly affects ‘green’ portfolio allocations. 
From a methodological perspective, we first employ a time-varying coefficient version of the 
original empirical specification proposed in Chang et al., (2000) in order to expose herding towards the 
market consensus in U.S. energy stocks. Next, we set up vector autoregressive (VAR) models including 
a dynamic herding metric along with returns, volatility and uncertainty that proxy for the relevant 
information set available to investors. Last, we derive our main insights based on empirical tests and 
impulse responses from several estimated VAR models.  
This chapter of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature, while section 3 describes our dataset used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the 
empirical methodology and a discussion of the main results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current hype in ‘greening’ portfolio allocations looks exciting, although great risks and uncertainty 
dominate ‘green’ assets’ valuations and their long-term prospects. Despite these inherent challenges, 
and despite some previous disappointing returns, ‘green’ assets are considered by portfolio managers 
for diversification motives (Miralles-Quiros and Miralles-Quiros, 2019), but also as a way to attract 
client inflows in the current social context. Not the same can be said about oil portfolio allocations. 
Andersson et al., (2016), Batten et al., (2018) and Engle et al., (2019) propose risk management 
techniques to hedge climate-related risks requiring portfolio allocations to both crude oil and (global) 
stocks. Currently, crude oil serves as a hedge against various uncertainty sources stemming mainly from 
                                                          




the policy and/or political realms (Chkili et al., 2014; Omar et al., 2017); energy equities can serve a 
similar scope by providing their investors with exposure to oil fluctuations and substantial dividends as 
well. These differences in motivations carry a significant importance for those investors deciding their 
portfolio allocations, particularly during periods of market stress and uncertainty.  
Given the complex nature of the associated risks and uncertainties facing investors today, it is useful 
to review the early study of Avery and Zemsky (1998) discussing financial investors’ behavioural 
biases, and in particular herding. Avery and Zemsky (1998) structure their discussion around (i) value 
uncertainty about price signals, under which herding does not occur, (ii) event uncertainty, which makes 
herding possible but also supportive in the price discovery process, and (iii) composition uncertainty, 
under which the proportion of informed versus uninformed investors is not known, thus complicating 
social learning and incentivizing herding behaviour that obscures rather than support price discovery.70    
The concept of herding in financial markets was initially presented in the studies of Bikhchandani 
et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992), who define it as a tendency for imitation that leads to correlated 
investing (e.g. buy, sell) patterns. The early literature (surveys can be found in Devenow and Welch, 
1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000; Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003) has concentrated on 
explaining rational herding behaviour based on: (i) payoff externalities, when an individual agent’s 
payoff depends on the number of other agents adopting the same action; (ii) principal-agent or 
reputational mechanisms, when failing together is less costly than failing alone; and (iii) information 
cascade mechanisms, when investors ignore their own beliefs and private information in order to follow 
the market consensus. The more recent literature adds elements drawing from the physiology and 
neuroeconomics fields, emphasising individuals’ emotional, psychological and/or social traits (e.g. 
Rubinstein, 2001; Shiller, 2002; Baddeley et al., 2012). 
Relying mostly on statistical measures and constructs, a vast empirical literature has analysed the 
presence of herding amongst several financial actors (e.g., institutional investors, fund managers, 
financial analysts), as well as in various financial markets (e.g., stock and bond markets, mutual funds, 
foreign exchange markets). The first literature strand uses micro-data to detect herding amongst (mostly 
institutional) investors (e.g. Sias, 2004; Blasco et al., 2012; Cipriani and Guarino, 2014). The second 
literature strand, to which our approach belongs as well, investigates herding towards the market 
consensus using aggregate market data (e.g. Christie and Huang 1995; Chang et al, 2000).  
The earliest empirical specification designed for herding detection based on aggregate market data 
is provided by Christie and Huang (1995); alternative model specifications and extensions are included 
in Chang et al. (2000); Chiang and Zheng, (2010); Economou et al., (2011); Yao et al. (2014); Galariotis 
et al., (2015; 2016); Demirer et al., (2015); Litimi et al., (2016) etc. Even though herding is expected to 
                                                          
70 This is because the trading patterns in a market with many uninformed traders that exhibit herding behaviour can be similar 
to the trading patterns observed in a market with many informed investors that trade based on news related to fundamentals. 
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be more pronounced during down or declining markets (Chang et al., 2000; Chiang and Zheng, 2010), 
there is evidence of significant asymmetric herding behaviour (Philippas et al, 2013) and during up 
markets as well (Tan et al., 2008; BenMabrouk and Litimi, 2018). We contribute to this literature by 
proposing a time-varying continuous herding proxy, whose inference is more data-efficient than 
existing approaches (e.g. Chiang et al., 2013; Babalos et al., 2015) and which preserves the theoretical 
consistency of the original model (Chang et al., 2000). 
Cipriani and Guarino (2014) prove experimentally that rational herding behaviour increases with 
uncertainty. In a companion paper, they present a theoretical model where investors’ private 
information becomes less important as trading (and volatility) increases (see Cipriani and Guarino, 
2008). Sias (2004) finds that it is more likely for investors to herd in case of small cap stocks, where 
there is less information available and the degree of information asymmetries is higher.  
Sudden changes or regime shifts, such as those triggered by (de-)regulation reforms, can speed up 
learning and facilitate action convergence among market participants, without necessarily being 
considered as herding. In this context, Wustenhagen and Menichetti (2012) discuss how changes in 
government policies and regulations can affect the current trade-offs associated with investing in the 
energy sector. We believe our analysis contributes to this debate by disentangling among different 
information types that affect investors’ learning and portfolio allocations across the energy sector.  
Finally, our paper relates to the recent booming financial literature dealing with attention allocation. 
Kacperczyk et al., (2016) predict that attention and information acquisition behaviour, i.e. learning, 
determine investors’ risky portfolio choices, and present empirical evidence for their claim. Similarly, 
Andrei and Hasler (2019) present a model where optimal attention increase with future returns’ 
uncertainty, treating attention as a non-financial allocation in investors’ portfolios. In this context, we 
interpret herding as a temporary failure to allocate attention by investors. 
 
3. DATA 
Our data set comes from different sources, which we discuss in detail in this section. Data on the 31 
constituent shares of the S&P 500 Energy Index come from Thomson Reuters Eikon.71 The full sample 
spans from January 2011 to December 2018.72 All our indicators are constructed as weekly averages of 
daily observations. Although herding behaviour is more likely to be identified with high-frequency data 
(see Christoffersen and Tang, 2009), daily figures would capture too much of the trading noise. 
                                                          
71 Source: https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500-energy-sector.  
72 The chosen period includes several events originating in the USA, Europe, Middle East etc., with potential impact for the 
U.S. and global energy industry. Some examples refer to Brexit referendum, a series of declarations and political actions by 
the U.S. president Donald Trump on the Iranian nuclear deal, OPEC agreements with Russia to limit oil supply, the ongoing 
crisis in Venezuela, political upheaval in the Middle East related to the Syrian war, etc. 
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Moreover, decision-making in finance is a lengthy process, and significant changes in the strategic 
allocations of investors are not visible on a high frequency (e.g. daily) basis, e.g. the reallocation from 
conventional to ‘green’ energy assets. In fact, most changes in portfolio strategy and asset allocations 
are normally associated with phases of the economic cycle, or changes in risk appetite or in the existing 
correlations amongst various asset classes (see Batten et al., 2018). Our results obtained at weekly 
frequency should be viewed therefore as being rather conservative in terms of herding detection. 
The constituents of the energy sector in the S&P 500 Index are some of the biggest oil and gas 
companies, not only in U.S., but globally (e.g. Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Halliburton, ConocoPhillips). 
Some of these energy companies are already positioning as leaders in the transition towards ‘greener’ 
energy sources (Pickl, 2019). The sector includes companies active in various segments of the oil and 
gas industry (e.g. upstream, midstream, downstream), with different levels of vertical integration, being 
thus very heterogeneous. At the end of 2018, the S&P energy sector had a market representation of 
5.3% in the total S&P 500 index, although this value has varied significantly over time. At its lowest 
point in terms of market valuation, i.e. March 2009, the energy sector had a share as high as 14.3%. In 
general, the market valuation share is a function of the capitalization of the constituent stocks, which 
may depend on the economic cycle, geopolitics, risk appetite, etc. Empirical research shows that the 
energy sector’s performance depends mainly on the oil price (Baffes et al., 2015; Ahmadi et al., 2016; 
BenMabrouk and Litimi, 2018), which is the most relevant reference as well as a leading indicator of 
the global economic cycle. We therefore use the WTI crude oil prices as the main proxy for conventional 
energy investing in the following sections. 
To capture the financial performance of ‘green’ assets instead, we rely on various available indexes 
and datasets. Firstly, we use 16 ‘green’ Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which are some of the most 
representative ETFs in this sector, and are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq.73 The 
ETFs are an attractive option for many investors, offering diversification benefits and indirect access to 
(sometimes illiquid or inaccessible) international equities or exotic asset classes. ETFs generally have 
low fees, high transparency and liquidity, and trade similarly to stocks, i.e. throughout the day, meaning 
that investors can employ leverage and/or short selling in order to take advantage of market moves in 
real time. Some ETFs might invest exclusively in particular industries (e.g. solar), or focus on specific 
geographical regions (e.g. South America), but many try to hold a diversified portfolio of ‘green’ 
investments in order to counter the impact of low profit margins that characterise this sector, especially 
during its infancy about a decade ago.74 Several empirical papers focusing on the energy sector, use 
‘green’ ETFs in order to study the transition to a low-carbon economy (Andersson et al., 2016; Miralles-
                                                          
73 The data source is Bloomberg. The detailed list of ‘green’ ETFs used in this paper is provided in Appendix A. 
74 Despite growing volumes and capacity, and sometimes generous subsidies from governments, most companies operating in 
the ‘green’ energy sector risk declining prices and margins as the technology improves and investment costs add up, new 
competitors enter the market, or new regulation constraints become binding.  
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Quiros and Miralles-Quiros, 2019). To summarize the 16 ETFs performances with a single aggregate 
indicator, we employ two measures: (i) a time-series of returns derived from an equally weighted (in 
US dollar terms) portfolio based on all 16 ETFs, and (ii) a time-series of synthetic returns derived from 
the first principal component of the 16 ETFs’ weekly returns.75  
Secondly, we use four indexes that are more commonly employed in empirical studies on financial 
aspects of climate change (Rahdari et al., 2015; Baker et al., 2018). These indexes are available from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon and serve to monitor the financial performance of companies, whose investing 
and operating principles are sensitive to environmental and climate-related risks. The first two indexes 
are based on the leading U.S. stock market index, i.e. S&P500, but with different allocations in order 
overweight (underweight) companies that fulfil (do not fulfil) certain criteria. More specifically, we use 
(i) the S&P500 ESG Index, which over-(under-)weights companies that have high (low) ESG scores, 
and (ii) the S&P500 Carbon Efficient Index, which over-(under-)weights companies with a low (high) 
carbon footprint. The last two indexes are (iii) the S&P Global Clean Energy Index, which provides 
investors with exposures to 30 global companies with businesses in clean energy production and 
equipment; and (iv) the S&P Global Water Index, which tracks a portfolio of about 50 global companies 
that do water-related businesses in utilities, infrastructure, equipment and materials.  
Lastly, we take a broader view on risk, expanding beyond standard financial risk measures (e.g. 
volatility), and include (Knightian) uncertainty as well. To reflect risks and uncertainty affecting the 
investment decisions of financial investors in energy stocks, we use the CBOE Volatility index (VIX) 
to proxy for financial markets risk, and the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index76 developed in 
Baker et al. (2016) for the U.S. The former is the most widely used indicator of financial risk in the 
empirical literature. The latter is a composite index based on the frequency of some relevant keywords 
in leading U.S. newspapers and is available as a daily time-series for U.S. In terms of explaining 
economic dynamics, Baker et al., (2016) show that the EPU is orthogonal to market volatility or risk 
indexes (such as VIX), despite some overlaps and correlation between the two. To refine the content of 
the index, the authors have defined several categorical sub-indexes77 that pertain to different policy 
domains (e.g. monetary, fiscal, trade etc.). Given our research questions, in addition to the more general 
EPU index, and mainly as a robustness check, we use the EPU Regulation index which includes several 
                                                          
75 The main goal of principal component analysis (PCA) in our case is to summarize the correlations among the 16 ‘green’ 
ETFs returns with a smaller set of linear combinations. Considering PCA as an aggregation tool, there is an implicit 
requirement that the ETFs are correlated. Our analysis shows that the correlation between the returns of any two ETFs in our 
list is above 0.4 and statistically significant. 
76 Data and details regarding the methodology are available from www.policyuncertainty.com.  




climate-related terms within its long list of keywords, e.g. carbon tax, drilling restrictions, offshore 
drilling, pollution controls, environmental restrictions, clean air act, clean water act.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
This section presents our empirical framework, which is divided in two main parts. Firstly, we use 
regressions and data filtering techniques to detect the presence of herding behaviour among the 
constituents of the S&P 500 Energy Index. Secondly, we estimate several VAR models specified in 
herding, uncertainty and risk-return proxies. Finally, we draw our main insights based on impulse 
response functions for herding, oil and ‘green’ assets, and discuss their robustness. 
 
4.1. Herding detection 
We start with herding detection under what has become the common approach in the empirical 
literature, following the seminal paper of Chang et al. (2000). It is standard to use the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation (CSAD) as a proxy for assets’ return dispersion:  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =





where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the return of asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is return on the market portfolio at time 𝑡, and 𝑛 is the 
number of all assets traded on that market.  
Chang et al., (2000) demonstrates that in the presence of herding, the linear relationship that capital 
asset pricing models (CAPM) predict between the dispersion of individual asset returns and the absolute 
market return, |𝑟𝑚|, would be violated. Herding behaviour introduces nonlinearities, as some investors 
may trade closer to the market consensus (i.e. low CSAD values) when faced with extreme market 
moves (i.e. extreme 𝑟𝑚 values). Therefore, herding can be detected in the following model:  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1|𝑟𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛽2𝑟𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝑢𝑡 (2) 
where |𝑟𝑚,𝑡| denotes the absolute value of market returns, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡
2  denotes the squared market returns, 𝛽0, 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are coefficients to be estimated, and 𝑢𝑡 is an error term. For herding detection it is sufficient 
to let the market portfolio (used to compute the returns series, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡) simply be an equally weighted 
portfolio constructed from all stocks in our sample, i.e. the constituent stocks of the S&P 500 Energy 
Index.  
The mathematical derivation of eq. (2) implies that the first derivative of cross sectional dispersion 
with respect to the market portfolio is simply a constant term, and that the second derivative is null. 
Therefore, in the absence of herding, the CAPM-based model predicts that variations in market returns 
(in either direction) should be linearly associated with CSAD, demonstrated by a positive and 
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statistically significant 𝛽1 coefficient.
78 If herding exists then investors will ignore private information 
and switch from their own strategies to following the market consensus, thus pulling individual asset 
returns towards the market returns. This obscures the linear relationship between CSAD and market 
returns, and it is reflected in a statistically significant and negative 𝛽2 coefficient (see Chang et al., 
2000).  
We estimate eq. (2) with weekly data for the constituent stocks of the S&P 500 Energy Index (see 
section 3). We use OLS, which provides us with consistent estimators, despite larger estimated standard 
errors, to gain some preliminary insights. Table 1 shows that the 𝛽2 coefficient is positive and 
statistically insignificant, and therefore offers no evidence at this point of herding behaviour within the 
constituent stocks of the S&P500 Energy Index. 
 
Table 1. Standard herding model and estimates by OLS 
 𝛽0 𝛽1 𝛽2 
Coefficient  0.364*** 0.182*** 0.013 
Standard error 0.013 0.036 0.017 
Notes: The table presents the results from the estimation of Eq. (2) for the period Jan. 2011 to Dec. 2018, at weekly frequency. 
Newey-West Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are reported below the estimated 
coefficients. The Adjusted R2 of the equation is 0.31. Three stars (***), two stars (**) and one star (*) denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Herding has been repeatedly shown to be market-dependent, non-linear, asymmetric and therefore 
essentially time-varying. Several papers have tried to identify what specific market conditions and 
factors, beyond pure volatility, are more likely to be associated with herding towards the market 
consensus. Chang et al. (2000) introduce dummies for up and down markets; Chiang and Zheng (2010), 
Economou et al., (2011) add spill-overs from international markets; Galariotis et al., (2015) and Hwang 
and Salmon (2014) separate between the role of fundamental and non-fundamental factors in driving 
herding; Demirer et al. (2015) include volatility persistency; Yao et al (2014) include traded volume as 
an additional indicator. At this point we prefer not to impose any given model structure, e.g. by adding 
dummies and other explanatory variables, as explained below. 
Given the conditional, non-linear and time-varying nature of herding behaviour, we relax the 
constant coefficient assumption implicit in Eq. (2) and employ a Kalman filter to estimate it. We let 
only 𝛽2 be time-varying and keep the other two coefficients as time-invariant to reflect the linear 
relationship between CSAD and market returns embedded in the CAPM theory. We re-specify eq. (2) 
in state-space form as:  
 
                                                          
78 See Hwang and Salmon (2014) for a model of herding detection when the CAPM does not hold. 
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𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽′0 + 𝛽′1|𝑟𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛽2,𝑡𝑟𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝑒𝑡  
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝛽2,𝑡 = 𝛽2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (3) 
where 𝑒𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), 𝛽′0 and 𝛽′1 are coefficients, while 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛽2
2). The filtered time-varying 𝛽2,𝑡 
state will be denoted as our dynamic ‘herding proxy’ in the remaining of the paper, because it reflects 
the time-varying nature of the non-linear relation between cross-sectional dispersion and market 
extreme returns, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡
2 . Although herding is an exceptional market state, a continuous and time-varying 
proxy can help us gain more insights into its potential determinants, without additional assumptions that 
impose a given structure on the estimated equation.  
Estimation of the model given in eq. (3) over the Jan. 2011 – Dec. 2018 sample, using weekly 
observations, leads to statistically significant 𝛽′0 and 𝛽′1, but very close to the values of 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 from 
Table 1, for which reasons we do not report them separately. Figure 1 displays the time-varying 𝛽2,𝑡 
along with its confidence interval set at +/- 2 standard deviations. 
It is important to see our ‘herding proxy’ as reflecting real market phenomena rather than being a 
statistical construct. Our herding proxy generally displays mostly negative (though statistically 
insignificant) values, except some short periods of time at the end of 2015 – beginning of 2016 when it 
becomes positive. Our estimated 𝛽2,𝑡 is significantly negative during most of 2013 and 2014, coinciding 
with a time period when the energy market was peaking and the oil prices were hovering above 100 
USD per barrel; other short periods of negative and significant values for 𝛽2,𝑡 occurred around mid-
2015 and mid-2017. Overall, this observation shows that herding in energy stocks is probably more 
prevalent during rising (or peak) energy stocks and oil prices. This is in line with the recent empirical 
evidence provided in BenMabrouk and Litimi (2018), who find that herding in energy sector is more 
likely during rising rather than declining oil markets. Moreover, given that the market capitalisation 
share of the energy sector in the S&P 500 index is negatively correlated with the business cycle, many 
investors use energy equities and oil for portfolio diversification and protection against recession (i.e. 
macroeconomic) risks. There is also ample evidence on the importance of crude oil as a hedge against 
various other risks, including (geo)political risks (Chkili et al. 2014; Omar et al., 2017; Antonakakis et 
al. 2017); in this context, energy stocks allow portfolio investors not only to gain an exposure to oil as 





Figure 1: ‘Herding proxy’ in energy stocks along with S&P 500 Energy and WTI oil prices 
  
Notes: The graph displays the time-varying estimate of 𝛽2,𝑡, i.e. our ‘herding proxy’, as a solid black line along with a 
confidence interval set at +/-2 standard deviations depicted in grey. Sample runs from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 2018, at weekly 
frequency; the first 3 months of 2011 were dropped due to the known erratic behaviour of the filtered states from the Kalman 
filter. The left panel includes the S&P 500 Energy Index in red, while the right panel includes the crude oil prices in USD/barrel 
(on the right hand scale) in red. 
 
We believe our approach to estimating a dynamic ‘herding proxy’ is more data-efficient than the 
existing alternatives, as it allows for more degrees of freedom, and fits some relevant real market 
phenomena. For example, Chiang et al., (2013), Babalos et al., (2015), and Balcilar et al., (2017) 
estimate herding models with time-varying coefficients using complex filtering techniques, but do not 
discuss whether and how their estimates match certain market dynamics or events. In additional, Chang 
et al. (2000) derive their testing model based on the long-run linear relationship between CSAD and 
market return predicted by the CAPM (i.e. constant 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 coefficients); therefore, estimating only 
𝛽2,𝑡 as time-varying is data-efficient and balances the need for a dynamic estimate with the theoretical 
consistency of the original model.  
 
 
4.2. Herding in a multivariate model 
To capture various sources of friction that might be relevant to understanding information cascades and 
herding in the U.S. energy sector, we oppose oil and ‘green’ assets by looking at their returns and 
conditional volatility proxies. To keep things simple, we derive conditional volatility from estimating a 
simple GARCH (1, 1) model specified in weekly returns. For investors, the returns would convey 
information that is relevant from a short-term investing perspective (particularly in trending markets), 
while volatility proxies would carry information about the medium- to long-term portfolio implications.  
While much of the empirical literature concentrates on the impact of volatility (or its proxies) on 
herding behaviour, there is only scarce or less clear evidence available on the inverse relationship. For 
example, using an intraday measure of herding intensity proposed by Patterson and Sharma (2006), 
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Blasco et al. (2012) find that herding impacts positively on the volatility of Spanish stocks. Instead, 
Holmes et al. (2013) show that market volatility impacts negatively on herding, while Litimi et al. 
(2016) and BenSaida (2016) find evidence for U.S. that herding, particularly when trading volume is 
high, reduces aggregate volatility due to the presence of inactive stocks. 
To address the main questions formulated in the introduction, we seek to understand herding and 
thus social learning when investors are facing investment choices that imply trading off an established 
investment strategy (into an old production technology that is oil-dependent) for a new one. To do so, 
we set up a simple VAR model in the following variables: one pair of information-relevant variables 
for each investment option (both oil and ‘green’ assets), the log of VIX, log of EPU, and the estimated 
dynamic ‘herding proxy’ from the previous section (albeit with a negative sign to facilitate 
interpretation). We have included information-rich variables like VIX and EPU indexes as a way to 
filter out market-related and policy-related noise, and thus reflect information from a broader context. 
Compared to other estimation methods (e.g. GARCH-family models for volatility, including 
multivariate specifications), a simple VAR is able to expose the most important linkages and, in the 
same time, to remain flexible in allowing for a larger number of endogenous variables without 
compromising on its inference efficiency. There are 4 or 5 lags (i.e. approximately one month) included 
in all VAR specifications, based on selection criteria and residual autocorrelation tests. All estimated 
VARs are stable, with roots inside the unit circle.  
We choose the equally-weighted portfolio built out of 16 ETFs, henceforth ETF_EQW, as our 
‘green’ proxy in the remaining of this section. All the other 5 ‘green’ proxies described in section 3 are 
used as robustness checks and discussed in the next sub-section.79  
Granger causality tests are a standard check in applied econometrics and can give an overview of 
the existing linkages between variables included in the VAR. We report only the most relevant Granger 
causality results in Table 2 below. To summarize, we find that: (i) conditional volatility in the ‘green’ 
proxy Granger-cause herding in energy stocks; (ii) EPU Granger-causes ‘green’, but not oil conditional 
volatility; and (iii) VIX Granger-cases both conditional volatilities in oil and ’green’ proxy. We do not 
go into more details here, since these results will be discussed later in this section.  
                                                          
79 Appendix B to this chapter provides the summary statistics for oil and ‘green’ returns.  
131 
 
Table 2. Selected Granger causality tests  
Panel A:  
Dependent variable DLOG_CRUDEOIL 
Excluded: Chi-square Prob. 
DLOG_ETF_EQW 6.84 0.1442 
LOG(VIX) 0.7257 0.9481 
LOG(EPU) 1.9266 0.7492 
-BETA2 8.8479 0.0650 
  
Dependent variable DLOG_ETF_EQW 
Excluded: Chi-square Prob. 
DLOG_CRUDEOIL 1.3670 0.8499 
LOG(VIX) 3.9260 0.4161 
LOG(EPU) 5.4794 0.2415 
-BETA2 4.6439 0.3258 
  
Dependent variable -BETA2 
Excluded: Chi-square Prob. 
DLOG_CRUDEOIL 0.6466 0.9577 
DLOG_ETF_EQW 3.9377 0.4145 
LOG(VIX) 4.4310 0.3508 
LOG(EPU) 1.5772 0.8129 
Panel B:  
Dependent variable GARCH_CRUDEOIL 
Excluded: Chi-square Prob. 
GARCH_ETF_EQW 11.8774 0.0365 
LOG(VIX) 31.9261 0.0000 
LOG(EPU) 4.1309 0.5307 
-BETA2 18.5617 0.0023 
  
Dependent variable GARCH_ETF_EQW 
Excluded: Chi-square Prob. 
GARCH_CRUDEOIL 10.4965 0.0623 
LOG(VIX) 132.2029 0.0000 
LOG(EPU) 9.3513 0.0958 
-BETA2 23.9310 0.0002 
  
Dependent variable -BETA2 
Excluded: Chi-square Prob. 
GARCH_CRUDEOIL 5.6640 0.3403 
GARCH_ETF_EQW 14.9603 0.0105 
LOG(VIX) 8.7699 0.1186 
LOG(EPU) 2.6793 0.7493 
Notes: For panel A, a 4-lag 5-variable VAR is used, specified in the following variables: weekly WTI crude oil returns denoted 
as DLOG_CRUDEOIL; weekly returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs, denoted as DLOG_ETF_EQW; 
log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the ‘herding proxy’ derived in previous section denoted as -BETA2. 
We report the Chi-square statistics and the associated probability (Prob.) for 4 degrees of freedom. For panel B, a 5-lag 5-
variable VAR is used, specified in the following variables: conditional volatility of WTI crude oil returns denoted as 
GARCH_CRUDEOIL; conditional volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs, denoted as 
GARCH_ETF_EQW; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the ‘herding proxy’ derived in the previous 
section, denoted as -BETA2. We report the Chi-square statistics and the associated probability (Prob.) for 5 degrees of 




In terms of identification80, we adopt an agnostic approach and employ generalised impulse response 
functions (or GIRFs) to derive our main insights (see Koop et al., 1996; Pesaran and Shin 1998). We 
believe GIRFs are more appropriate in our case, given that it is hard to impose a-priori restrictions on 
contemporaneous responses or establish a specific ordering in a model featuring fast-moving variables 
like volatilities, along with herding. The GIRFs, however, do not hold any structural interpretation, and 
only provide the average impact expected after a shock.  
 
Figure 2: Selected bootstrapped GIRFs  




Note: The figure displays the GIRFs with bootstrapped confidence bands (set at +/- 2 standard deviations) and median 
responses to shocks in returns (i.e. DLOG terms) and conditional volatility (i.e. GARCH terms). For panel A, a 4-lag 5-variable 
VAR is used, specified in the following variables: weekly WTI crude oil returns denoted as DLOG_CRUDEOIL; weekly 
returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs, denoted as DLOG_ETF_EQW; log of VIX index; log of EPU 
index; and the negative of the ‘herding proxy’ derived in the previous section denoted as -BETA2. For panel B, a 5-lag 5-
variable VAR is used, specified in the following variables: conditional volatility of WTI crude oil returns denoted as 
GARCH_CRUDEOIL; conditional volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs, denoted as 
GARCH_ETF_EQW; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the ‘herding proxy’ derived in the previous 
section, denoted as -BETA2. Estimation sample for both panels includes weekly observations Apr. 2011 - Dec. 2018. The 
‘herding proxy’ is taken with a negative sign in the VARs, such that an increase in herding is associated with positive values.  
                                                          
80 Structural decomposition methods applied to VAR models designed to study oil and market volatility can be found among 
others in Kilian (2009), Bastianin and Manera (2018). Compared to these studies, our focus is not on identifying structural oil 




Figure 2 provides a selection of the most relevant GIRFs from two VARs, one specified for returns 
and the other one specified for conditional volatility. Given that the VARs include some generated 
regressors (i.e. the conditional volatility, or the GARCH terms, and the herding proxy), robust 
confidence intervals are obtained following Kilian (1998), by bootstrapping the estimated VARs. In 
addition, we use a rather conservative interval of 95% for these confidence bands, or 2 standard 
deviations on either sides of the median impulse responses, in order to draw our main insights.  
Two main results emerge from the analysis of GIRFs, confirming some of our previous insights from 
the Granger causality tests. Firstly, we find that our ‘herding proxy’ does not respond to shocks in 
‘green’ returns, but increases in response to positive shocks in oil returns; given that oil is an established 
investment strategy, into an industry reliant on old production technologies, there is no need for more 
than information on returns. Secondly, our ‘herding proxy’ responds (albeit with a lag that reflects the 
learning process) only to shocks in ‘green’ (but not oil) volatility, which can be best related to the 
medium- and long-term prospects and the quality of the information set available for ‘green’ assets and 
technologies. Therefore, unexpected spikes in ‘green’ assets’ volatility reduce herding intensity 
amongst equity investors, suggesting that some of them might be considering additional information is 
needed before joining the trend. 
What these GIRFs from Figure 2 imply is that unexpected negative oil returns and/or positive spikes 
in ‘green’ volatility might reduce herding intensity among investors in energy equities. The results offer 
a perspective on what type of information is required to resolve uncertainty and ease information 
frictions that are conducive to herding in the first place. Kacperczyk et al., (2016) suggest that skilled 
investors allocate more attention and prefer to learn more about the most uncertain outcomes (see 
Proposition 1);81 in other words, high volatility in ‘green’ assets would incentivize (at least) some 
investors to learn more (i.e. implying less herding) about ‘green’ opportunities. Andrei and Hasler 
(2019) arrive at a similar conclusion in a model where optimal attention represents a non-financial 
allocation in investors’ portfolios. From this perspective, we can interpret herding as a temporary failure 
in allocating attention. While much of the literature surveyed in section 2 suggests that higher volatility 
drives more herding, we provide evidence that an opposite channel might be at work in the ‘green’ 
sector, where higher volatility/uncertainty pushes (at least some) investors towards more learning, and 
therefore less herding. The arrival of better informed investors can break the information cascade and 
reduce herding incidence (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). To summarise, social learning with respect 
to old technologies requires nothing more than information on returns, but newer investment 
opportunities require a better information set in the first place. 
                                                          
81 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) made a similar prediction much earlier, i.e. when many investors are informed about some 
risk, market prices are being informative, therefore decreasing one’s incentives to learn about the very same risk. 
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Appendix C at the end of this chapter includes the full set of GIRF derived from the two VARs 
discussed in this section; these plots provide additional evidence in line with our previous Granger 
causality insights where we saw that ‘green’ assets (not oil) are sensitive to policy uncertainty. We find 
that unexpected shocks in EPU lead to higher volatility and lower returns in the case of ‘green’ assets, 
but not in the case of crude oil. In the same time, unexpected VIX shocks drive higher volatility and 
lower returns in both oil and ‘green’ assets. Policy uncertainty is therefore a better indicator than 
financial risk proxies, like VIX, in reflecting the multidimensional nature of risks associated with 
‘green’ investing today. The importance of this result should not be underrated: if policy uncertainty 
drives ‘green’ assets volatility, but not oil volatility, then investors might be able to use oil as a hedge 
against policy uncertainty shocks, and therefore as a hedge for their ‘green’ portfolio allocations against 
policy-related and regulatory changes. This surprising result might thus justify the substantial equity 
shares in big oil companies (e.g. ExxonMobil) reported by some of the biggest ESG funds in U.S. 
Moreover, it is in line with the recent results provided in Andersson et al., (2016), Batten et al., (2018) 
and Engle et al., (2019) regarding the role of oil allocations for financial portfolios that need to hedge 
climate-related risks. 
 
4.3. Robustness  
As robustness checks we implement a series of modifications to the VAR models estimated in the 
previous section. Firstly, we replace the equal-weighted ETF portfolio, ETF_EQW, with each of the 
other 5 ‘green’ proxies mentioned in section 3. Results are qualitatively similar, except for the S&P 
Global Clean Energy Index, where herding responses are not statistically significant based on the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals (set at +/-2 standard deviations around the median response).  
Secondly, we use futures oil prices instead of spot prices. Avery and Zemsky (1998) claim that the 
presence of derivatives makes herding and price bubbles less pronounced as such instruments are better 
at reflecting multidimensional uncertainty. Futures prices provide a link between current prices and the 
expected spot prices after including all relevant uncertainty sources into the price formation process. 
However, in our case herding occurs in a different market segment (i.e. energy equities) than the one 
where we measure volatility (i.e. oil futures market), although the two would be tightly linked. The 
main results remain mostly unchanged, but in addition we find that herding response to an unexpected 
shock in futures oil price volatility is negative (just as in response to a ‘green’ volatility shock); this 
new result validates the interpretation provided in Avery and Zemsky (1998) that derivatives are better 
at reflecting multidimensional uncertainty. Figure D1 in Appendix D provides a selected set of relevant 
GIRFs in this case. 
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Thirdly, we replace EPU with one of its domain-specific sub-indexes, i.e. EPU-Regulation, which 
is expected to be more relevant for the ‘green’ sector given the strong feedbacks between regulation, 
innovation and investing (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018). In addition, we might like to clean EPU 
from those elements that could be unrelated to climate policy and regulatory risks, but instead reflect 
international political crises or conflicts (e.g. U.S. fight against terrorism in Middle East), which are 
known to increase investors’ demand for oil as a hedge (see Omar et al., 2017). Results are qualitatively 
unchanged (see figure D2, Appendix D).  
Fourthly, we re-estimate our herding proxy from section 4.1, eq. (3), this time assuming its dynamics 
follows an autoregressive of order 1, i.e. AR(1), process instead of a unit root, i.e. I(1), process. While 
the persistency of the new estimated state variable, 𝛽2,𝑡, is high and close to 0.9 (statistically significant), 
and the two herding proxies are correlated (i.e. at 0.72), the confidence interval associated with the new 
estimates implies a lack of herding over the sample period. In addition, we believe that the new herding 
proxy is less intuitive and less relevant in terms of matching real market phenomena. However, the 
GIRFs that depict herding responses to ‘green’ and oil shocks are statistically significant, though 
slightly less persistent than in the benchmark case presented in section 4.2 (see Figure D3, in Appendix 
D). Acknowledging that the ‘herding proxy’ remains a model generated variable that might depend on 
specific inference techniques, none of our main findings with respect to herding and social learning are 
affected by the modelling choice adopted for herding persistency.   
Fifthly, we include a 6-th variable in our VAR to reflect mass media coverage of climate-related 
topics, an indicator that complements the market information available to investors from returns or 
volatility proxies. Boykoff et al., (2020) collect data on media coverage from 55 countries, in several 
languages and from different sources, e.g. newspapers, wire services etc.82 The authors show that 
coverage tends to increase around global policy events, such as the United Nations Framework 
Conventions on Climate Change (COPs), or during natural disasters that are most likely to raise 
awareness among the public and investors. Data is provided as a simple count of media news, articles 
and mentions; we remove the upward trend from the data (in order not to bias the results) using a HP 
filter and denote this variable as NEWS. The impulse responses from the extended 6-variable VAR  (see 
Appendix D, Figure D4) confirm the main findings from the previous section, but also show a negative 
response of herding to a positive shock in NEWS. Despite any possible drawbacks that come with such 
(simple count) data, this new result proves that increased media coverage can improve social learning, 
and therefore have a favourable impact on investors’ behaviour with respect to energy stocks – an idea 
in line with our previous discussion.  
                                                          
82 See https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/icecaps/research/media_coverage/world/index.html. Data is provided as a simple 
count with no additional transformation, and is available on a monthly frequency since 2004, by source, and by region. We 




5. CONCLUSIONS  
Given the current hype associated with ‘green’ investing, and climate change in general, the transition 
to a low-carbon economy entails significant challenges for financial investors trading in energy stocks. 
Whether and how these investors, as a group, learn to deal with various information frictions and to 
navigate through swings in risk appetite and uncertainty is important for their investment choices and 
strategies. Our broader view on risk expands beyond standard financial risk measures, like volatility or 
the common VIX index, to include Knightian uncertainty as well, and particularly policy uncertainty 
(see Baker et al., 2016). In a market context dominated by high risks, uncertainty and information 
frictions, we focus on investors’ herding behaviour, which is associated with situations where social 
learning can lead to significant price distortions. We thus seek to understand investors’ behaviour when 
facing choices that essentially boil down to trading off a conventional investment strategy that is centred 
on oil, for a new one that is ‘greener’, but less predictable.  
We first estimate a proxy for herding towards the market consensus derived from the time-varying 
version of the standard herding detection model of Chang et al., (2000) and next use it to understand 
how herding behaviour in U.S. energy stocks might interact with asset returns, volatility and uncertainty 
proxies. We set up a VAR model and use standard tools such as Granger causality tests and generalised 
impulse response functions to draw conclusions. We find that herding among investors in energy stocks 
responds to ‘green’ volatility shocks, but not to ‘green’ return shocks. In contrast, herding responds to 
shocks in oil returns, but not in oil volatility. Therefore, opting for an investment strategy into an old 
and established technology requires little besides information on returns, but newer investment 
opportunities would require a better information set. This conclusion is further supported by the result 
that, while both oil and ‘green’ assets are sensitive to VIX shocks, only ‘green’ assets are sensitive to 
EPU shocks, which encompass more uncertainty dimensions, spanning across policy-related and 
regulatory realms. The importance of reducing uncertainty and improving information is highlighted 
again in the robustness checks section, where we find that better media coverage of climate-related 
topics can reduce herding in energy sector.  
In the case of ‘green’ assets, uncertainty and information frictions can prevent market prices from 
being fully informative about the associated risk-return trade-offs. This creates a potential for future 
gains because higher uncertainty incentivises (at least some) investors to allocate more attention in 
learning about new risks and opportunities (Kacperczyk et al., 2016; Andrei and Hasler, 2019); such an 
information acquisition behaviour, instead, reduces herding incidence, which can be viewed as a 
(temporary) failure in allocating attention. Our empirical results confirm this interpretation, contributing 
new evidence to the recent booming literature dealing with investors’ attention allocation. 
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Other implications of our findings concern hedging options, which are important mostly for portfolio 
investors. While negative returns on conventional energy assets, such as oil, might look bad for the 
overall portfolio performance, we find that equity investors herd less and are more likely to refocus and 
search for value within the energy sector itself. In addition, since oil is also used as a hedge against 
various shocks and risks, negative oil returns are can be acceptable for some portfolio investors. When 
it comes to ‘green’ investing, unfortunately, and given that ‘green’ volatility is significantly affected by 
policy uncertainty, investors might have no easy hedge to rely on, except again oil, which appears less 
sensitive to this type of uncertainty. It is not surprising therefore to see that many ‘green’ funds today 
are invested in oil, or holding equity shares in big oil companies. 
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Appendix A  
The list below provides details on all the ‘green’ ETFs included in this paper. All these ‘green’ ETFs 
are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, with the exception of Global Energy Efficient Transport 
Index (PTRP) and Clean Edge Global Wind Energy Index (PWND), which are traded on the Nasdaq 
exchange. Data source is Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
 






It replicates the performance of the S&P Global Water Index, which is comprised 
of 50 securities selected based on the relative importance of the global water 
industry within the company’s business model. 
TAN 
(April 2008) 
It replicates the performance of the MAC Global Solar Energy Index, which is 
comprised of 25 securities selected based on the relative importance of the solar 
power within the company’s business model. 
FAN 
(June 2008) 
It replicates the performance of the ISE Global Wind Energy Index, which is 
comprises companies selected based on their actively engagement with the wind 
energy industry, such as the production of distribution of electricity generated by 
wind power, and so on. 
DSI 
(November 2006) 
It replicates the performance of the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index, which provides 




It replicates the performance of the FTSE KLD Select Social Index, which 




It replicates the Ardour Global Index, which provides the exposure of publicly 
traded companies that derive over 50% of total revenues from the alternative 
energy industry, in the globe. 
KWT 
(April 2008) 
It replicates the Ardour Solar Energy Index, which shows the exposure to publicly 




It replicates the Cleantech Index, which is comprised of companies that produces 
any knowledge-based product, service that improves operation, performance, 
productivity, efficiency, and, meanwhile they reduce costs, inputs, energy 
consumption and pollution. 
PBD 
(June 2007) 
It replicates the WilderHill New Energy Global Innovation Index, which is 
comprised companies that focus on green renewable sources of energy and 





It replicates the Wilder NASDAQ OMX Global Energy Efficient Transport Index, 
which is comprised companies engaged in societal transition toward using cleaner, 
less costly, and more efficient means of transportation, worldwide. 
PIO 
(June 2007) 
It replicates the Palisades Global Water Index, which is comprised international 
companies engaged with the provision of potable water, the treatment of water and 
the technology/services directly related to global water consumption. 
PWND 
(July 2008) 
It replicates the NASDAQ OMX Clean Edge Global Wind Energy Index, which is 
comprised of companies engaged with the wind energy industry, such as 
manufacturers, developers, distributors, installers and so on.  
PHO 
(December 2005) 
It replicates the Palisades Global Water Index, which is comprised international 
companies engaged with the provision of potable water, the treatment of water and 
the technology/services directly related to global water consumption. 
PBW 
(March 2005) 
It replicates the WilderHill Clean Energy Index, which is comprised of companies 




It replicates the WilderHill Progressive Energy Index, which is comprised of 







This Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for crude oil and various ‘green’ assets with respect to 
the S&P 500 Energy Index, which is the benchmark index for energy stocks. 
 









Global Water ETF_EQW 
 
ETF_PC1 
Mean -0.135758 0.201691 0.199435 -0.120802 0.13068 -0.007396 0.047149 
Median -0.125961 0.19578 0.227077 -0.031001 0.203419 0.054875 0.271420 
Maximum 19.03458 13.06619 13.01171 13.05091 12.72652 11.95351 13.08835 
Minimum -20.5408 -11.32934 -11.45179 -12.4112 -10.3813 -12.11665 -16.91626 
Std. dev. 3.9212 2.734804 2.748969 3.434494 2.773523 2.924592 3.64903 
Skewness -0.226564 0.081546 0.08116 -0.294353 0.166531 -0.34964 -0.75756 
Kurtosis 5.921579 5.708811 5.63433 4.409422 5.070002 4.982961 5.60703 
Jarque-Bera 152.2382 128.2608 121.3252 40.6339 76.56083 77.0013 158.3562 
Observations 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 
 Note: Sample refers to weekly observations between Jan. 2011 and Dec. 2018. All data in the tabel pertains to returns, in log 
terms, and taken with respect to S&P 500 Energy Index, i.e. relative returns. All indicators listed on the top row are described 
in Data section 3. ETF_EQW denotes the equally weighted (in USD terms) portfolio comprising all 16 ETFs mentioned in 








This appendix displays the bootstrapped GIRFs for the two VARs discussed in section 4.2. Figure C1 
presents the GIRFs from a VAR with oil and ‘green’ returns; figure C2 presents the GIRFs from a VAR 
with oil and ‘green’ conditional volatility. The GIRFs depicted in figure 2 are highlighted with red. 
 
Figure C1. Full set of bootstrapped GIRFs from a VAR with oil and ’green’ returns  
 
Note: The figure displays the bootstrapped GIRFs from a 5-variable VAR specified in the following variables: weekly returns for 
WTI crude oil, denoted as DLOG_CRUDEOIL; weekly returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs, denoted as 
DLOG_ETF_EQW; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy, denoted as -BETA2. Estimation 
sample includes weekly observations from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 2018. A number of 5000 bootstrap replications are used to derive 










Figure C2. Full set of bootstrapped GIRFs from a VAR with oil and ’green’ conditional volatility 
 
Note: The figure displays the bootstrapped GIRFs from a 5-variable VAR specified in the following variables: conditional 
volatility for WTI crude oil denoted as GARCH_CRUDEOIL; conditional volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ 
ETFs, denoted as GARCH_ETF_EQW; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy, denoted as -
BETA2. Estimation sample includes weekly observations from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 2018. A number of 5000 bootstrap replications 












This appendix presents the bootstrapped GIRFs for some of the VARs discussed in section 4.3. 
  






Note: The figure displays the GIRFs with bootstrapped confidence bands and median responses to shocks in returns (i.e. 
DLOG terms) and conditional volatilities (i.e. GARCH terms). For panel A, a 5-variable VAR is estimated, specified in the 
following variables: weekly returns for WTI crude or futures oil; weekly returns for an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ 
ETFs; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy, denoted as -BETA2. For panel B, a 5-
variable VAR is estimated, specified in the following variables: conditional volatility of WTI crude or futures oil; conditional 
volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy, 
denoted as -BETA2. In black, the VAR includes spot crude oil; in red, the VAR includes futures oil. The herding proxy is 
always taken with a negative sign in the VARs, such that an increase in herding is associated with positive values. Estimation 
sample includes weekly observations from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 2018. A number of 5000 bootstrap replications are used to derive 










Note: The figure displays the GIRFs with bootstrapped confidence bands and median responses to shocks in returns (i.e. 
DLOG terms) and conditional volatilities (i.e. GARCH terms). For panel A, a 5-variable VAR is estimated, specified in the 
following variables: weekly returns for WTI crude oil; weekly returns for an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; 
log of VIX index; log of EPU index or EPU Regulation sub-index; and the negative of the herding proxy, denoted as -BETA2. 
For panel B, a 5-variable VAR is estimated, specified in the following variables: conditional volatility for WTI crude oil; 
conditional volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; log of EPU index or EPU Regulation sub-index; 
and the negative of the herding proxy, denoted as -BETA2. In black, the VAR includes the log of EPU index; in red, the VAR 
includes the EPU Regulation sub-index. The herding proxy is always taken with a negative sign in the VARs, such that an 
increase in herding is associated with positive values. Estimation sample includes weekly observations from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 








Figure D3. Selected bootstrapped GIRFs from VARs with the herding proxy filtered out both as AR(1) 





Note: The figure displays the GIRFs with bootstrapped confidence bands and median responses to shocks in returns (i.e. 
DLOG terms) and conditional volatilities (i.e. GARCH terms). For panel A, a 5-variable VAR is estimated, specified in the 
following variables: weekly returns for WTI crude oil; weekly returns for an equally-weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; 
log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy. For panel B, a 5-variable VAR is estimated, 
specified in the following variables: conditional volatility for WTI crude oil; conditional volatility of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy. In black, the VAR includes the herding 
proxy filtered out as a unit root process, or I(1), as in section 4.1 (thus corresponding to Figure 2 in the main text); in red, the 
VAR includes the herding proxy filtered out as an AR(1) process. The herding proxy is always taken with a negative sign in 
the VARs, such that an increase in herding is associated with positive values. Estimation sample includes weekly observations 
from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 2018. A number of 5000 bootstrap replications are used to derive median responses along with (+/- 2 











Note: The figure displays the GIRFs with bootstrapped confidence bands and median responses to shocks in returns (i.e. 
DLOG terms), conditional volatilities (i.e. GARCH terms) and media coverage of climate-related topics – a variable we denote 
as NEWS. For panel A, a 5-variable VAR and a 6-variable VAR are estimated, where the latter additionally includes the 
NEWS variable; both VARs share the following variables: weekly WTI crude oil returns; weekly returns for an equally-
weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy denoted as 
-BETA2. For panel B, a 5-variable VAR and a 6-variable VAR are estimated, where the latter additionally includes the NEWS 
variable; both VARs share the following variables: conditional volatility for WTI crude oil; conditional volatility of an equally 
weighted portfolio of 16 ‘green’ ETFs; log of VIX index; log of EPU index; and the negative of the herding proxy denoted as 
-BETA2. In black, we display the GIRFs from the 5-variables VAR (thus corresponding to Figure 2 in the main text); in red, 
we display the GIRFs from the 6-variable VAR, which includes the NEWS variable. The herding proxy is always taken with 
a negative sign in the VARs, such that an increase in herding is associated with positive values. Estimation sample includes 
weekly observations from Apr. 2011 to Dec. 2018. A number of 5000 bootstrap replications are used to derive median 
responses along with (+/- 2 standard deviations) confidence bands. 
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